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AUSTRALIAN SOCIAL SCIENCES ✓ OUTLOOK

**Journal of the Australian
Institute of International Affairs**

**DECEMBER, 1960
Volume 14 Number 3**

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Registered in Australia for transmission by post as a periodical.

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THE AUSTRALIAN OUTLOOK is published in April, August and December each year. The Institute wishes to acknowledge the financial contribution which the Social Science Research Council has made to the journal since 1959.

SUBSCRIPTION RATES: in Australia £1 a year or 7/- a copy; in the United Kingdom 16/- a year; in U.S.A. \$2.25 a year. Subscriptions should be addressed to the Commonwealth Secretary, The Australian Institute of International Affairs, 177 Collins Street, Melbourne.

ARTICLES SUBMITTED FOR PUBLICATION should be addressed to The Editor, Australian National University, Canberra, A.C.T., book reviews to The Review Editor, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria.

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THE OBSERVER

"To inform the informed"

Is The Observer achieving the purpose it has set before its "overseas" section — to inform informed Australians about international affairs? Here is an extract from an article on Christ and Mahommed in Africa, written by Neil McInnes in Paris and published in the issue of September 3, 1960.

"Deeper than that, it is too early yet to write off paganism just because it dons the dress of Christianity or Islam. The result is often a mixture (syncretism, the theologians say) that leaves one wondering who has converted whom. When conversion ceases to be a prestige-weapon in African politics and a social prop for these days of revolutionary change, we shall see what it means in religious terms. It may turn out that the foreign faiths have been grafted to a plant they could not extirpate. The flood-tide of African racialism is today flowing into every channel that can relieve it, grabbing at every weapon that can express its violence and vitality to the world at large; it grabs at religions as

at political systems or economic nostrums. (Think of Patrice Lumumba's fantastic series of contradictions during the Congo crisis, throwing his country into the arms of Moscow one day and Wall Street the next.) Millions of negroes may recite Koranic formulae in an Arabic they do not understand, while millions of others get touchy about the meaning of Holy Communion. Both attitudes serve a pressing human need, but under them the vast fund of paganism, blind religious fervour, and native prophetism perhaps remains intact. The religious future of Africa has not been fixed by foreign missionaries any more than its political future by colonial administrators."

Published fortnightly — THE OBSERVER — Price 1/6.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 'PRESENCE' FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

T. A. PYMAN*

EVENTS IN THE TERRITORY OF the Congo, formerly administered by the Belgian Government, have focused world attention on the role of the United Nations as an instrument for executive action in a situation threatening international security. The process of creating the 'UN presence' in that territory (in the form of the UN Force) has not differed in basic character from earlier precedents (e.g., in the Middle East) although the situation of internal dispute between factions in the various provinces has complicated and (at the time of writing) still threatens to jeopardise the carrying out of the second stage of the whole operation, namely following up the withdrawal of Belgian troops by assisting to preserve law and order throughout the territory.

The term 'United Nations presence' has come to mean, in international parlance, all the various forms of functional representation which have been tried, or may normally be devised, under Chapter VI of the UN Charter which deals with the peaceful settlement of disputes. The Secretary-General claimed in an address in Copenhagen in May, 1959, that the UN was filling a vital need in maintaining peace through executive measures.

The history of UN executive activity for the peaceful settlement of disputes is divisible into two distinct periods.

(i) The period from 1945-54 when UN activity for the peaceful settlement of disputes was very much controlled and directed by a 'built-in' majority of governments led, and strongly influenced by, the United States and determined to set limits to Communist expansionism. Action taken during this time reflected the pressures of the 'cold war'.

(ii) The period since 1955 introduced by a substantial increase in the number of member governments and characterised by the emergence of a Secretary-General prepared to take initiatives and by the disappearance of the automatic voting majority for the position of the Western powers led by the United States. It has steadily become clearer during this period that the task of settling

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THE UNITED NATIONS 'PRESENCE'

international disputes through the UN is to be based upon the assumption that it intervenes as an agency free from commitment or partisanship and is not dominated by any single country or group of countries.

Very early in the history of the organization it became apparent that a collective security system under Ch. VII would not be achieved. The fundamental differences of opinion between Soviet Russia on the one hand and the Western Powers, led by the United States, on the other, were too deep to allow this most direct manifestation of the 'UN Presence', namely an international fighting force, to become a reality. The contribution of the UN, therefore, to the national security of member governments had to be found in measures for the reduction of tensions and the blunting of the sharp edges of conflict between disputing States. Member States, it should be remembered, are obliged under the Charter to attempt to settle their differences by normal diplomatic methods without resort to international intervention. Only 'tough' disputes, in short, those for which no direct bilateral solution has proved possible, may find their way into the UN fold.

THE PERIOD 1946-54

During the first period, from the inception of the UN down to the retirement of the first Secretary-General, some basic techniques were introduced for handling, under Ch. VI of the Charter, difficult international dispute situations. Before noting instances of these it is as well to recall the general characteristics of international relationships in the period under consideration. It was the disillusioning time of the active 'cold war' era. Within all too short a period the exuberant relations of victorious military allies had given place to a coldly calculated endeavour to protect one's own group of governments from the threat apparently posed by the opposing group.

Within the UN itself the majority of member governments clearly favoured the attitude and cause of the Western governments, led by the United States. The United States was allied with three other permanent members of the Security Council (France, United Kingdom and Nationalist China) and opposed only by Soviet Russia. The United States-led group could be certain throughout this period that, in the event of an issue being raised which involved any question of the security or strength of the non-Communist group, it could reckon on a clear majority within the Security Council and the General Assembly—the latter being just as important for debating major dispute situations because of the inhibiting effects of the veto in the Council.

In this period certain distinctive, if fairly obvious, techniques were

developed. They may be described and illustrated under these heads:

(a) *Observation*. In the early years of UN activity under Ch. VI of the Charter it became a natural requirement that the facts of a dispute situation should be investigated and clarified so that a basis for decision could be laid. In December 1946 when the Greek Government complained that border violations were occurring in its northern provinces involving Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania the Security Council sent out a fact-finding mission.¹ The report of this mission led the Assembly to over-ride Russian opposition and establish the UN Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB as it was called) in October 1947.² This committee set up headquarters in Salonika (1948-52) and kept observers in the area until the insurrection faded out.

Under this general heading must be mentioned another example of an observation agency which though established in this earlier period has continued to function. This is the Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) established in 1948 and still operating along the Arab-Israel Armistice Lines on both sides (except for the border between Egypt and Israel where UNEF now operates³). UNTSO illustrates not only the investigatory aspect of the 'observation' technique but also the further element of 'interposition', the interposing between disputants of representatives of (in this case) the UN Security Council to oversee the conduct of a truce or armistice agreement. Another leading example of the 'investigation and interposition' technique is the military observer group in Kashmir which has been reporting for the past twelve years on a static cease-fire line.⁴

(b) *Conciliation*. This technique is characterized by the endeavour, through the UN 'presence', to reconcile conflicting viewpoints as between disputant governments. The endeavour to conciliate was attempted at an early stage of UN reconciliation efforts, e.g., in Kashmir Sir Owen Dixon was appointed by the UN and accepted by both parties.⁵ His conciliation efforts, though they did not achieve their principal objective, had real value in revealing very clearly the basic disagreements between the two Governments concerned and the lack of any real prospect of an early adjustment of the conflicting view-points.

In Indonesia, the process of conciliation was entrusted to a Committee of the Security Council (Committee of Good Offices) with

1. *Year Book of the United Nations* 1946-47, p. 361.

2. *Year Book of the United Nations* 1947-48, p. 298.

3. *Year Book of the United Nations* 1947-48, p. 415.

4. Established in 1948 (see *Year Book of the United Nations* 1947-48, p. 398).

5. *Year Book of the United Nations* 1950, pp. 304-13.

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one member appointed by each disputant and the third appointed by the two first selected. Working 'in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations' (Article 24(2) of the UN Charter) this Committee made a very real contribution to the ultimate settlement reached between the Indonesian and Netherlands Governments.⁶

(c) *Armed Intervention.* The classic example in this first period, is, of course, the Korean Force. For present purposes suffice it to recall that the Security Council, following a report from the UN Commission on Korea (June 1950) and in the temporary, voluntary, absence of the Soviet representative, recommended to members that they furnish assistance to repel the North Korean attacks (United States forces had already been ordered into action on the strength of an earlier resolution declaring the invasion to be a breach of the peace). The United States was then asked to name the Supreme Commander of the unified UN command. United States forces constituted 90 per cent of the total Force and it was the financial and military strength of the strongest member of UN that enabled the organisation to contain the North Korean attack and protect the independence of South Korea.

It was not surprising that, in the atmosphere of 'cold-war' tension and stress, efforts should be made to institutionalise certain techniques which had proved of value. The 'Uniting for Peace' Resolution of 1950 set up a Peace Observation Commission to observe and report upon situations anywhere in the world likely to endanger international peace. This Commission was used once (in the Balkans in 1952) but has never, apart from that instance, been activated by the Security Council or the General Assembly. Instead it has remained merely a pre-constituted Commission of fourteen Member States waiting in vain for an assignment. The fact that it was pre-selected at the height of the 1947-54 'cold-war' fever was probably a big factor in the eyes of many governments militating against its use.

Similarly, in the same 'Uniting for Peace' resolution Member States were asked to hold armed contingents of their services ready for use as a UN unit—since the Charter scheme of military contribution under a Military Staff Committee had not materialised. This would have enabled the Assembly to act with force if needed. A very poor response to this request was received from the majority of UN members.

The lesson to be derived from these two unsuccessful efforts to 'streamline' UN dispute settlement machinery was that many of the governments backed the anti-Communist group, led by the United

6. *Year Book of the United Nations* 1947-48, p. 368.

States, by voting in favour of resolutions condemning Communist activity threatening peace. They were not prepared, however, to support moves to arm the United Nations with instruments that would provide an effective means of exerting pressure in circumstances in which a majority of member governments wanted to exercise it. There were, in short, many anti-Communist governments which feared that pressure might be exerted against them by a majority group in the UN. The 'neutral' or 'non-committed' governments were, of course, even more strongly opposed to vesting the majority with such possibilities of pressure. They feared a resort to force before all possibilities of reconciliation were tried.

PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE PERIOD 1946-54

What, then, were the main features of this period so far as they can be estimated at the end of 1954? Some success had been achieved in bringing actual hostilities to an end, the principal examples being in Palestine, in Kashmir and in Indonesia. Observation machinery had assured that major outbreaks did not recur in Palestine and Kashmir, no mean achievement when regard is paid to the depth of feeling between the opposing parties. In Indonesia, conciliation techniques had helped in achieving a settlement. No progress, however, had been made in the Palestine and Kashmir situations towards any adjustment of bitterly conflicting view-points.

The balance of the UN's efforts in the sphere of international disputes had been concerned mainly with 'cold-war' affected situations in which the majority anti-Communist governments sought to utilise the resources of the UN to set limits to what they regarded as the threatening advance of Communist spheres of influence. Hence UN bodies found themselves in such places of tension and conflict as the Balkans and Korea. NATO powers, under United States leadership, normally took the initiative in proposing such moves. Whilst direct major Power clashes were avoided UN executive agencies had little opportunity, or motive, to attempt a diplomacy of reconciliation.

NEW FACTORS IN THE SECOND PERIOD 1954-1960

In the second period of UN activity as an agency for the peaceful settlement of disputes, from the end of 1954 or early 1955 onwards, certain new factors became significant at an early stage. First, the theme of 'co-existence' between Communist and non-Communist groups began to have some effect on relationships between governments and, therefore, on their speeches and actions in the UN organs. Secondly, a flood of new members was admitted to the UN commencing with sixteen such admissions in 1955 (only eleven members had been admitted in the previous nine years). More have been added since then, total membership passing the eighty mark in the process.

THE UNITED NATIONS 'PRESENCE'

The consequence was that any 'built-in' majority for the NATO powers was virtually eliminated. There will be nearly one hundred members by the end of 1960. Thirdly, in 1953 a new Secretary-General was appointed who had a clear belief in the possibility, and virtue, of the United Nations serving a 'diplomacy of reconciliation'. As he said later, in 1958, the 'tendency in the United Nations is to wear away, or break down differences, thus helping towards solutions which approach the common interest and application of the principles of the Charter'. Moreover, the application of the technique of 'quiet' or private diplomacy became a feature of the new Secretary-General's method and manifested itself in a willingness to take initiatives towards peaceful settlement when such actions appeared, in his judgment, to be justified as a means of impartially serving Charter objectives. It must be appreciated, too, that the Charter vested considerably greater powers and responsibilities in the Secretary-General than the Covenant had given the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, e.g., Article 99 even gives him power to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which, in his opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. The Assembly's rules of procedure enable him to place an item on the draft agenda of that organ and to make written or oral statements to it.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECOND PERIOD

A review of the history of the past five years brings out the extent to which Secretariat initiative has played a role in meeting the threats to peace arising from disputes between governments and has thus given the 'UN presence' a very real significance. All three factors abovementioned (co-existence, new members and the election of a new Secretary-General with a new outlook) resulted in the application of techniques that were not new in their generic description (e.g., observation, interposition, conciliation) but which did have a different inspiration and method. The first real indication of a change came when the Secretary-General accepted a suggestion from the General Assembly that he seek the release of imprisoned United States airmen in Communist China (December 1954). He conducted the whole project with a minimum of publicity and succeeded in securing the release of the eleven captives. From that time onward there has been little doubt that the Secretary-General is a force to be reckoned with in the sphere of diplomatic adjustments and relationships.

It is useful to consider a few leading examples, before attempting to assess the principal characteristics of this activity in the last few years.

(a) *Observation.* Perhaps the classic example in this second period is the UN Observation Group in Lebanon during the United Arab Republic-Lebanese friction in 1958. The Security Council decided, on 11th June, 1958, to despatch the Group to Lebanon and authorised the Secretary-General to take the steps necessary to carry out the decision. The first military observers (borrowed from UNTSO) began to arrive on the following day. The three Executive members (from Ecuador, India and Norway) were appointed and on the job within a week. A team of 600 military observers drawn from 21 countries was eventually gathered together and through fixed observation posts, reconnaissance parties and aerial observation, all of which took time to locate and organise, a real endeavour was made to ensure that there was no illegal infiltration of arms or men across the border with Syria. As well as observing the situation the Group also had the effect of acting as a deterrent to a resort to force.⁷ The functioning of UNOGIL illustrates a different feature in the application of observation techniques in this second period, that is, the extent to which the implementation of general principles, established by decision of a UN organ, has been left to the Secretary-General and detached from the supervision of governments that had been chosen invariably in the first decade of UN activity by the vote of the controlling majority. The Secretary-General, however, to avoid charges of isolated control over execution of policy, followed the practice in the Lebanese affair of consulting an informal advisory committee of seven member governments none of whom were great powers. In fact, it was the same group as that which he consulted in connection with the Suez incident to which reference is made below.

(b) *Conciliation.* It is convenient, at this point, to follow through the UNOGIL activity by reference to the action taken by the Secretary-General, in pursuing the initial decision on observation, by presenting, as an effort at conciliation, a plan for settlement of the Lebanon-Jordan situations. This plan was presented to the Special Assembly which met after a Soviet veto had blocked further action in the Security Council. Talks by the Secretary-General with the governments chiefly concerned, especially with the Arab States, led to the Assembly requesting him to make 'such practical arrangements as would help in upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter . . . and thereby facilitate the early withdrawal of foreign troops' from Lebanon and Jordan. From this point began the direct intervention of the Secretary-General, as the chosen agent of the UN with the intent of promoting, through consultation, a general good neigh-

7. For UN Secretariat's account of UNOGIL activities and assessment of its efficacy see *United Nations Review*, January 1959 (p. 22).

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bour policy in relation to Lebanon and Jordan and in the Middle East generally.⁸ (This was necessarily limited, in the first instance, to relations between the Arab States as no one believed that the Secretary-General could make any immediate impression on relations between the Arab States and Israel.)

The Secretary-General in September 1958 visited Amman, Cairo, Bagdad and Beirut to sound out the intentions of the Governments regarding their Assembly resolution pledges of non-interference in each others' affairs, etc., and abstention from action calculated to change established systems of government. He decided that a force of the UNEF type and an observation group of the UNOGIL character would be inappropriate in Jordan but that a special representative should be appointed with ambassadorial status to keep within purview developments under the resolution and to prepare for any subsequent action by the UN which might be rendered necessary by these developments. Thus was created the Spinelli Mission in Jordan. At the same time it was agreed that another representative of the Secretary-General would visit the capitals of other neighbouring Arab countries 'as need be'. The rule was established that normally the communications of these representatives to the Secretary-General would be confidential and would not be published unless a threat to the peace was involved. Thus the 'quiet' diplomacy of the Secretary-General began to function in the Middle East. It is a little too soon to be evaluating the effects of this diplomacy but indications over the period of just on two years are that the practical arrangements made by the Secretary-General have, at least, prevented any serious deterioration in a situation that was in mid-1958 extremely dangerous and threatening.

Similarly, in the South East Asian area governments have turned to the Secretary-General for assistance in settling disputes. At the end of 1958, Cambodia and Thailand became involved in certain border difficulties which led to a suspension of diplomatic relations between the two countries. They invited the Secretary-General to send a special representative to assist them to find a solution. The Secretary-General consulted with the Security Council and then accepted the invitation. With the help of the good offices of his representative, diplomatic relations were resumed in February 1959. The Secretary-General promised continued interest from the UN to help the Governments' purpose of achieving greater stability in the area.⁹

8. The Secretary-General's Report on his Mission to the Middle East—see *United Nations Review*, November 1958, p. 11.

9. See *Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization* (June 1958-June 1959), Supplement No. 1 (A/4132) pp. 25-6.

(c) *Interposition.* The United Nations Emergency Force which was deployed on the armistice line between Israel and the United Arab Republic in November 1956 provides the most dramatic and well-known illustration of the use of the 'UN presence' as a stabilising and peace-maintaining instrument.¹⁰ In summary, the principal features of UNEF are these:—

(i) It was created by executive action of the Secretary-General. The Secretariat consulted directly with possible contributory governments regarding the volume and nature of the forces to be made available. The Commander of the force is responsible to the UN, as such, through the Secretary-General and is given authority to recruit officers from member States. It thus derives from a basically different concept from that governing the UN Korean Force under which a particular country was entrusted with the responsibility of providing for the international force.

(ii) The consent of the government concerned, that is the government on whose territory the Force was to operate, was required before the Force could be disposed on that territory.

(iii) The Force is para-military in character and much more than an observer corps but it is in no sense a military force exercising through force of arms even temporary control over the territory in which it is stationed.

(iv) It is composed of national contingents accepted by the Secretary-General from those voluntarily offered by member States. Military personnel belonging to permanent members of the Security Council or to any country with a special interest in the conflict have been excluded. No *impasse* developed with the host country (Egypt) in regard to the composition of the Force.

(v) Excessive dependence on any one contributing State has been avoided.

(vi) Administration, finance, communications, maintenance and other services have been taken care of within the framework of the UN Secretariat.

(vii) Formally, UNEF is treated as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly.

The story of the establishment of the Force does not need retelling in detail.¹¹ An Assembly resolution of 2nd November, 1956, was directed towards obtaining an immediate cessation of hostilities and a halting of the movement of military forces and arms into the

10. A study by the Secretary-General of the main characteristics of UNEF will be found in UN General Assembly (1958) Document A/3943.

11. For a brief but useful account see Nicholas, *The United Nations as a Political Institution*, pp. 159-163.

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area. Such an objective required extraordinary measures. Between 4-7th November, after consultations between the Secretary-General and key governments (especially Canada) the UN Commander was appointed, provision was made for the establishment of an initial small staff of officers drawn from UNTSO and for the recruitment of additional staff-officers. Guiding principles for the role, composition and administration of the Force were also agreed upon.

A most important innovation designed to provide the Secretary-General with a means of day to day (if not, in the early stages, hour to hour) communication with member governments was the establishment of an Advisory Committee of seven governments, all contributors of units and very much concerned in the arrangements for the Force (Canada, Norway, India, Columbia, Ceylon, Pakistan and Brazil). The Assembly entrusted this body with the task of guiding the Secretary-General in the carrying out of the Assembly's general directives. This body has met informally and its findings have been transmitted to the Assembly through the Secretary-General who has made regular reports on the UNEF operations.

UNEF forces were moved into position with remarkable rapidity — the first elements arrived on 12th November in Egypt followed by advance units of troops on 15th November. This early period of activity was characterised, also, by the successful negotiation of a satisfactory Status of Forces Agreement with Egypt, no mean diplomatic feat on the part of the Secretary-General.

After securing the withdrawal of the armed forces of France, the United Kingdom and Israel from Egyptian Territory, the Force has continued to be deployed along the Egypt-Israel Armistice Demarcation Line, in the Gaza area and to the south along the international frontier. There is little doubt that it has made a real contribution to the avoidance of major incidents and a renewal of hostilities. As part also of its general 'executive' responsibility a UN salvage force cleared the Suez Canal, completing the task within four to five months.

The situations that have been reviewed have all been instances of executive action by the United Nations to meet threats to the peace through a process of reconciliation of disputing parties within the spirit and intent of the provisions of Ch. VI of the Charter. Any account of the increasing resort to the Secretary-General for the establishment of constructive international machinery to be used in the relief of threatening situations would be incomplete if no reference were made to another situation in which Secretariat action has assumed a slightly different form. In this case it has not been a matter of the Secretary-General helping to create 'political'

machinery of an observatory or quasi-military or conciliatory type: it has rather been a matter of organising technical aid to assist a particular government to tackle its grave economic, social and administrative problems. Such problems appear to have lain at the root of the 'political' difficulties which have led to instability and civil disturbances within the country concerned, namely Laos.

Allegations by the Laotian authorities were made to the UN suggesting that there had been crossings of the frontier by regular troops of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and that the regime in North Vietnam had lent support to rebel units (Pathet Lao) in some provinces. The Security Council confronted with these charges appointed a Sub-Committee (the appointment was regarded as a procedural decision and therefore not subject to the veto) to investigate the allegations. This was a Committee of the older type. It was some time since such a body had been constituted reflecting as it did the preponderance of political opinion in the Security Council. The Committee of Investigation was clearly obliged to proceed to Laos to enquire into the allegations. Its report was non-committal as it found that the information submitted to it did not establish that there had been crossings of the frontier by North Vietnamese regular troops. It did find, however, evidence of centralised co-ordination of hostile operations by rebel units. Following these rather inconclusive findings the Secretary-General himself, seeking 'an independent and full personal knowledge of the problem' visited Laos. The President of the Security Council described the visit as being based 'on the general responsibilities of the Secretary-General under the Charter'. Then came the appointment by the Secretary-General of Mr. Tuomioja, the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Europe, to study the role UN economic and technical assistance could play in furthering the economic growth and stability of Laos. His recommendations have been followed up by visits of UN Technical Assistance officials and the 'UN presence' has been further emphasised by the appointment of a Co-ordinator of UN activities in Laos.¹²

At the time of the preparation of this article the UN had become involved in what the Secretary-General has described as 'its biggest single effort under UN colours organised and directed by the UN itself', namely the establishment, deployment and functioning of the UN Congo Force. The basic features of the whole exercise resembled closely the previous major UN effort after the Suez trouble. The Congo Force was recruited, organised and administered by the Secretary-General. It was described as a 'peace' force and

12. See *United Nations Review*, December 1959 at p. 2.

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not a fighting force with the objective of providing the Congolese Government 'with such military assistance as may be necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government, with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks'.¹³ As a first step United Nations forces were to replace Belgian units. The situation was vastly complicated, however, by the absence of a central authority capable of exercising control over the whole Congo area and was rendered even more difficult by the presence of disputing leaders and groups. The UN could not, by the nature of its intervention, take sides in any civil conflict. As in the case of UNEF no units were accepted from major nations and an Advisory Committee was established, representative of Governments contributing to the Congo Force, to act as a consultant body for the Secretary-General's benefit.

The major issues at the beginning of September seemed to be whether neighbouring independent governments could be persuaded that the value of an international solution of the Congo problem outweighed any possible advantages that might be secured from a nationalist approach to the situation; also, whether the ambitions of local political leaders could be directed towards, and even reconciled by, the objective of creating an independent and viable state. Behind this situation the UN and its Specialized Agencies stood ready to tackle the costly and difficult task of assisting to create such a state by at least co-ordinating the technical aid which the Congo would require and, if possible, providing a large part of it from UN Technical Co-operation sources.

The process of creating an effective UN 'presence' organised and directed by the Secretary-General, began in 1955, was tested strenuously in 1956-8 in the Middle East, and in 1960 faced its most challenging test. No matter what the ultimate result might be sufficient had been achieved in the Congo by the end of August, 1960, to reveal that the pattern of operation previously laid down represented a basis on which to plan effective executive activity in the interests of stability and progress in the Congo. Whether UN machinery would be allowed to assist in achieving this objective or whether other factors would intervene to force the international medium out of the picture remained to be seen. All that could be said at mid-September was that the UN machinery had survived several crises, had won strong support and had gained most, if not all, of its initial objective.

13. *United Nations Newsletter*, Vol. IV, No. 28 (15 July, 1960, p. 2).

THE PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF UN EXECUTIVE ACTIVITY IN THE SECOND PERIOD

It is barely four years since the Secretary-General began to assume, quietly but firmly, the responsibility for leading the UN towards a more positive and clear-cut role as a force for the maintenance of peace. These four years (1956-60) have been marked by a substantial increase in the diplomatic and operational functions of the Secretariat. It has, in short, become one of the significant organs of the UN, working, albeit, within the framework of resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly which have laid down very broad principles of guidance but little else.

Not only has the Secretary-General assumed a more independent position as a spokesman for the UN but the organisation itself has developed an independent status and with it a capacity to claim freedom from partisan interest. This characteristic has, in turn, enabled the UN to act effectively in situations where its freedom from commitment has been a feature without which its intervention would not have been acceptable and its influence would have been minimal.

The fact that the instrumentalities planned, organised and operated by the UN (e.g., UNEF, the Spinelli Mission, UNOGIL, the Congo Force, etc.) have been rapidly assembled and efficiently administered has added further prestige to the Secretariat and thereby to the UN itself.

One basic consideration which the Secretary-General appears to have had in mind throughout has been the need for consultation with member governments through their permanent representatives in New York and their top level delegates when they are present at major meetings. Indeed this has been a cardinal feature of the Secretary-General's conception of the UN's new role. At times criticism has been voiced, and apprehensions raised, regarding the alleged 'isolation' of the Secretary-General, the inference being that he is becoming too remote from governments and independent of them in his activities. The record of the Secretary-General's actions in various crisis situations does suggest that he has carefully maintained especially close links with the governments chiefly concerned and with those other governments which, he judged, might be in a position to render help. His Advisory Committees for UNEF, UNOGIL and Congo operations were drawn from such governments as these.

It is true that the Secretary-General has devoted particular attention to consultation with representatives of middle and smaller powers. He has done so deliberately, it seems, because of his conviction that they are in a better position to participate in arrangements by which delicate adjustments in relationships between dis-

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putant governments are implemented. Participation by any major powers would, in his estimation, only complicate the position and prejudice the prospects of settlement.

Another essential feature of the Secretary-General's technique has been the appointment of diplomatic representatives (e.g., the Spinelli appointment in Jordan) to act as advisers to certain member governments, and as sources of information for the Secretary-General in regard to the situations in which the UN, as such, has become involved. Such appointments in themselves reflect the growth in the positive peace-promotion activity of the Secretariat.

A more recent development, of real significance from the point of view of the extension of UN diplomatic activity, has been the commencement of forms of 'preventive' activity. The Secretary-General, faced with situations of tension and instability in a member country, or newly independent State, has responded by evolving plans for immediate economic and other forms of aid. Such measures (as, for example, those being taken in Laos and planned in the Congo) are distinct from the normal technical co-operation activities of the UN. They are designed as extraordinary measures to meet extreme political situations and are, in a sense, new expressions of UN executive activity.

LIMITATIONS ON UN EXECUTIVE ACTION

Whilst appreciating fully the importance of the developments described above, particularly the progress made since 1955 in rendering more effective and penetrating the 'peace-enforcement' capacity of the UN, it is necessary to set these encouraging aspects in perspective. This is done not to minimise the significance of the developments in relation to the 'UN presence' but to give proper perspective by conceding the limits to the system of international peace or security created, first, by major-power differences, and, secondly, by the unreadiness of many member governments to accept their obligation to co-operate in the establishment of peace enforcement machinery.

The latter difficulty, which is, perhaps, less serious in its immediate impact than the former, is demonstrated by the unwillingness of a large number of member governments to pay their allocated contributions towards the expenses of UNEF. This reluctance has not been confined to the Communist bloc countries which have consistently refused to accept UNEF as a legal body. The *Economist* in its issue of 26th September, 1959, commented that 'the reluctance of member nations to furnish funds suggests a lack of understanding and responsibility that is far more serious than the failure to pay up in hard cash'. This factor could also pose some extraordinarily difficult problems for the Congo Force.

Similar attitudes manifested themselves when the Assembly debated a report of the Secretary-General at the 1958 Assembly in which he indicated the principles and conclusions emerging from a study of the UNEF operation, as a guide for any future efforts of a similar kind by the UN. The Secretary-General was clearly anxious to obtain endorsement of the principles and rules derived from UNEF experience and thus to provide a prepared basis from which resources of manpower and equipment could be smoothly and rapidly organised to meet urgent needs for UN intervention. (One cannot help noting, at this point, that the existence of such understandings and arrangements as those envisaged in the Secretary-General's 1958 report on UNEF might well have been of considerable advantage in the present Congo situation.) The majority of member governments were not prepared to endorse the principles and rules derived from UNEF experience. Latin-American and Afro-Asian (as well as Communist bloc) support was lacking. The Afro-Asian group seemed to fear that such a force might mean that the UN would be put in a position of being able to exert pressure on small States in the interests of a majority of UN members. Latin-American representatives appeared to share this apprehension. The result was that nothing was done about endorsing the principles and rules suggested by the Secretary-General. There was little doubt, however, that they would be followed by the Secretary-General when a force of the UNEF type was requested.¹⁴

The United Nations has been deliberately shielded from the wrangling of the Great Powers over the World War II peace settlements. The United States, the Soviet and the United Kingdom agreed, prior to the 1945 San Francisco Conference, to separate the peace-making from Charter-drafting. Communist and non-Communist powers have assumed and retained positions of control in areas the future destiny of which has been left undecided because of the inability of the major powers to agree upon the terms of settlement. Major crises arising from this circumstance have, fortunately, been infrequent. In the first Berlin crisis UN intervention was not sought although an understanding was eventually reached largely as a result of informal discussion between UN Delegations of the powers concerned. Attempts to use the UN in an executive role in the Hungarian crisis failed. The Soviet authorities (and their Hungarian allies) would not countenance any approach from the Secretary-General or from other nominees of the General Assembly. Military observation groups and, at an earlier stage, a

14. For a discussion of the Secretary-General's study see *Australia's Neighbours*, March-April 1959.

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neutral nations commission have helped to avoid further resort to hostilities in Korea but no progress has been made by the UN bodies towards achieving the avowed UN objective of unification. In the case of German unification, and the problem of the future of Berlin, suggestions have been made, over the past year or so, for bringing the UN into the picture in some executive capacity, proposals varying from the introduction of an international military force to the creation of an observation mission to check on the due discharge of any agreements covering the rights of West-German citizens or the supervision of such arrangements as those limiting the broadcasting of propaganda material. The Secretary-General has shown considerable caution regarding all such proposals especially the idea of a military force for Berlin. He will clearly need to be convinced that the major underlying political issues have been unambiguously settled before he supports an executive role for the UN. It does not seem very likely that the UN will be able to play any considerable part, in the immediate future, in relation to the amelioration of situations in which the Great Powers find themselves in basic disagreement and where their interests are in direct conflict. Where these interests are opposed, but less directly so, as e.g. in the Middle East, the UN has been able to exert a major influence in favour of peaceful settlement through the executive means already discussed.

The hope is that in Africa the UN will be able to play a similar role. The developments in the Congo situation, up till the middle of September, had not confirmed that the organisation would be given a real opportunity to exert a constructive influence. Indeed, the attitude of one major power, the USSR, threatened the whole basis of UN operations and raised serious issues regarding further progress in UN executive activity. Personal attacks on the Secretary-General's impartiality posed the question whether action based on international foundations could survive great power antagonism. It seems that the answer may lie, in the last resort, in the response of the large Afro-Asian group of member nations and their willingness to back the Secretary-General's initiatives and actions and thereby to express complete confidence in his record.¹⁵

To sum up the position attained by the UN in the field of peaceful settlement of international disputes, it is clear that UN executive

15. The General Assembly's resolution, adopted unanimously on 20 September, 1960, indicated continuing strong support of the Afro-Asian Group for the Secretary-General and his handling of the Congo position. It also represented a decided rebuff to the USSR which had engaged in strong attacks on the Secretary-General during the previous week.

machinery has achieved considerable success in areas such as the Middle East in terminating hostilities, preventing further major outbreaks and making limited head-way towards the resolution of underlying conflicts. This advance has been made in areas in which Great Power antagonisms are an underlying factor. The UN method has been to work through the consent of the governments concerned. If consent is not forthcoming then the UN is powerless to act, hence the inability of the organisation, as yet, to act executively in disputes (e.g., Hungary) in which the direct interests of a Great Power are involved and its consent to UN intervention is lacking. The effectiveness of UN executive activity has deepened as the Secretary-General has increasingly assumed a directing role in the machinery arrangements made to meet any disputed situation. He has acted not on the basis of any majority plan but rather on his independent estimate of the machinery required and appropriate and after consultation with the powers which he has considered could be helpful in the situation. Finally, a system of appointing representatives in the troubled areas has provided the Secretary-General with facilities for gathering information and exerting a conciliatory influence.

The decisions taken by the General Assembly and the Security Council entrusting the Secretary-General with special diplomatic and operational functions, within very general terms of reference, have developed methods of approach which may now be considered part of a common law of organised international co-operation. This development has particular significance for the emerging African states which might well find it difficult to live without the UN, which acts as a guardian of their independence and neutrality as well as a source for economic and technical aid resources to be drawn from the world outside.¹⁶ The importance for the Western Powers of this contribution to stability in Africa requires no emphasis. Total African backing of the UN effort in the Congo is, of course, the only factor that can bring order out of confusion in that situation and, at the same time, deter outside powers from interfering to counter the suspected machinations of the other side in the 'cold war'.

16. See, e.g., the London *Economist's* observation on this point at p. 1063 of its edition of 17 September, 1960. This journal has consistently reiterated since the Congo crisis began the theme of African dependence on the United Nations.

THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH EAST ASIAN STATES

R. G. BOYD*

THE FORMATION OF AN ASSOCIATION of South East Asian States, comprising Malaya, Thailand and the Philippines, was announced by the Malayan Prime Minister, Tengku Abdul Rahman, on 27 July.¹ The Association does not have any formal sanction, but it is based on a general understanding that the members will co-operate substantially with each other in economic and cultural matters. Co-ordination in economic planning, joint efforts to stabilise world prices for South East Asian primary exports, and the promotion of a common market were among the types of co-operation which had been envisaged by spokesmen of the member governments before the Association was launched.² As yet, however, there appears to be no commitment in principle to these objectives, and the Association's Secretariat, which is to plan projects for common action, is to operate on a rather *ad hoc* basis. An advantage of this, in the opinion of Tengku Abdul Rahman, is that it will make participation look more feasible to other South East Asian countries.

The new Association represents an alternative to the South East Asian Friendship and Economic Treaty which Tengku Abdul Rahman had proposed while visiting the Philippines in January 1959 and for which the two countries had then agreed to solicit support from their South East Asian neighbours. The Treaty was to sponsor comprehensive economic co-operation among the South East Asian countries without regard for their neutrality or their alignment with the West. Of the countries invited to participate, however, only Thailand accepted. Burma and Indonesia were apparently unenthusiastic. They were possibly discouraged by the hostility which the Chinese Communists showed to the project, on the ground that it was an extension of SEATO.

A very strong case for the promotion of intra-regional trade in South and South East Asia, however, had been presented in the 1959 economic survey of Asia and the Far East, published by ECAFE in Bangkok, and this presumably made some impression on official opinion in South East Asia. At the annual meeting of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East in March this year the Filipino delegate called for regional economic co-operation in South East Asia in order to build up trade within the area, co-ordinate industrial development, and establish a stronger bargaining position

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1. *Straits Times*, 28 July, 1960.

2. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 14 July, 1960, p. 51.

for the region in trade with the rest of the world. The suggestion appeared to win some approval from other Asian delegates but their attitudes on the whole were cautious. The Burmese representative suggested that it would be difficult for the smaller countries to take the initiative but that if one of the bigger countries took the first steps there would be a snowballing effect. He was presumably referring to India, but India did not show any enthusiasm for the suggestion.

After the Economic Commission's meeting it seemed that Tengku Abdul Rahman's project would fail because of lack of support, but in April the Philippines, Malaya and Thailand agreed to launch it.³ Until Tengku Abdul Rahman's announcement on 27 July, however, it was not clear that the project was to be given a different title, although it had been indicated that co-operation within the new body would be on an informal basis.

The Association has a political disadvantage in that it has failed to secure the participation of any of the neutral South and South East Asian countries. On the other hand its members comprise the politically and economically more advanced countries of South East Asia. Malaya and the Philippines, and to a lesser extent Thailand, have a high level of internal security and have achieved significant degrees of economic development: considerable increases in their rate of economic growth should be possible if they begin large-scale co-operation with each other in trade promotion and the development of industries. Although the combined population of these countries is only about 54 million, their collective significance in world trade is roughly the same as India's, and is significantly higher than the combined foreign trade of Indonesia, Burma and Pakistan; and, if Singapore were grouped with them, they would have a considerably larger share of world trade than Australia.

Thailand is under a form of military rule, but the Philippines and Malaya have democratic political systems inspired by western political philosophies and functioning on a fairly sound basis. There are no important tendencies towards extreme nationalism in the Philippines or Thailand, and the rivalry between the Malays and Chinese in Malaya, although aggravated by constitutional discrimination against the Chinese, is at present quite restrained. Each member of the Association has cordial relations with the West, and intellectual communication among them and between them and the West is facilitated by their wide use of English.

Although the Association is not officially intended to concern itself with political or military matters the development of its eco-

3. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 14 July, 1960, p. 50.

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conomic and cultural functions will tend to promote common political attitudes and may well often require joint action of a purely political nature. In particular any collective bargaining on trade with the industrial countries will probably require use of united political pressures on matters not in themselves related to such trade. Moreover any large-scale economic co-operation will tend to involve common measures related to defence requirements. Hence if substantial economic co-operation is begun within the Association, the members will undoubtedly develop attitudes of responsibility for the external security of their partners and such attitudes will influence the direction of their future co-operation.

The Philippines and Thailand are members of SEATO and their co-operation with Malaya in the new Association could result in a *de facto* extension of SEATO. Malaya does not participate in SEATO, but has a defence agreement with the United Kingdom and like the Philippines and Thailand it pursues strongly anti-communist domestic and foreign policies; like them, it has no official relations with the Chinese Communist Government, and has resisted the penetration of unofficial Chinese Communist influences.

The co-operation in economic planning and trade development which should be possible in the new Association is needed among the South and South East Asian countries in order to improve their position in world commerce and to enhance their prospects for general economic progress. At present these countries depend heavily on revenue from exports of primary products in order to finance their industrialisation, but there is a long-term trend for the purchasing power of those primary exports to fall, due mainly to a relative decrease in the demand for such products by the industrial countries. In particular, economic integration in Western Europe will probably result in a somewhat quicker relative decline in that area's demand for primary products, while on the other hand Western European bargaining strength will increase. Meanwhile the Asian primary exporting region will experience more serious competition from its rivals, viz., Latin America and Africa, whose productive capacity has been favoured very much more by private capital inflows from abroad.

In order to cope with the adverse trend in their terms of trade with the industrial countries, to compete more effectively in primary exports against those countries and against Africa and Latin America, and above all to build advanced and diversified economies of their own, the South and South East Asian primary exporting countries have been advised:⁴

4. 1959 *Economic Survey on Asia and the Far East*.

- (a) to promote import substitution within the region, i.e., to endeavour to satisfy their import requirements as much as possible by trade among themselves, especially in order to be able to maximise purchases of industrial equipment with foreign exchange available for use in the industrial countries; and
- (b) to plan complementarity in the region, particularly through the development of new industries.

Considerable import substitution could be achieved in South and South East Asia by promoting intra-regional trade in food, raw materials and consumer goods: large quantities of these are at present coming into the region from outside, although some of the countries within the region find it difficult to sell such products. Further substantial import substitution in the region would be made possible by developing local light industries. Meanwhile it goes without saying that the establishment of capital goods industries, the fundamental solution to the South and South East Asian trade and developmental problems, would be best attempted on a regional basis.

TRADE PROSPECTS

It would appear that the foundation members of the new Association are rather unsure of their capabilities and that they will be inclined to defer fundamental measures for economic co-operation while seeking broader membership, and while initiating forms of economic co-ordination in limited fields. The Philippines is especially conscious of the need for a fourth member and hopes to persuade Indonesia to join,⁵ although the prospects for this appear to be small. The Philippines also considers that the new Association should have close links with Japan.⁶ Meanwhile Thailand's attitude to the Association appears to be rather cautious and reserved.⁷

The present economic bonds between the members of the new Association are slight, but they will be more significant if Singapore becomes a member, as may happen if the present common market negotiations between Malaya and Singapore are successful. The following table indicates the scale of trade among the members during 1958, which can be regarded as an average year except for a drop in Thailand's total exports.

5. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 15 September, 1960, p. 596.

6. *Straits Times*, 8 July, 1960.

7. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 21 July, 1960, p. 106.

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Trade within Association of South East Asian States 1958: in million US\$

	Malaya	Philippines	Thailand
Malaya	0.7	9.1	
Philippines	0.1	0.1	
Thailand	41.1	6.0	

(*Direction of International Trade*, United Nations, 1959, Statistical Papers Series T, Vol. X, No. 8.)

These figures, however, convey a misleading impression about the scope for commerce among the Association's members. There are grounds for believing that, with few changes in the structure of their economies, these countries could greatly increase their trade with each other. The members of the Association normally import from the industrial countries food, beverages and tobacco worth about four times more than the value of such products purchased from each other, and approaching the amount which they spend on imports of machinery and transport equipment from the industrial countries. In 1958 the member states and Singapore purchased from the industrial countries food, beverages and tobacco worth about US\$253m., but the imports of such products from each other totalled only about US\$66m. The scope for import substitution in respect of those products is therefore probably quite considerable: many of the imported foods are undoubtedly non-essential; except for the dairy products, and these can be produced in the mountain areas of the Philippines and in northern Thailand. Opportunities for import substitution in consumer manufactures within the Association are probably rather small, but if the members are willing to promote and give joint protection to certain light industries, such as textiles, a fairly high degree of import substitution would almost certainly result. Progress along these lines, however, would cause some difficulties in trade with Japan.

The foreign trade of the members of the Association, apart from reflecting a heavy dependence on commerce with Western Europe and the U.S.A., shows strong links with Japan and Indonesia:

Foreign Trade of Association of South East Asian States 1958: in million US\$ — Exports/Imports

	Western Europe	U.S.A.	Japan	Indonesia	World*
Malaya	171.4/127.5	60.9/6.4	53.6/12.7	3.3/45.1	396.2/274.9
Philippines	93.4/74.7	275.2/292.4	96.6/81.2	0.1/39.3	492.5/646.0
Thailand	45.2/11.5	55.9/67.0	23.1/90.0	16.7/14.2	218.9/343.7

*Excluding other members and Singapore.

(*Direction of International Trade*, United Nations, 1959, Statistical Papers Series T, Vol. X, No. 8.)

Exports to Japan consist mainly of raw materials (from Malaya and the Philippines) and foods, beverages and tobacco (from Thai-

land). Manufactured goods make up the bulk of the Association's imports from Japan, but the Philippines and Thailand also import fairly large quantities of machinery and transport equipment.

The most significant expansion in the Association's exports during the next fifteen years is expected to be a 150 per cent increase in Malayan and Filipino primary exports to Japan. Exports to Western Europe and North America, however, together with Thailand's primary exports to Japan, are expected to increase by an average of only about 40 per cent. Whilst it is thus likely to increase its dependence on Japan, the Association is on the other hand well placed to bargain with Japan, since Japan is dependent to a fairly high degree on raw material imports from South East Asia and a considerable part of her future prosperity is predicated on the expansion of her sales of manufactured goods and capital equipment in this region. The Association produces almost half of the rubber available in South and South East Asia, most of the tin and about one-third of the iron ore. Japan's imports from the members represent more than 50 per cent of her total imports from South and South East Asia and her exports to the members constitute almost half of her total exports to that region. No other industrial country is as dependent as Japan on the Association and the expected increase in her demands for Malayan-Singapore and Filipino primary products will probably make her the leading trade partner for those two countries by 1975. Very close ties between Japan and the Association will thus be inevitable if effective co-operation develops among the member states. The question to be faced on both sides is whether the relationship will be determined only by the restricted motivations of everyday commerce or by far-sighted planning which will give expression to Japan's natural role as a capital goods supplier to the Association as well as to the Association's capabilities to provide itself with significant varieties of manufactured goods.

The Association's links with Indonesia are likely to remain quite substantial on account of its dependence on petroleum from that country, which may increase with the progress of industrialisation in the member states. Indonesia's membership would strengthen the Association's bargaining position in relation to the industrial countries, because petroleum exports to those countries have been holding their purchasing power much better than primary products.

SIGNIFICANCE FOR ASIA

The new Association could well be the foundation of a strong economic community in South and South East Asia and in such a community considerable political integration could result. This would help to overcome the serious vulnerabilities of the region,

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which expose it to the threat of direct or indirect Chinese Communist or Sino-Soviet aggression. At the same time it could result in some withdrawal of Western interests, influence and protection from Asia and the community could begin to exert an influence in Asian affairs offsetting that of the two main non-Communist countries — India and Japan.

The impediments to the development of economic and political unity in the new Association will be considerable. There are no cultural, racial, or major ideological bonds between the members and their peoples have not felt aware of any common interests with each other. There are strongly individualistic influences in the leadership of each country, and so far little has happened in their relations to establish conditions for building up mutual trust. In each member state, official and public resistance to any apparent sacrifice of national interests for the sake of the Association would be very great. Moreover, both Malaya and the Philippines could be expected to have reservations about close co-operation with Thailand if the stability of that country's government were in question. Finally, it would clearly be difficult to arrive at an acceptable method for resolving differences within the Association: Malaya and Singapore, although their population is much smaller than those of the Philippines and Thailand, handle more than twice the foreign trade of the other two countries. On the other hand there has been no serious clash of interest between the three states, and there is probably much scope for application of the existing consensus in straightforward schemes for economic co-operation that would not involve issues which could embarrass the member governments domestically. Moreover, it seems reasonable to expect that if some steps are taken towards the promotion of a common market that prospect will prove a stimulus to industrial and commercial activity among the members and that this in turn will promote demands for further economic unity and wider political co-operation. This is the principle which has operated in the European Economic Community, although under much more favourable circumstances, and it is worth noting that the success and in particular the bargaining power of the European Economic Community appear to have made a strong impression on official thinking within the Association, and especially in the Philippines.

The degree of progress towards economic and political unity within the Association may depend very much on the attitude of Japan, who as indicated above will probably be the Association's main trading partner among the industrial nations, and who is well placed to serve as the Association's main source of capital goods, although in

this respect she receives some serious competition from Western Europe and the USA. Japan could easily acquire a privileged position in relation to or even within the Association, and if there were opportunities for making her influence paramount she would probably contribute energetically to the promotion of economic and political unity between the members.

If the Association becomes a fairly strong economic body this will have important consequences in Asia generally. Other South East Asian countries will be attracted towards membership, and stimulus may be given to the formation of other economic groupings in Asia, e.g., between India and Pakistan, who have recently undertaken far-reaching plans for the joint use of the Indus river.

Even if it is expanded considerably, however, the Association will probably not be able to improve very much its rather weak bargaining position in the primary export trade with the industrial countries, because the prospects for effective co-operation from Latin America and Africa will be small. Hence the leaders of the Association will probably be drawn to concentrate on accelerating specialised industrialisation within their states in order to build up an independent regional economy; and, to the extent that this is pursued, increasing needs will be felt for some elementary political integration.

Meanwhile, by inviting membership from other South East Asian states, the Association in effect offers the neutral countries in the region a potentially decisive way of modifying their non-alignment and improving their internal and external security, especially in order to resist Chinese Communist pressures. Economic co-operation in the Association will certainly tend to enhance the military strength of all members and prepare the way for co-ordinated defence, basically through fostering attitudes of responsibility for the overall welfare of other members. At the same time, a neutral state which joins the Association will not experience the loss of face which could result from formally abandoning its non-alignment, although the hostility of the Chinese Communists to the project has clearly been intended to make it so. The most strategically important vulnerable neutral state adjacent to China is Burma, and membership of the Association could give her a valuable *de facto* improvement in security.

AUSTRALIA'S ROLE

Australia has important political and economic links with the members of the new Association: she participates with Thailand and the Philippines in the South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty, and through membership of the British Commonwealth she is connected with Malaya and co-operates with the United Kingdom

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in extending defence support to that country. Through the Colombo Plan, Australia also provides some economic aid to the members of the Association.

In Australia's foreign trade, the members of the Association, and especially Malaya, constitute an important export market, equal in size to that provided by South Asia and the remainder of South East Asia. The Association members took £A19,107,000 worth of Australia's products in 1958/9. In the same period Australian exports to Ceylon, India, Pakistan, Burma and Indonesia totalled £A21,096,000. Australia's imports from Thailand and the Philippines are negligible, however, while those from Malaya (£A11,482,000 in 1958/9) represent only a small item in her total imports from South and the remainder of South East Asia.

The Association's degree of success in promoting economic development and import substitution among its members will probably tend to reduce food imports from Australia while providing wider scope for imports of capital goods and most manufactured articles, other than textiles. This will necessitate some important readjustments in Australia, because foods appear to constitute at least 50 per cent of her exports to the members of the Association, and if she is to sell more machinery, industrial equipment and manufactured goods to the members she will have to compete more effectively with the other advanced countries, especially Japan.

Australia has not been called upon to indicate her attitude to the Association of South East Asian States and at this stage she may feel that, in view of the uncertainties about the success of the Association, she should do no more than note its existence, while resolving to treat on an *ad hoc* basis such problems as it may create for her foreign policy. The requirement to prepare for changes in the composition of her exports to the Association, however, is one which Australia will probably have to face in respect of South and South East Asia at some later date even if the Association is a failure, and hence any adjustments to her economy now, even if based on over-optimistic estimates about her scope for exports of capital goods and manufactured articles to the Association, will nevertheless help her to compete more effectively in meeting the later demand for these products in the under-developed parts of Asia generally.

Apart from the fundamental adjustments in her economy which establishment of the new Association counsels, Australia may feel that she should extend encouragement and assistance to this new attempt at economic co-operation in South East Asia. There are some very important arguments for such an approach.

In the first place, support for the Association is one way in which Australia can discharge more effectively her moral responsibility to aid economic development in this part of the world. Australia officially acknowledges this responsibility and, although she may not wish to intervene in what has evidently been intended to be a South East Asian affair, she would be neglecting her responsibility if she withheld support from a scheme of regional co-operation which could deal with some of the basic developmental problems of the area. The import substitution which would be advisable in the Association would probably conflict with Australia's short term trading interests, but in the long term Australia would stand to gain from the development of modern economies in this part of the world.

Secondly, owing especially to wider official recognition in South East Asia of the need for regional economic co-operation, the Association may well develop, after some time, into a strong economic grouping, possibly under considerable Japanese influence. In that event, Australia's interests would be much better served by some form of participation in that grouping than by separation from it, and to ensure such participation Australia should now be supporting the Association. If the Association became a strong body it would not feel a *need* for Australian participation, and would probably not be inclined to grant such participation if Australia had hitherto given the organisation no support.

Thirdly, as has been indicated above, the Association can in effect offer an increase of security to the formally unaligned states of South and South East Asia, which are increasingly threatened by Communist China's developing war potential, but which would face a loss of prestige if they tried to remedy their vulnerability by alliances with the West. Such a security improvement in South and South East Asia would obviously be an important advantage for Australia.

The way in which Australia should support the Association, however, may be difficult to decide. Ordinary membership would probably not be feasible because the foundation members would presumably feel that it would prejudice their chances of attracting other Asian members and because opposition from within Australia would almost certainly be formidable. But Australia might secure for herself a special relationship with the Association which would enable her to participate to a significant extent in its affairs and which perhaps might be broadened into membership later on.

If, as seems likely, the Association's immediate need is for additional leadership, Australia's best course of action would probably

ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH EAST ASIAN STATES

be to lend assistance in planning and financing the initial projects for co-operation among the members. Subsequently, she might well feel obliged to switch to the Association some of her rather large imports of timber, tobacco, textiles and carpets from the major industrial countries. Such a change, together with her assistance in promoting import substitution among the members of the Association, could introduce an element of strain into Australia's trade relations with the advanced countries which receive most of her exports but there is no reason why she should not be able to handle such strains. In the long term, Australia's prosperity will probably be bound up very much with that of her Asian neighbours, and the extent of her co-operation with them in their present period of difficult economic growth will largely determine the degree of harmony or conflict in that future relationship.

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Single copies — 12/6.

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THE COLONIAL DEMISE IN AFRICA

D. A. LOW*

AT THE BEGINNING OF 1960 British newspapers and the British Labour Party dubbed 1960 'Africa Year'. Subsequent events have gone far to justify this description. Perhaps two of them stand out as pre-eminently important: the shooting dead of 78 Africans at Sharpeville and Langa in South Africa in March and the later protracted crisis in the Congo. The former epitomised for the watching world the tragic issues which have to be resolved upon the last major battleground for racial equality. Racial discrimination, of course, exists elsewhere; but in no other country is it any longer elevated so purposefully to be the touchstone of national life. The world's coloured peoples, so overwhelmingly in a majority, and by far the largest proportion of its white minority now concentrate their gaze upon South Africa as never before. Sharpeville, moreover, turned the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in May 1960 into the most electric of the whole series of such meetings which stretch back for half a century and more. It precipitated a clear definition of the Commonwealth as pre-eminently a multi-racial society, and it hastened the possibility that a member of the Commonwealth (and a 'white' one at that) would for the first time and against its own declared wishes be excluded from membership after having been a full participant for over half a century. For the world's only close-knit cross-continental club that was an eventuality of major significance. The crisis in the Congo, which followed its attainment of self-government on 30th June, 1960, obviously had even greater repercussions. It precipitated in particular not only the most ambitious political operation ever undertaken by the United Nations, but the establishment of the growing number of independent African countries as a world political force in their own right. These events were only the most dramatic of a whole series which in 1960 thrust Africa upon the consciousness of a largely unsuspecting world. Beneath them there subsisted a single common theme.

It needs to be remembered that Africa has a total population of something over 220 millions. Of these less than 15 millions live in the Union of South Africa. The real centre of interest, therefore, lies to the north where the remaining 200 millions and more live. At the beginning of 1960 considerably less than half of these lived in non-self-governing African states: by the end of 1960 consider-

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ably more than half lived in self-governing nation states. This major transformation was the starting point for Africa's propulsion during 1960 to the centre of the world's stage. It intimately affected, for example, the congeries of developments which surrounded both the Sharpeville incident and the crisis in the Congo. For the attainment of independence in the latter could only be properly understood within the context of (and by contrast with) similar, concurrent, attainments of self-government by numerous other African countries which are near neighbours to it; whilst the Sharpeville incident symbolised the pressures which were piling up in Africa wherever the attempt was being made to dam up the onward swirling waters of African independence. Political independence for Africans — its attainment and its denial — engulfed African affairs in 1960 to a quite tumultuous degree. Why?

In the first place it needs to be recalled that in a number of instances the attainment by African countries of political independence in 1960 had for several years past been a pre-arranged and widely-expected conclusion. Somalia, the Italian Trust Territory, and former Italian colony, in the north-eastern horn of Africa, became self-governing on 1st July, 1960, in accordance with the mandate which the Italian Government received from the United Nations in 1950 at the end of a long international wrangle about the territory's future. The Italian trustees were then granted ten years in which to complete preparations for Somali independence. They fulfilled their mandate in the letter and the spirit. There have been many arguments advanced against the setting of time tables for independence. They need to be seriously reconsidered, however, in the light of the Italian achievement in Somalia. For few colonial countries ten years before attaining independence have been quite so 'backward' in the possession of embryonic self-governing constitutional, political and administrative instruments, or the local citizens to man them. Yet knowing that there was a bare decade in which to accomplish the allegedly impossible, the Italian administration buckled themselves to their task, and, having within six years held countrywide elections to the first Somali parliament, felt ready in 1956 to grant a measure of autonomy to the first Somali government; with the consequence that, thanks to Italian application, there existed in Somalia at the transfer of power not only a local administration wholly composed of Somalis, but an indigenous parliament, cabinet and structure of government with a modicum of experience behind them. The Italians have, in short, shown that there is nothing to make colonial rulers think and plan more urgently or more perceptively like the fixing of a term to their stay

a good way ahead. A very large part of Africa's story in 1960 derives from the myopic failure of other colonial powers to emulate the crystal gazing which the Italians had forced upon them. This is not to say that Somali independence carried with it no problems: Somalia is not economically self-supporting, and its leaders are keenly anxious to wrest from neighbouring Ethiopia Somali-occupied areas which lie within Ethiopian borders — an ambition which Ethiopia has plainly indicated she will resist: but the smooth attainment of independence under a long-regulated programme by so backward a country suggests that there was little that was unavoidable about, for instance, the Congo crisis.

The attainment of self-government in 1960 by three other territories, all of them in West Africa, was also in accordance with pre-arranged plans. Two of these had likewise been Trust Territories, both this time of France. On 1 January, 1960, as the herald of so many others to follow, Cameroons, which comprised a large part of the once German colony of Kamerun, became self-governing. It was followed on 27 April by the similar but smaller one-time German colony of Togo. Neither had been incorporated by the French into their large administrative Federations of French West and French Equatorial Africa. Because of the Trust agreements which France held with the United Nations for them they were not subject either to the long persistent French plans for organic connection between their colonial territories and metropolitan France itself. They were accordingly free to tread untrammelled the path to national independence on their own. Neither, however, upon the attainment of independence was a particularly flourishing country. Cameroons lay in thrall to a civil war in which one faction had control of the Cameroons government, whilst the other enjoyed the patronage of the most active of the self-governing African powers — the United Arab Republic, Ghana and Guinea: as for Togo, which is so small and tribally so artificially compounded that it is obviously in danger of incorporation by more formidable neighbours, within a few weeks of its independence it was the target of some verbal ranging shots upon this very objective by President Nkrumah of neighbouring Ghana. Both Cameroons and Togo thus contributed their meed to the quicksilver of African politics in 1960.

Within six months, however, the fourth planned attainment of self-government in 1960 was accomplished on 1 October in much more promising circumstances when Nigeria joined the ranks of the world's independent nations. Nigeria is the African giant. While Ghana has a population of no more than five millions, Nigeria has a population variously estimated as between 35 and 40 millions. No

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African country south of the Sahara has even half that number. If it holds together it is securely placed to take the political leadership in Africa. It is constitutionally divided under a Federal regime into three Regions. Each of these has thrown up its own dominant political party and its own distinguished leaders. There is naturally rivalry between them. Yet it is so obviously to Nigeria's advantage to hold together, so as to be able to claim the leadership of the whole continent, that the fissiparous tendencies which it contains have heavy odds against which to contend. Upon the attainment of self-government, moreover, the three powerful regional political movements were very neatly dovetailed into the federal structure. The Prime Minister was Sir Abubaker Tafawa Balewa, the federal leader of the Northern People's Congress, which shared power in the Federal government with the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons. The NCNC, which is dominant in the Eastern Region, supplied the head of state too — the Governor-General, the veteran Nigerian nationalist leader, Azikiwe; while the Action Group, which is dominant in the Western Region, supplied the Leader of the Federal opposition, whose party shortly before the attainment of independence had once again won the regional elections in the region which surrounds the Federal capital at Lagos. The Nigerian government does not seem to have been in any particular hurry to lay claim to the leadership of Africa which its power warrants. That leadership throughout the preceding decade had lain fairly firmly with Ghana and its Dr Nkrumah. The Congo crisis coming so soon before Nigeria's attainment of self-government gave an unbudgeted, last-minute boost to Ghana's leadership in Africa. It was Ghana which represented sub-Saharan Africa amongst the neutralist 'five' that tried to secure a vote in the UN Assembly in September to bring President Eisenhower and Mr Khrushchev together. But as soon as Nigeria wishes to assume the purple which Ghana has worn in Africa hitherto, it can probably shoulder it for the asking. In view of its size and position Nigeria has too a rightful claim to be heard second only to India after the United Kingdom in the counsels of the Commonwealth; the older members will find themselves having to move down a chair. It is no mean phenomenon, however, that the leading independent power of Africa should now have joined the leading non-communist power of Asia in the inner circle of the Commonwealth. These happenings alone would have made 1960 a memorable year.

One other major occurrence in Africa in 1960 had also been foreseen — the review of the constitution in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This had been fixed for 1960 in a joint communique

issued at the end of talks between the British and Rhodesian governments in 1957. It was then assumed that the review would be primarily directed towards the establishment of Dominion status for a Federation which would be European dominated. In the event that relatively simple formula had to be completely jettisoned, primarily because of the unheralded concourse of events which crowded the African year in 1960.

The expected occurrences in Africa in 1960 were, in all conscience, considerable enough. They were soon almost completely overshadowed, however, by those which were not widely foreseen. These included not merely such considerable steps as the holding of a referendum for the establishment of a Republic in both the first white and the first black Commonwealth Dominions in Africa—in South Africa and in Ghana—but the collapse of a long-nurtured French policy in west Africa and Madagascar, of a long-nurtured Belgian policy in the Congo, and of a long-nurtured British policy in east and central Africa, as well as the addition to UN membership not just of four but of seventeen new African countries.

The key to this swift and radical concourse of events lay in the main in the destruction of the illusion that any one part of Africa was immune to events elsewhere in the continent. It used to be thought by European colonial administrators that it was possible for them to handle their colonial territories each in their own distinctive way and each at its own distinctive pace. Thus French policy had one set of priorities, Belgian another, British a third, Portuguese a fourth, and so on. It was assumed too that whatever, for example, might happen in British West Africa, it could have no immediate impact upon British East, Central or South Africa. Was there not (it was implicitly argued) a whole decade separating the independence of India from the independence of Malaya? Would there not be a similar interval between, say, the independence of Nigeria and the independence of Tanganyika? It was such shibboleths as this which in 1960 were rudely demolished. Events in one corner of the continent had prompt repercussions everywhere else. Africa, in this respect, was shown to be one single whole. There was almost everywhere a burgeoning forth of the more strident African nationalism—in places as widely separated as Basutoland, British Somaliland and French Sudan, to take just three examples almost at random. One precipitating cause was certainly the relatively sudden growth over the immediately preceding years of Pan-African assemblies which drew African leaders from non-self-governing territories into concert with African leaders of independent nations. But in addition to this, it is important to remember

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that African demands for independence were aggravated in a large number of the still non-self-governing territories by the persistence within them of colonial policies which had become very largely anachronistic; and more particularly that Africa, as the last major preserve of colonial rule, had now attracted the concentrated attention not only of the anti-colonial forces of the Communist, Arab and Asian worlds, but of the Western world itself. These now gave their full moral support to the clamant demands of African leaders that Africa's colonial regimes should be liquidated without more ado. In the face of these cumulative pressures three of the four major colonial powers were in no mood to resist. More than one of them had progressively so reduced the timescale for the changes which they thought should precede self-government that they no longer had any satisfactory grounds for holding out against still further reductions. No longer were they as concerned as before with their self-imposed task of nation-building; their prime desire was now to establish friendly post-independence relations with their former colonies; they accordingly vied with each other in displaying a generous spirit, and for this purpose suppressed any latent qualms. The logic behind the former idea, moreover, that countries should attain self-government when they were 'ready' for it had been put to mockery; the succession of countries attaining self-government bore no relation whatsoever to their relative viability. The question in one form or another which Africans all over the continent were now asking was: 'if Ghana (or the Sudan, or Somalia, or Guinea, or Liberia) can have self-government, with a seat in the UN, why cannot we too?' To this there was no final answer. The floods had risen up. The banks had worn thin. Soon the waters poured through.

The *bouleversements* were countless. Even the British, who have often prided themselves on their skill in these matters, were critically affected. In British Somaliland, which is neighbour to (Italian) Somalia, little note was taken until 1958 of the UN mandate to the Italians to grant independence to Somalia in 1960, and it was not until February 1960 that the first elected majority was introduced into the British Somaliland Legislature; yet in May 1960 at a constitutional conference held in London the British Government agreed that British Somaliland should become self-governing on 26th June, 1960 (five days before Somalia) because the two peoples (as had long been clear) were anxious to amalgamate. This was even more precipitate than the Belgian handling of the Congo.

It was not, however, just the pace of events in 1960 which overturned all previous assumptions. Whole policies were washed away too. The French, to begin with, had always planned to maintain

some organic link between their colonial territories and the metropolitan country; their Algerian policy has only been the most extreme example of this. In the immediate post-war period they formulated plans for a French Union incorporating their colonial territories. By the time President de Gaulle came to power this had been officially reconstituted as the French Community; but the essential purpose remained. It looked at one moment as if in sub-Saharan Africa it might triumph. By contrast with British colonial and constitutional practice the French had long had colonial representatives in their own parliament in Paris. For four years before de Gaulle came to power in 1958 one of the Vice-Premiers in the French Governments was an African, M. Houphouet-Boigny, the leader of the powerful *Rassemblement Democratique Africain* which had a substantial following in several French African territories. Houphouet was a strenuous advocate of the organic link with France, which, given the environment of French colonial and constitutional practice, was no more extraordinary than Nkrumah's advocacy of the Commonwealth. When de Gaulle put this policy to its first serious test in 1958 — when he held the referendum on his accession to power, and gave the African territories the option of enjoying what the British would call 'responsible government' within the Community, or separated independence — only one French African territory, Guinea, out of thirteen chose the latter alternative. Thereafter de Gaulle was assiduous in giving French African leaders an honoured place in France's international relations; four African leaders, for instance, became in 1959 Ministers Advisory to the French delegation to the United Nations.

But in 1960 the whole project for organic links between France and its African territories collapsed. African leaders in power as Premiers of their territories saw no good reason to curtail their independence. The French failure to resolve the Algerian war undermined African confidence. Guinea's success in strutting across the world's stage once it had severed its links with France, Ghana's self-confident nationhood, the prospect of the Cameroons, Togo, Nigeria and the Belgian Congo securing independence in 1960 all proved to be too beguiling. The world's predilection for self-governing nation-states proved too powerful for French Africans, even Houphouet, to withstand for very long. In a speech at Dakar in December 1959 President de Gaulle gave evidence of his awareness of the coming change. The only hope now for France was to seek the establishment of a transformed French Community on the model of the British Commonwealth. Immediate incorporation in such a creation was the wish of those in the Mali Federation in West Africa

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and in Madagascar who at the beginning of 1960 were the first to slip loose. In April 1960 the necessary constitutional instruments with France were signed. Both states became self-governing in June, Mali on 20 June, Malagasy (as Madagascar was renamed) on 26 June. By that time the four territories of French Equatorial Africa and Mauretania in French West Africa had decided to follow suit, and the four remaining territories of French West Africa, momentarily caught out on a limb, then decided to go one better and demanded that they be granted independence in advance of any commitment to joining the Community. These four became self-governing in August, Dahomey on the 1st, Niger on the 3rd, Upper Volta on the 5th, Ivory Coast on the 7th; they were followed by the Equatorial territories, Chad on 11 August, Central African Republic on the 13th, Congo (the French Congo, that is) on the 15th and Gabon on the 17th. The last of the series, Mauretania, followed in November.

It was these events which caused the sudden balkanisation of this part of Africa. For the assumption in French Africa from 1956 onwards was that internal political authority would be devolved upon the 13 different territories of French Africa, and that since they would maintain organic links with metropolitan France, the former Federations of French West (eight territories) and French Equatorial Africa (four territories; Madagascar alone lay on its own) could be allowed to be whittled down to the bone. In consequence the French and French Africans never steeled themselves to create something comparable to the British West African Federation of Nigeria. But in 1960 the organic links with France were broken so that there only remained the former constituent French African territories, now elevated to be nation states on their own. There were three attempts to check this result, but each of them failed. The Mali Federation of French West Africa, formed in 1959, originally consisted of Senegal, French Sudan, Upper Volta and Dahomey. Ivory Coast soon procured the secession of the last two, and with them and French Niger established the Conseil de l'Entente. This, however, never developed into a constitutional union; while shortly after the truncated Mali Federation attained independence it split (as a result of a quarrel between its leaders) into its two component parts, French Sudan reserving to itself the Mali name, Senegal procuring independence on its own. Meanwhile the four territories of French Equatorial Africa first discussed the possibility of a customs union and then of a Union of Central African Republics. But Gabon, the richest though the smallest, refused to join the Union. French Congo was soon pre-occupied by

the proximity of untoward events in the former Belgian Congo and, by the time independence was upon them, no effective union had been created. It was these events which, by making out of French Africa not three or four but thirteen independent nations, gave the African bloc in the UN the extra ten seats which have made it the largest single bloc in the organisation.

If French plans for their African colonies had to be radically transformed during 1960, two successive Belgian plans were destroyed in as many years. It had always been the Belgian assumption that if they placed sufficient emphasis upon social and economic development, political upheaval could be postponed. They certainly did more to create an African artisan class than any other colonial power in Africa, primarily because by contrast with West Africa there was no long-standing economic contact with Europe, by contrast with East Africa there were no Asiatics and by contrast with South Africa too few Europeans. So consistent was their policy of holding down precipitate political advancement that they restricted the political rights of the Europeans in the Congo hardly less than those of Africans. But in view of events in British West Africa and then more especially in view of the establishment of African territorial governments in neighbouring French Africa, it was abundantly clear by the end of 1958 that Belgian policy would have to undergo a radical transformation. Near the mouth of the Congo river, for instance, some members of the Bakongo tribe in French Congo now enjoyed local autonomy; it would have been impossible to deny this for very much longer to the members of the same Bakongo tribe within the Belgian Congo without using force. At this point it is of first importance to recall Belgium's position in Europe, with France to the south and Holland to the north. For both of these neighbours had faced similar situations elsewhere and the Belgians had seen both of them suffer in a manner which they did not wish to see repeated on themselves. Fundamentally Belgian policy during 1959 was to avoid in their relations with the Congo a French-Algerian situation on the one hand and a Dutch-Indonesian situation on the other. They wished to establish a Belgo-Congolese Community of a Commonwealth type on the British-Indian, British-Ghanian model. The Belgians eventually concluded, however, that such was Congolese estrangement (aggravated as it was by Congolese political inexperience) that nothing short of precipitate independence had any chance of winning for them any accord with the Congolese politicians. As a result the Belgian Government agreed in February 1960 to grant independence to the Congo on 30th June, 1960. Had their hope of

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thus creating a mutually acceptable Belgo-Congolese Community been fulfilled, the subsequent crisis in the Congo which faced the United Nations need never have occurred. The world now knows that the hope was not justified. But wishful thinking, unfortunately, has long been the bane of capricorn Africa.

Throughout the preceding decade it dominated official British thinking about British East and Central Africa. In 1951 a British Labour Colonial Secretary spoke in Uganda about 'partnership' as the official British policy for this as well as other British territories in the region. The idea in origin was, no doubt, noble; it suggested that men of different races should co-operate in partnership. But as it came to be translated into constitutional formulations it generally displayed one fatal flaw, for in practice it was used in defence of constitutional expedients designed to give non-African minorities in these territories a political preponderance which their small numbers did nothing to justify. In the end it probably did serious harm to such contrivances, for it provoked a cynical edge to African protests against them. Except in one last but critical instance—the Federal constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland—'partnership' was relegated in 1960 to the limbo of lost causes along with French plans for organic union and Belgian plans for a Belgo-Congolese Community.

The *coup de grace*, as it chanced, was given by Mr Macmillan himself. 'The winds of change', he said in his justly famous speech in Cape Town in February, 'are blowing through Africa'. This statement had an immediate impact upon the Commonwealth, the Conservative Party in Britain, and on the Union. It was no coincidence that the Sharpeville episode followed a month later. Mr Macmillan's words about creating a society 'in which individual merit and individual merit alone, is the criterion for a man's advancement, whether political or economic' were translated along with the rest of his speech into numbers of South African languages. But it needs to be remembered too that these words were of no less immediate significance to the British territories further north. They allowed the British Colonial Secretary, Mr Macleod, at a constitutional conference in February to break the coalition between the Kenya Government and the Kenya Europeans which for several years had dominated events in Kenya, and so open the way to African domination of the country's government. They enabled him to repeat the performance for Nyasaland in July, and for Northern Rhodesia thereafter. Both Tanganyika and Uganda had already circumvented the old formulation of the 'partnership' doctrine: the former when Mr Julius Nyerere, the leader of the

Tanganyika African National Union, discovered that the particular constitutional formulation of the partnership doctrine in Tanganyika was not so loaded against Africans as elsewhere, won the elections of 1958, and emerged as the dominant leader of an allegedly partnership framed legislature; the latter when the 'Wild' constitutional committee of 1959 broke with impunity its restricted terms of reference on the establishment of a common roll with special safeguards for minorities. After Mr Macmillan's speech in Cape Town Tanganyika and Uganda once more found themselves back within the ranks of the orthodox, for partnership in its initial formulation had disappeared. With the Congo to the west, Somalia to the north, and Malagasy to the east—all shortly independent African nations—this was only just in time. Tanganyika bids fair, under Nyerere's leadership, to secure self-government shortly amid an aura of friendliness. Kenya and Uganda will no doubt follow, though each is plagued, to an extent that as yet Tanganyika is not, by deep political divisions among its African populations. The question for them is not whether they will before long become self-governing; it is rather the *locus* of power when they do.

Immediately to the north of the capricorn line the colonial demise was thus by the end of 1960 virtually complete. Southwards there remained five bewildering situations. First there was the undetermined future of the three British Protectorates—Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland. Embryonic self-governing institutions were being introduced in all three, but their future awaited the resolution of the fate of their neighbours. Secondly, there was the question of the status of South West Africa; the Union's persistent refusal to transform its mandate from the League of Nations into a trust agreement with the United Nations continued to provide a legalistic basis for its continued refusal to countenance any external interference with its regime there. Thirdly there was the situation in the Union itself; it seemed at the end of 1960 that the position there would become even more forbidding before it could improve, and that the next critical occurrence would not be so much its possible expulsion from the Commonwealth, as the establishment of a South African Government-in-exile on the Algerian (one almost might say the de Gaullist) model. Fourthly, there were the two Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique. Officially both are part and parcel of metropolitan Portugal. There were, however, well authenticated reports from them of troop movements and even of massacres of dissidents. The Portuguese had apparently decided not to emulate the Belgians and quit. They still, after all, occupied Goa; yet Goa is far smaller (and its population far more assim-

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lated) than either of the two territories in Africa. There could well be the makings here of Congo crises worse than the Congo's.

Lastly there was the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It is the scene of the head-on collision of two classic British colonial policies. Under the one, political power is granted to white colonists despite the paucity of their numbers; under the other, political power is transferred to the indigenous peoples, despite their inexperience in handling British constitutional instruments. Events elsewhere in Africa suggest that here too the eventual outcome should not be in doubt. The African majority will be content with nothing less than their own nation state, or nation states. Nothing short of this has prevailed anywhere else in Africa. There is nothing to suggest that Africans even in Southern Rhodesia will be satisfied unless it prevails there. It used to be suggested that Southern Rhodesia, the European stronghold in central Africa, which claimed sixty years of freedom from racial violence, might be immune to changes accruing elsewhere, but riots in Salisbury and Bulawayo after the middle of the year put paid to that illusion. In October the Monckton Commission, in its published report, recommended a series of reforms which, given the tenor of previous official British and Rhodesian policies in central Africa, were little short of revolutionary. However, the only fundamental question which remained in the Rhodesias was whether the transition from European dominance to African control would be smooth, and the outcome free from tragedy. Already by the end of 1960 the rule of colonial powers in Africa was virtually over. This left the citadels of colonist domination — in Algeria, in the Rhodesias, in the Union — perilously isolated.

DUTCH OPINION ON THE WEST NEW GUINEA PROBLEM A REVIEW

JUSTUS M. VAN DER KROEF*

ON JULY 31, 1959, INDONESIA'S Foreign Minister, Subandrio, announced that Indonesia would not introduce its dispute with the Netherlands over control of Dutch held West New Guinea into the United Nations this year, but would instead concentrate 'on a contest of power' with the Dutch toward an ultimate vindication of the Indonesian position. A little over two weeks later, on the occasion of Indonesia's national independence day, on August 17, 1959, President Sukarno gave an indication of what such a 'contest' would involve. Reiterating that Indonesia would not attempt to place the West New Guinea problem on the agenda of the UN Assembly, Sukarno warned that those enterprises in Indonesia still operating in part with Dutch capital would be the target of further measures if Dutch 'stubbornness persisted' in the West New Guinea issue, and early in October Subandrio announced that Indonesia, after consultation with other shareholders, would seek to nationalize Dutch shares in the Shell Oil operations in Indonesia.¹ Dutch press reaction to all these announcements did not indicate that the Dutch would be persuaded to alter their stand on the West New Guinea dispute. Typical, perhaps, was the comment of the daily *Telegraaf*, which wrote that Sukarno kept 'hammering' on the West New Guinea issue, as if that was the cause of the chaos in his country.² In Indonesia, meanwhile, Sukarno's pronouncements created a minor political tempest, with the Communist press bitterly criticizing the decision not to bring the West New Guinea question before the UN, and with other papers agreeing that an internal consolidation of the country was necessary before the matter was brought before the world forum again, and that the Communists were trying to exploit the West New Guinea dispute for purposes of private agitation.³ Yet, in the Netherlands, the new threat to the

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1. *Antara Daily News Bulletin*, August 4, August 19 and October 5, 1959.

2. August 18, 1959. For a summary of other Dutch press reaction see *Pers-documentatie Ministerie van Zaken Overzee*, August 18, 1959, Jaargang 2, No. 315 (The Hague).

3. *Harian Rakjat* (Djakarta), August 11, 13, 1959; *Merdeka* (Djakarta), August 10, 1959, and *Pedoman* (Djakarta) August 10, 1959.

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last vestiges of Dutch capital in Indonesia has given added impetus to a national soul-searching on the dispute with Indonesia over West New Guinea. The fruit of this self-examination has been a large number of publications from many different ideological quarters which have appeared in the last two years or so and which, if anything, indicate that the issue is far from having been put 'on ice' by Dutch public opinion, as is sometimes alleged. Some of these publications may here be reviewed in the light of three issues: (1) the legal basis of the Dutch claim, (2) the problem of West New Guinea's internal socio-economic development and (3) international political considerations and their effect on world opinion.

I

The confusion stemming from both Indonesian and Dutch policy pronouncements regarding West New Guinea, made during the course of the Indonesian Revolution (1945-1949), still occupies many writers. Dr J. van Baal, a former Governor of West New Guinea and a prominent figure in the circles of the influential Anti-Revolutionary Party (a Reformed, i.e., Calvinistic, generally conservative political organization) notes in a recent pamphlet that initially West New Guinea was 'a matter of indifference' to Indonesian leaders, for in one of his first addresses to the people on August 23, 1945, Sukarno appealed to all Indonesians from Aceh (on the Northern tip of Sumatra) to Amboyna (in the Moluccas), thus excluding West New Guinea.⁴ It is indeed difficult to determine just when this

4. J. van Baal, *Het Nieuw-Guinea Vraagstuk. Een Opgave voor de Natie* (Kampen, 1959), p. 20. See also J. A. van Beuge, *Het Nederlandse Standpunt Inzake Nieuw Guinea* (s.l., 1958?), p. 6 (mimeo). (Van Beuge is presently Head of the Section of General Policy Affairs of the Netherlands New Guinea Bureau, in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, The Hague.) During the Eleventh General Assembly of the UN the Dutch delegate referred to Sukarno's original appeal to Indonesians 'from Aceh to Amboyna'. The Indonesian delegate thereupon accused the Dutch delegate of an incorrect quotation, declaring that Sukarno had really appealed to his followers from 'Aceh to Merauke'. The Dutch delegate then deposited photographic copies of an official Indonesian publication dealing with Sukarno's speech in which the words 'Aceh to Amboyna' appear. This elicited no further Indonesian arguments. The Indonesian delegate had a point, however, when earlier in the debate he declared Sukarno's pronouncement to be a kind of symbolic reference to the widely scattered areas that constitute Indonesia; and indeed, the President's rhetorical flights are not always accurate. But ambiguity of pronouncement in the West New Guinea problem is not always a failing of the Dutch, as is sometimes alleged. Related to this question was the Dutch delegate's attempt to show that in 1945, when the revolutionary Indonesian Committee for the Preparation of Independence enumerated 'the territories of the Indonesian Republic, New Guinea was not explicitly mentioned.

national Indonesian appeal came to include West New Guinea (as embodied in Sukarno's often reiterated slogan that Indonesia should be one 'from Sabang to Merauke'). Did it arise in response to Dutch policy toward New Guinea? As early as the October 1946 conference of Pankalpinang in which the Dutch government outlined in greater detail its plans for a federal Indonesia to representatives of Indonesian groups essentially critical of the revolutionary movement, a separate status for West New Guinea was considered. Professor Röling, a member of the Dutch delegation to the Twelfth General Assembly Meeting of the UN, in which the New Guinea issue figured prominently, writes in his brochure that 'the reason' for the contemplated separate status for the West New Guinea area was that a 'safe harbour' was believed to be necessary for the benefit of Eurasians in Indonesia who might find a new political order in Indonesia unacceptable.⁵ While the Eurasian factor was undoubtedly of significance in the Dutch government's attitude,⁶ it would be a serious oversimplification to regard it as 'the reason' for a separate status for the area. Other aspects need to be considered, e.g., the relative significance of evidences of anti-Indonesian hostility among the Papuan population of West New Guinea, and Indonesian superiority feelings as regards the Papuans before, during, and after World War II,⁷ as well as the low level of development, and what the Dutch Lieutenant-Governor General H. J. van Mook chose

The Indonesian delegate thereupon referred to a statistical publication of the pre-war Dutch government in Indonesia in which New Guinea is mentioned as included in the provincial division of the Moluccas. And the Moluccas were specifically mentioned as one of the territories of the Republic of Indonesia by the Committee for the Preparation of Independence. The Dutch delegate thereupon countered by saying that even in the reference to the Moluccan provincial division, as cited by the Indonesian delegate, New Guinea is separately mentioned and that 'If New Guinea was included in the Moluccas it should not have been separately mentioned'. This Dutch argument is not conclusively convincing, but the Indonesian view is misleading to the extent that it seeks to de-emphasize such degrees of separate public administrative status as were accorded the West New Guinea area in the pre-war governmental and legal structure of the Netherlands East Indies. See *Nederlands Nieuw Guinea in de Elfde Algemene Vergadering van de Verenigde Naties November 1956-Maart 1957*, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken no. 49 (The Hague, 1957), pp. 123, 142-143, 201, 217.

5. B. V. A. Röling, *Nieuw Guinea Als Wereldprobleem* (Assen, 1958), p. 18.

6. C. Smit, *De Indonesische Quastie. De Wordingsgeschiedenis der Souvereiniteitsoverdracht* (Leyden, 1952), pp. 97-98, note 2.

7. Van Baal, *Het Nieuw-Guinea Vraagstuk*, op. cit., pp. 10-12 and J. van Baal, 'De Bevolking van Zuid Nieuw Guinea onder Nederlandsch Bestuur: 36 jaren', *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-Land-en Volkenkunde Uitgegeven door het Koninklijk Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen*, vol. 79 (1939), p. 334 and note 1.

to call the 'non-Indonesian' character of the area. It was at another conference, the one in Den Pasar in December, 1946, which was to occupy itself again with the further implementation of the federal idea in Indonesia, that van Mook would stress the primitive condition of land and people of New Guinea, and the difficulty of gathering accurate impressions of Papuan political wishes, as other reasons for a special consideration for the area.⁸

Perhaps at no time during the Indonesian Revolution did ambiguity of policy statement become so confusing as at the Den Pasar meeting. This aspect of the matter has already been commented upon,⁹ but it is necessary to stress one feature of it that has not always received adequate consideration. As is known, several Den Pasar delegates objected to the provision in the draft regulation establishing the federal state of East Indonesia, which held that 'later' decision would be reached regarding the status of West New Guinea. These delegates stressed the historic ties between East Indonesia and West New Guinea, and especially the significance of the latter territory for the development of the former. What is apparent from the observations of the delegates (e.g., from the Nadjamuddin motion at the conference) is not only a desire to keep West New Guinea within a broad federated structure comprising all Indonesia, but more especially to keep it within the territory of the proposed state of East Indonesia.¹⁰ It is difficult to say if the element of regional sentiment here expressed among the supporters of the East Indonesian state necessarily included unqualified adhesion to the idea of inclusion of West New Guinea in a unitary national state. Van Mook's simultaneous declarations to the delegates that it was not the intention of the Dutch government to exclude West New Guinea from the projected new state of Indonesia and yet that the region, being 'non-Indonesian', should more properly not be united with an Indonesian state, but establish a separate

8. W. H. van Helsdingen, ed., *Op Weg Naar Een Nederlandsch-Indonesische Unie: Stemmen van Hier en Ginds* (The Hague, 1947), pp. 335-337.

9. See e.g. J. M. van der Kroef, *The West New Guinea Dispute* (Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1958), pp. 4-5.

10. W. A. van Goudoever, *Denpasar Bouwt Een Huis. Een Overzichtelijke Bewerking van Notulen en Tekstuele Redevoeringen ter Conferentie van Denpasar, 7-24 December, 1946* (Batavia, 1947), pp. 45-46. Thus, according to one knowledgeable Dutch source (J. A. van Beuge, *op. cit.*, p. 2) it was the Premier of the then still existing state of East Indonesia, Anak Agung, who, as representative of the federal states at the Round Table Conference at The Hague in 1949, was most concerned over a transfer of sovereignty that would include West New Guinea. The Republican delegation, though willing to support this position as far as possible, had 'at the time relatively little interest in New Guinea', certainly not to the point of wrecking the whole Round Table Conference.

relationship with either Indonesia, the Netherlands or the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, could not but becloud the issue,¹¹ even though the Den Pasar conference agreed that again 'later' it would be decided what relationship West New Guinea would have as regards the state of East Indonesia and the federal Indonesian Republic.

Recent Dutch writers take different views of van Mook's Den Pasar statements. Professor Röling, strongly sympathetic to the Indonesian view in the West New Guinea dispute, regards van Mook's concessions as possibly being of 'decisive importance' in the whole problem.¹² Röling devaluates subsequent official Dutch arguments that van Mook's pronouncements at Den Pasar were circumscribed by the government statement of December 10, 1946 (a week before the Den Pasar meeting was held) in which the government, on the advice of its representatives in Indonesia, envisaged a separate status for West New Guinea.¹³ For the Den Pasar delegates van Mook was the highest Dutch government representative, and his words *in situ* outweighed 'a dubious government declaration'. One need not be greatly impressed by Röling's argument to realize, nevertheless, that the muddle of ambiguity was undoubtedly exacerbated by these Dutch policy statements, and it is well to note that the Den Pasar promises made by van Mook have always figured strongly in the Indonesian case for West New Guinea. But van Mook has not been without defenders. The liberal Catholic parliamentary deputy, Verhoeven, for example, in a recent publication, argues that van Mook's views at Den Pasar must be taken in context and in the light of the existing political situation.

11. W. H. van Helsdingen, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 335-337.

12. Röling, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25. On the December 10, 1946, government declaration and the advice of the Dutch Commission General in Indonesia, both of which expressed the possibility of a special status (indeed the desirability of such a special status) for West New Guinea, see *Rapport van de Commissie Nieuw Guinea (Irian)* 1950 (The Hague, 1950), 2 de stuk, pp. 98-104 ff. It is well to stress that between Dutch negotiators in Indonesia (e.g., van Mook, but also a specially sent Commission General) and Dutch parliamentary and government circles there often existed a considerable disparity of approach and opinion on the Indonesian question, so that the decisions of Dutch negotiators in Indonesia seemed to the Dutch parliament and government to have been taken in excess of the authority given them. The consequence was the 'interpretation' by the latter of genuine points of difference. See in this connection the recent study based on the diary of one of the members of the Commission General, former Dutch Premier Schermerhorn, by C. Smit, *Het Akkoord van Linggadjati. Uit Het Dagboek van prof. dr. ir. W. Schermerhorn* (Amsterdam, Brussels, 1959), esp. pp. 79-84.

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To be sure, van Mook indicated that West New Guinea should be included in a projected Indonesian state, but, says Verhoeven:¹⁴

How can one accentuate this pronouncement so heavily, indeed, for the Dutch position so fatally heavily, when right next to it we have that other statement which we cited from Dr van Mook's words: namely that it must be regarded as more correct not to tie New Guinea to an Indonesian state, but to unite it — out of three possibilities — also with the Netherlands?

It is in the context of this train of thought, Verhoeven believes, that the value of van Mook's statement that West New Guinea should remain within the political frame of the future Indonesian state, is 'relativized', and robbed of the possibly 'decisive' significance which Röling assigns to it. Van Baal also believes that it is questionable whether van Mook at Den Pasar seriously deviated from the government's position, because even then — as is apparent from the statements being made in the Netherlands — 'opinions were still being formed' in the New Guinea matter; a 'clearly defined objective' in Dutch policy regarding the territory did not exist at the time.¹⁵

But Dutch apologists have usually a still stronger argument in this connection. A recent report to the Dutch Labour Party dealing with the pros and cons of the West New Guinea matter puts this argument succinctly: '... everything which took place before the Round Table Conference as regards the public legal status of New Guinea belongs to history. Only the RTC agreements provide the measure-rod for a judgement of the public legal status of the area'.¹⁶ The Round Table Conference Agreements of 1949 excepted West New Guinea from the Dutch transfer of sovereignty over its former East Indian possessions to the Indonesian Republic and provided that its status would be negotiated within one year. The phraseology of this excepting clause and the question of whether or not Indonesia recognized Dutch sovereignty over West New Guinea

14. Bernard Verhoeven, *Nieuw Guinea. Vraagstuk van Verantwoordelijkheid* (Amsterdam, 1959), p. 11.

15. Van Baal, *Het Nieuw Guinea Vraagstuk*, op. cit., p. 13.

16. *Het Vraagstuk Nieuw-Guinea. Rapport van de Dr. Wiardi Beckman Stichting* (Amsterdam, 1958), p. 26. This report was composed by a commission under the auspices of the Wiardi Beckman foundation in the Netherlands at the behest of the Labour Party, which at its March 1957 congress had adopted a resolution asking for a report setting forth various alternative solutions to the New Guinea question. Old Indies' hands and noted Indonesia scholars (e.g., P. J. Idenburg, F. M. baron van Asbeck, P. J. Koets) were members of the commission. In Dutch Labour Party circles there is by no means agreement on present policies toward West New Guinea and Indonesia. See the recent criticisms of five party members in *Vrij Nederland* (Amsterdam), September 5, 1959.

at the end of the Round Table Conference have elicited considerable comment in various publications, not the least because Indonesians since 1951 have maintained that the sovereignty transfer at the Round Table Conference *included* West New Guinea, and that only the status quo, i.e., Dutch authority over the disputed region, was to be maintained for one year. Now it is true that the West New Guinea clause of the RTC agreements does not mention the word sovereignty, but merely states that the status quo of this area, which was that of a residency of the Netherlands East Indies government, would be maintained for one year. In an exchange of letters between the Indonesian and Dutch delegations the two sides agreed that this term 'status quo' meant 'continuation of the authority (*gezag*) of the government of the Netherlands Kingdom over the residency of New Guinea'.¹⁷ Again the word sovereignty was not used, and recourse was deliberately had, according to Professor Röling, to an ambiguous phraseology; yet, even Röling has to admit that the word, let alone the concept of Dutch 'sovereignty' over West New Guinea was evidently recognized by Indonesia. In a note appended to the Round Table Agreements on the 'assignment of citizens' one reads that none of the provisions of the agreement would apply to the nationality of New Guinea residency inhabitants in case 'the sovereignty of this territory is not transferred to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia'.¹⁸ Röling, ever concerned with a defence of the Indonesian position, suggests that the use of the term sovereignty here is 'probably in error', and that in international law this use of the term should not be given decisive weight. Röling's interpretation seems of dubious value, however. For one thing, as van Baal points out, in their memoir of August 1, 1950, the Indonesian members of the joint Dutch-Indonesian Commission on West New Guinea (Irian) conclude that the 'sovereignty of Indonesia over land and people of Indonesia needs to be perfected before December 27, 1950, by means of the transfer of *sovereignty* over West Irian to the Indonesian government'.¹⁹ It would be difficult to gainsay from this demand that the Indonesians did not recognize existing Dutch sovereignty over West New Guinea. Verhoeven also points out that, juridically considered, recognition of the status quo of West New Guinea means 'nothing but an indication

17. *Resultaten van de Ronde Tafel Conferentie zoals Aanvaard tijdens de Tweede Algemene Vergadering Welke Op 2 November, 1949, werd gehouden in de Ridderzaal te 's-Gravenhage* (The Hague, 1949), pp. 83-84.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

19. *Rapport van de Commissie Nieuw Guinea (Irian)*, op. cit., 3rde stuk, p. 149, also cited van Baal, *Het Nieuw Guinea Vraagstuk*, op. cit., p. 28, note 11. Italics supplied.

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of the juridical position in which New Guinea found itself at the time of the Round Table Conference, namely, that of a region under Dutch sovereignty'. Moreover, the Round Table Agreement clause dealing with West New Guinea states that the positions of the two parties in the New Guinea question 'remain in dispute'. In this condition of 'remaining in dispute' there has subsequently been no change, argues Verhoeven, excluding by definition a change in status quo based on mutual agreement.²⁰ The latter view strikes one as somewhat specious, in view of the injunction in the New Guinea clause of the RTC agreements which provides that within a year the public status of West New Guinea 'shall be decided' by mutual deliberations between the two parties. On the other hand it is surprising to find Rölöng inclining towards the Indonesian view that sovereignty over West New Guinea was in fact transferred to Indonesia by the Netherlands at the Round Table Conference, leaving only the status quo to the Dutch for one year, inasmuch as the Netherlands, in 1952, proposed that this interpretation of Indonesia be submitted to the International Court for decision, a suggestion which Indonesia declined, on the grounds that this was not a juridical, but a political matter.

In the meantime even this Indonesian position was to change. Since the unilateral Indonesian abrogation of all remaining Round Table Conference Agreements early in 1956, Indonesia has maintained that the independence declaration of August 17, 1945, also applied to West New Guinea, and that Indonesian sovereignty over the area stems from that date. The juridical weaknesses and internal contradictions of this contention (e.g., the government of the Indonesian Republic in a memorandum to the US government on July 6, 1947, explicitly recognized Dutch sovereignty in Indonesia until 1949) has been sufficiently exposed not to require much elaboration here.²¹ Rölöng again seeks to defend this new Indonesian position by an appeal to the political significance of Asian nationalism directed against colonial domination and desiring to base the new concept of nationhood on the political unity of former colonial possessions. This argument of 'historic continuity' Rölöng regards as

20. Verhoeven, *op. cit.*, p. 10, note.

21. See the analysis of the Dutch delegate to the UN, C. W. Schürmann on February 23, 1957, in *Nederlands Nieuw Guinea in de Elfde Algemene Vergadering van de Verenigde Naties*, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-136. In the Dutch opinion Indonesia's claim of sovereignty to New Guinea based on the 1945 independence declaration is also weakened by President Sukarno's 1945 appeal to his people from 'Acheh to Amboyna', and by the enumeration of the territories of the Republic by the Indonesian Committee for the Preparation of Independence, described above.

of great significance in Indonesian attitudes toward West New Guinea.²² Perhaps so, but one must add that the legal and juridical basis of these attitudes has not been strengthened over the years.

The Indonesians are not alone in contradicting themselves in their appeal to principles with which to buttress their position. Thus, one may find Verhoeven declaring that prior to 1956 and the Indonesian abrogation of the Round Table Agreements, Indonesia could still construe a Dutch obligation to negotiate over West New Guinea on the basis of the New Guinea clause in the Round Table Agreements, but that after 1956 and the abrogation 'Indonesia deprived itself of the judicial basis' of such a Dutch duty to negotiate.²³ One is bound to point out that after 1951, although the Dutch were willing to negotiate with Indonesia, a transfer of Dutch sovereignty over West New Guinea to Indonesia was no longer a genuine talking point with the Dutch, if it ever had been. Moreover, in 1954, the Netherlands government declared officially that it no longer wished to negotiate over West New Guinea.²⁴ It will not do to say that Indonesian recalcitrance alone made further negotiations impossible; rigidity on the Dutch side was as much in evidence from the start and equally contributed to the impasse.²⁵ Moreover, it was this Dutch refusal to negotiate over the sovereignty of West New Guinea which led directly to the unilateral abrogation by Indonesia of the Round Table Agreements. As I have suggested elsewhere,²⁶ a strong

22. Röling, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-44.

23. Verhoeven, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

24. Van Beuge, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

25. After the Round Table Conference of 1949 Dutch proposals made in negotiation with the Indonesians over West New Guinea's future status do not show the slightest indication that the Netherlands would compromise on the sovereignty issue. For example, in the negotiations in April and December, 1950, the Dutch proposed that the sovereignty over West New Guinea would be vested in the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, but 'with complete retention of Dutch authority over New Guinea'. This Dutch authority would 'freely be in the hands of the Netherlands . . . and could only be influenced by decisions *unanimously* reached by the Conference of Ministers of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union'. Earlier the Dutch had proposed a 'New Guinea Council', equally composed of Dutch and Indonesians, to which the Dutch government would send a report on its policies. Again only unanimous decisions of this Council could influence Dutch policy in New Guinea. (Cited here from *Het Vraagstuk Nieuw-Guinea. Rapport van de Dr. Wiardi Beckman Stichting, op. cit.*, p. 27, my italics.) Dutch charges that Indonesians refused to negotiate unless it was *a priori* decided that West New Guinea should pass to Indonesian sovereignty (a charge substantiated by the report of the United Nations Commission on Indonesia to the Security Council, April 2, 1951, Document S/2187, p. 23), and that this recalcitrance made further negotiations impossible, should be seen in the light of the equal rigidity of the Dutch.

26. Van der Kroef, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

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point in the Indonesian case is precisely this Dutch obligation to negotiate. For the New Guinea clause in the Round Table Agreement of 1949 can in no way be made to assert undisputed Dutch sovereignty over West New Guinea, since it says, in effect, that such (implied) sovereignty will continue, and that within one year the status of the area 'shall' be decided by mutual consultations. To decline further discussions on the question of transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia of the disputed area because no agreement was reached after initial meetings, could be interpreted as doing violence at least to the spirit and intent of the West New Guinea clause in the Round Table Agreements.²⁷

II

The nature of Dutch policies and development efforts in West New Guinea has never been free from continuous criticism. This aspect of the problem tends, on the whole, to be passed over by defenders of the Indonesian position, because Indonesia's own domestic political and economic condition is presently so unstable as to raise serious questions about its ability to aid significantly in the area's advance. To some observers, however, this by no means leads to the conclusion that the Dutch should be allowed to retain control over the area because the character of Dutch policies, they claim, offers little guarantee of a development in a democratic direction for the area, the often repeated objective of Dutch administration.

27. While the alleged sterility of Dutch 'legalism' has been often commented upon, the more political and 'evolutionary' Indonesian approach has not contributed to a clarification of the issues in the West New Guinea dispute either. The Round Table Conference Agreements formed a significant part of the legal claim of Indonesia. Now, however, these Agreements are sometimes seen as a mere 'tactic'. What to think of pronouncements such as these, made by President Sukarno on Indonesian independence day, August 17, 1959 (*Indonesian Spectator*, Djakarta, September 1, 1959, p. 11): 'I do not disparage the Round Table Conference as a tactic of struggle. In the past I myself sketched the outline of what I called a new "tracée" in order to obtain recognition of our sovereignty. But I do not endorse those who do not understand the dangers of obstruction to the Revolution which arose as a consequence of the compromise of the Round Table Conference. . . . They say that we must always bow to international agreements: Once we have agreed to a certain international agreement we may never till the end of the world deviate from it! They say that we may not alter the federal state à la van Mook, may not annul the (Netherlands-Indonesian) Union, because we have signed the Round Table Conference Agreements. "Faithful to the letter, faithful to the letter!" such is the wisdom which they sanctify. It is very plain they do not understand at all what is called a Revolution. It is very plain that they do not understand that precisely what a Revolution does is to repudiate the letter!'

One recent publicist sees West New Guinea as a bureaucratic paradise, in which government hierarchy gives a statist character to the entire social process and public criticism, let alone the formation of public opinion, is stunted.²⁸ The dominance of the state apparatus, so it is alleged, also obstructs economic development and the deployment of private initiative. When recently it was rumoured that 450 employees in government service were about to be dismissed as a result of government reorganization (a rumour subsequently denied by the government), one of West New Guinea's few dailies uttered this editorial complaint (which, incidentally, showed that 'freedom of the press' is not altogether fiction in this part of the world):²⁹

The government has in the past, for years now, nipped all private initiative in the bud and brought most enterprises under its control. We are therefore now confronted by the debacle of a guided economy which has emasculated the natural development of the economy in the past.

Thus [the government], has among other things transformed free workers into a kind of government service-workers, who are no longer fitted to a system of competitive work efforts. The majority of workers who preferred to remain free have in the past period, at their wits' end, left the country. As a result of this economic policy of the government there has gradually been created a class of employees which was turned away from private enterprise, was absorbed in government service and which, trusting the government, gradually adjusted itself to monopolistic government need, as a result of which healthy competition, the condition for a sound system of enterprise, no longer existed. The result was a bloodless and eroded society, subject to despotic decrees, which in many cases did not have the best effort but arbitrariness as its incentive.

The heavy hand of government, however it may be guided by a humanitarian mind concerned with the welfare of all population groups, also slows the private economic development of the autochthonous population in the interests of social balance. One is reminded of the onetime policy of employing the Papuan as worker on an estate, but prohibiting him from obtaining a plot of land of

28. S. Franken, 'Nieuw Guinea — van binnen uit', pp. 31-32 in *Terdege Ter Discussie. Vraagstukken betreffende de Verhouding Nederland-Indonesië-Nieuw Guinea* (The Hague, 1958). This brochure reflects Protestant Evangelical and left of centre political points of view in opposition to present Dutch policies towards Indonesia and West New Guinea. In addition to Franken's, there are contributions by C. van der Straaten, R. Roolvink, P. Telder and J. Verkuyl.

29. 'Klare Wijn', *Nieuw Guinea Koerier* (Hollandia), September 17, 1959, and September 28, 1959.

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his own nearby as a result of which he might become a competitor of the Dutch or Eurasian estate owner in the cultivation of marketable crops.³⁰ The demand for greater economic freedom (i.e., abandonment of government prescribed profit margins on certain goods in privately owned shops) has also arisen in the small Dutch mercantile group.³¹

Still, the bureaucratic regulatory structure of the West New Guinea economy should be seen in the context of what has already been achieved in terms of available area resources, and then it is difficult to leaf through the most recent report on West New Guinea of the Dutch government to the United Nations without noticing both significant accomplishments and apparent areas of stagnation. There is steady progress in the field of welfare services and control over the Papuan's social needs. Between 1954-1958 the number of registered Papuans in directly controlled areas increased from roughly 280,000 to 350,000, though some 38,000 in directly controlled parts of the country and an estimated 300,000 in indirectly supervised regions are unregistered. The total number of schools (both those subsidized and not subsidized by the government) and training courses increased from 1,181 to 1,203 in the period 1957-1958, with a corresponding growth in the number of teachers from 1,851 to 1,940, and of students from 51,198 to 53,002. In 1958 20 Papuans studied in the Netherlands and the first Papuan was admitted to the University of Leyden. Expenditures for health and medical services rose from 3.2 million florins in 1953 to 7 million in 1958, although between 1957-1958 hospital beds slightly decreased, while the number of patients grew. Between 1953 and 1958 the number of Papuans in the governing arm of the civil service grew from 49 to 87, and of the 66 districts in the West New Guinea territory 28 by the end of 1958 were headed by Papuans. The number of regular Papuan officials in government services (exclusive of such categories as day labourers) generally more than doubled between 1953 and 1958 (746 to 1,568), the number of Papuan government teachers alone increasing in this period from 255 to 521. In 1958 there were seven co-operative associations with a membership of 4,500 and a total capital of more than 300,000 florins, some 45 other co-operatives comprising

30. R. E. Filet, 'Het Arbeidsvraagstuk', p. 462 in W. C. Klein, ed., *Nieuw Guinea. De Ontwikkeling op Economisch, Sociaal en Cultureel Gebied in Nederland en Australisch Nieuw Guinea* (The Hague, 1953), vol. 1. Among the projects which will be financed with Euro-market money in the future, is a government estate in conjunction with smallholders' cultivation of cacao in the Grime plain near Lake Sentani. The government estate will serve as 'model' for the surrounding individual Papuan smallholders.

31. *Nieuw Guinea Koerier*, August 21, 1959.

about 3,000 members were in a process of development. Agricultural extension services and a number of pilot projects aid the Papuan cultivator greatly in the advance of a stable farm market economy. The budgets for the West New Guinea region, as approved by the Dutch government, have steadily grown over the years (e.g., 36.2 million florins in 1950, 93.9 in 1954, and 133.0 in 1958) and, since the country lacks the means completely to defray the expense of its own development, the contributions by the Dutch government have correspondingly grown (e.g., 15.5 million florins in 1950, 42.3 million in 1954, and 65.9 in 1958). Taking the last figure as a criterion, apologists for Dutch retention of the West New Guinea area might well ask if Indonesia, given its present difficulties, would be able to contribute some 700 million Rupiah (about 66 million florins) a year for the benefit of West New Guinea's development.³²

But the advance in welfare services and growth of budget allocations cannot obscure the fact that thus far West New Guinea's economic development has not reached the point of significant self-acceleration and, after nearly fifteen years of progressively more intensified administrative concern, seems in some fields even to be stagnating. Exports, both as to total volume and total value, have steadily declined since 1954, while imports continued to climb, until sharply curtailed in 1958. Especially alarming has been the decline

IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF WEST NEW GUINEA

Year	1954-1959 Exports		Imports	
	Weight	Value	Weight	Value
1954	509,805.4	31,149.6	75,716.6	75,802.6
1955	492,217.5	30,908.0	89,324.7	95,511.7
1956	372,256.5	27,445.5	117,371.3	98,788.2
1957	341,521.2	29,242.6	119,297.7	114,298.4
1958	275,534.8	24,192.1	92,567.0	85,860.1

Weights in 1000's of kilograms, values in 1000's of florins. Exports include petroleum and scrap.

Source: *Rapport Inzake Nederlands—Nieuw-Guinea Over Net Jaar 1958, Uitgebracht Aan De Verenigde Naties Ingevolge Artikel 73E Van Het Handvest* (Ministerie van Zaken Overzee, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (s.l., 1959), tables XXIV, XXV and XXVII A.

32. *Rapport Inzake Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea Over Het Jaar 1958. Uitgebracht Aan De Verenigde Naties Ingevolge Artikel 73E Van Het Handvest* (Ministerie van Zaken Overzee, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, s.l., 1959), pp. 3, 4, 15, 57, 74-75, 93-98. Comparisons have also been made with the 1957 report of the same title. On the financial structure of West New Guinea see also C. A. Cannegieter, 'De Monetaire Verhoudingen in Nederlands-Nieuw Guinea', *Economisch—Statistische Berichten*, vol. 44 (1959), no. 2191, pp. 547-548.

in petroleum production (from a peak production of 550,000 tons in 1954 to about 267,000 tons in 1958).³³ Although agreement has been reached recently between three Dutch corporations and the US Steel Corporation to explore and develop the nickel and cobalt resources of West New Guinea,³⁴ it will be some time before this development will begin to affect the area's economy. While the drop in imports since 1958 is ascribed to the completion of many basic facilities and development projects, the percentage of export value in terms of import value remains low (in 1954 41 per cent, in 1958 33 per cent). The first half of 1959, however, showed export increases both in volume and in value over the corresponding period the year before, but it is doubtful how stable a trend this upswing represents. For one of the characteristics of the domestic economy is the extreme instability of the agricultural export market, particularly of indigenous Papuan production. An example is the nutmeg production for export in the Fak Fak area, which, being also a spontaneous indigenous development, added significantly to the wealth and development of the Papuan community well before the government began to take an interest in it. But even a small increase in production in nearby East Indonesia causes the bottom to fall out of the Fak Fak nutmeg market and, with various forms of government aid, measures have been taken to ensure that 'the inhabitants of the Fak Fak area will not suddenly slide from wealth back into poverty'.³⁵ A special foundation to promote the export of smallholders' products (e.g., copra, copal and shells) which was founded in 1957, in Hollandia, has contributed its share to maintaining stability of this sector of the indigenous economy, and copra exports in 1958 alone grew with 12 per cent over the year before.³⁶ Production of rice, beetroots and fresh vegetables has equally expanded, but serves primarily local markets. The point is that all these products, including the much discussed cacao, cultivation of which by indigenous smallholders was recently introduced in several areas are, even when considered in

33. *Rapport Inzake Nederlands-Nieuw Guinea*, 1958, *op. cit.*, table XIII and *Vademecum Voor Nederlands Nieuw Guinea* 1956 (Den Helder, s.a.), p. 120.

34. Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, *Persdocumentatie betreffende Suri-name en de Nederlandse Antillen en Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea* (The Hague), vol. 1, no. 18, September 11, 1959.

35. M. Flach, 'De Huidige Welvaartsbron van Fak Fak: De Cultuur van Muskaatnoot en Foelie', *Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea*, vol. 7, no. 2 (March, 1959), pp. 18-21; See also the same author's article 'De Ontwikkeling van de Noot-muskaatcultuur op Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea en het Rapport van de Agrarische Commissie', *Nieuw Guinea Studien*, vol. 3 (1959), pp. 47-53.

36. D. Ducloux, 'De Export van Bevolkingsproducten', *Nederlands Nieuw Guinea*, vol. 7, no. 1 (January, 1959), pp. 8-9, and *Rapport Inzake Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea* 1958, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

combination, of such limited overall developmental significance, and are so hedged by uncertainties, that their role in terms of significant economic growth must be regarded as minimal, at least for years to come.³⁷

'New Guinea', van Baal has remarked, 'does not await a miracle, it awaits the hand of man'³⁸ and, particularly because of the political perspective in which West New Guinea's development has to be considered, this human hand will have to come from outside New Guinea. It is not just a question of the lack of initiative of some Papuans, who unless exhorted to accumulate food at regular times would die of hunger,³⁹ it is the apathy of Dutch capital and commercial interest, aggravated by bureaucratic control and by what one New Guinea weekly called 'the continued placing in debate of the legitimacy and appropriateness of our presence in this country by many authoritative persons and organizations'.⁴⁰ The very doubts that are aroused about the legitimacy of the Dutch position in West New Guinea impede a broader development effort and so lend substance to further doubts. Since 1953, declared a self styled 'pessimist' in a recent interview with a West New Guinea newspaper, 'private entrepreneurs have been leaving; whoever is able to, leaves. . . . That is the clear language of the facts.'⁴¹ The lack of sufficient development impulses from private Dutch capital is beginning to affect the growing group of would-be petty Papuan entrepreneurs as well. Nicolas Jouwé, a prominent figure in the emancipated Papuan

37. The Commission to study agricultural development possibilities in West New Guinea declared in its 1954 report that the basis, even of the better smallholder enterprises, is extremely feeble, and that a sound foundation, also from the point of view of operational efficiency and capital, of the smallholders' enterprises did not exist. The Commission not only recommended credit facilities but also a different form of enterprise with a stronger capital basis. *Rapport van de Commissie van Advies inzake de Agrarische Ontwikkelingsmogelijkheden in Nieuw Guinea*, pp. 82-83, cited P. Helder, 'Het Credietwezen in Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea', *Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea*, vol. 7, no. 3 (May, 1959), p. 10. While credit had been forthcoming, the strengthening of the business operational aspect of smallholders' production, also by means of e.g. introducing the capital and marketing mechanisms of private Western enterprise, would seem to be too greatly delayed.

38. Van Baal, *Het Nieuw-Guinea Vraagstuk*, op. cit., p. 43.

39. J. C. de Bruine in *Elsevier* (Amsterdam), June 13, 1959, cited in *Persadocumentatie Ministerie van Zaken Overzee* (The Hague), vol. 2, no. 217, June 15, 1959.

40. *De Tifa*, May 30, 1959, cited in *Persadocumentatie Ministerie van Zaken Overzee*, vol. 2, no. 199, June 1, 1959.

41. *Nieuw Guinea Koerier*, June 29, 1959. As a result of the unfavourable tax rate one journal recently noted that 'in the last few months a veritable exodus of small businessmen' has taken place from West New Guinea to the

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population group, recently revealed that due to rising unemployment among Papuans a group of Papuan leaders approached Japanese business concerns with an interest in Papuan forest products (e.g., rotan and damar); the Japanese in turn indicated a willingness to supply Papuans with capital and technical aids and Jouwé and his associates have requested the government for permission to form an enterprise to realize these plans.⁴² It would be incorrect to conclude from this that no official or private credit from Dutch sources is available to private Papuan ventures,⁴³ it is to say that such credit is comparatively ineffective if left unsupported by foreign purchasing, marketing and distributing concerns which could provide the small producer with the organizational mechanism of a larger market. The comparatively small number of such private Dutch concerns is conspicuous in West New Guinea. Apart from the reluctance caused by the legitimacy factor, a recent student comparing the economies of West and East (Australian) New Guinea points to another cause: the special 'coddling' of the private entrepreneur in East New Guinea compared to the Western part. Instead of complaints about the lack of governmental co-operation and about excessive bureaucracy which are common in the Dutch part of the island, one hears praise for official policy in the Australian section, where—until recently—no income tax existed to hinder the entrepreneur, where import regulations are more liberal, and where basic facilities are sufficiently available to attract, even as permanent residents, Australians on pension. The results are striking: the value of exports from Australian New Guinea is equal to the size of the government budget of the area (about 110 million florins, slightly less than recent budgets of West New Guinea), whereas exports from Dutch New Guinea only comprise about 20 per cent of the government budget.⁴⁴

Netherlands and to Australia. *Oost en West*, November, 1959, p. 26. An analysis of immigration and emigration data show that at least in the past two years substantially more private persons have left than have entered the area. In 1957 2,156 left for 1,763 that entered. Of those leaving 1,493, and of those entering 1,195 were Dutch citizens. In 1958 1,911 left the area, and 1,464 entered. Of these 1,958 emigrants 1,436 were Dutch citizens, as were 985 of those entering. *Rapport Inzake Nederlands-Nieuw Guinea*, 1958, *op. cit.*, table V A, and the 1957 report of the same title, table V A.

42. *De Tifa*, October 3, 1959, cited in Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, *Persdocumentatie Betreffende Suriname en de Nederlandse Antillen en Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea*, vol. 1, no. 53, October 5, 1959.

43. P. Helder, 'Het Credietwezen in Nederlandsch-Nieuw-Guinea', *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.

44. C. A. Cannegieter, 'De Economische Betekenis van het Nederlandse en het Australische Gedeelte van Nieuw-Guinea', *Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea*, vol.

The retardation of economic development due to the comparative paucity of Dutch private investment or business organization is beginning to exact its toll in the educational sector, where the spectre of unemployment of the semi-skilled or otherwise educated Papuan is becoming more and more prominent. Commenting recently on the encouragement given by West New Guinea employee organizations to increased private entrepreneurial activity, one West New Guinea daily praised the wisdom of this move, saying that 'students of technical programmes' were now threatened with not being 'able to find work with the acquired diploma'.⁴⁵ Indeed, according to one knowledgeable view, the entire structure and tempo of educational development raises problems. For the mass of Papuans a three year village school is the rule, connecting with a three year 'continuation school' (vvs). In the cities there are two types of primary schools which connect with regular secondary education, but these comprise only a minority of all Papuan pupils. Moreover there appear to be many more suitable pupils for the vvs schools than available places, yet the number of vvs schools 'needs to be restricted in order to avoid the creation of an intellectual proletariat'. The result is 'that 90 per cent of Papuan children only acquire a small educational base of three years village schooling. Perhaps too little for a minimum civilized foundation'.⁴⁶ Reference has already been made to the plan of Jouwé to help meet the problem of Papuan unemployment.

But there are other educational difficulties that loom larger because of the overall development needs of West New Guinea. Thus far no clear decision has been made as to what language (Dutch, Malay or a Papuan regional language) will serve as the area's princi-

7, no. 4 (July, 1959), pp. 6-9. Recently private entrepreneurs in West New Guinea approached fiscal authorities with a request for a change in the tax structure, specifically the abolition of income taxes and an alteration in the amount of indirect taxes. The paucity of private Western enterprise and the fact that Japanese and Australian corporations which were at one time considering investment in West New Guinea but thought better of it later are both attributed to West New Guinea's repressive tax structure. In the Netherlands, with its highly industrialized economy the ratio of direct to indirect taxes is about 50-50, while in underdeveloped West New Guinea 60% of state revenue is derived from direct taxes, and 40% from indirect taxes, 'as if New Guinea was more developed than the Netherlands'. See *Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea*, vol. 7, no. 6 (November, 1959), p. 28 and Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, *Persdocumentatie betreffende Suriname, en de Nederlandse Antillen en Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea*, vol. 1, no. 62, October 12, 1959.

45. *Nieuw Guinea Koerier*, June 29, 1959.

46. A. Matti and W. Spekking, 'Meer Onderwijs voor de Jeugd in Nieuw-Guinea?', *Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea*, vol. 6, no. 4 (July, 1958), p. 19. For recent analysis of educational problems see also K. J. S. Knol, 'Pedagogiek in de Praktijk', *Schakels*, 1959, NNG 30, pp. 16-25.

pal 'mother tongue' and confusion in language training in schools and government curricula continues. Roman Catholic and Protestant missions have been in sharp conflict ever since the Catholic mission was allowed to open a parochial school in 'Protestant' Hollandia with government subsidy. The 'unwritten law' Protestant mission work would centre on the Northern part of West New Guinea, the Catholic mission on the Southern part, was deemed to have been broken by this government subsidy to a Catholic school in the North, and dark allegations that the government is too susceptible to pressures coming from Roman Catholic circles have combined with implications in the Protestant confessional-political press that the coalition of parties supporting the present De Quay cabinet may be in danger. Such rivalry redounds adversely on the whole development process. The intellectual hold of modern Westernized education on the Papuan is often very tenuous, and when such intellectual training is not combined with tangible economic changes the results are bloody eruptions, of which the uprising in the Mappi tribal region in the South last year is a case in point.⁴⁷

To be sure, the question of the 'educated unemployed' should not be exaggerated. West New Guinea is still among the most primitive areas of the world and Dutch experts are quick to emphasize the enormous social and cultural impediments to Papuan development:⁴⁸

A pattern of organized community activity, such as the kibbutz in Israel, makes no sense to the Papuan whose community sense does not extend beyond the kacharin garden of a small group; an injection of American 'knowhow' has little effect on the Papuan, whose scientific capacity does not go beyond the visually attractive image of the phenomenon of a tractor. Thus money economy is an anxiously complicated concept for the Papuan, who does not know how to bring together an amount in rix dollars out of a handful of dimes and cents, and is equally ignorant of what he can purchase with this wealth. New Guinea is, considering its primitive condition and confrontation with the western world, an especially disharmonious country.

Thus speaks the voice of conservatism, in judgement of the

47. H. K. J. Cowan, 'Nederlands, Maleis en Streektaal', *Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea*, vol. 7, no. 6 (November, 1959), pp. 6-9; Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, *Perisdocumentatie betreffende Suriname en de Nederlandse Antillen en Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea*, vol. 1, no. 74 (October 19, 1959), no. 93 (November 2, 1959), no. 103 (November 7, 1959), no. 115 (November 16, 1959), no. 131 (November 26, 1959), no. 141 (December 3, 1959).

48. J. H. de Haan, 'Streekplanontwikkeling in Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea, in het bijzonder in het Ajamaroe gebied', *Nieuw Guinea Studien*, vol. 2 (1958), p. 174.

'emotional drive of the Papuan who wishes more, better, and higher than the level at which he is now living'. It is debatable, however, whether this conservatism, based upon the maintenance of social integration and resistant to rapid cultural change, is itself sufficiently aware of development achievements in other fields, which will inevitably affect the social process. One cannot read the quiet boast that 'the basis for a sound leprosy control has been laid',⁴⁹ or that it will definitely be possible to undertake large scale mechanized rice farming in the South, sufficient to satisfy the rice demand of the entire West New Guinea area,⁵⁰ or note the significant economic development engendered by agricultural nuclei programmes in Japen and Waropen (where 'in ever more homes there appears furniture, an attractive decorative cloth on the wall, here and there a sewing machine, a record player, or a battery fed radio')⁵¹ without realizing that the social and ideological revolution of the Papuan may be expected shortly, and in some respects is already here. 'The nationalism of the Papuan', a Dutch newspaper recently warned, 'will not have to be waited upon for very long'.⁵²

This Papuan revolution stands of course in the traditional signs of monetization and individualism of social and economic life. Even in projects which begin with a common work effort pattern the shift to individual performance is apparent. One student, noting the course of the development of a co-operative in the Nimboran area, indicates how individual farming in private plots has come to be preferred over work on the co-operative's mechanized farm as soon as 'the visible results and advantages to the individual garden owners were observed'. How significant advancing monetization can be as a dynamic in the Papuan economy is apparent from the cultivation of cacao in the Seroei region. It was the government's intention to encourage not the production of an export crop such as cacao but of better food crops, in order to improve the menu of the Papuans of the area. Improvement of food crop cultivation proved very difficult, however, due to the unfamiliarity of the population with some of these food crops and their manner of preparation, as well as the presence of certain customary prohibitions on the cultivation of such crops. It appeared however

49. D. D. Leiker, 'Leprosy Control in Netherlands New Guinea', *South Pacific Commission Quarterly Bulletin*, October, 1958, p. 33.

50. J. S. Vollema, 'Mechanized Rice Growing in Netherlands New Guinea', *South Pacific Commission Quarterly Bulletin*, July, 1958, p. 31.

51. L. H. Huizenga, 'De Landbouwkernen op Japen en in de Waropen', *Nieuw Guinea Studien*, vol. 3 (1959), p. 94.

52. *Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant*, August 21, 1959, cited *Persdocumentatie Ministerie van Zaken Overzee*, vol. 2, no. 323, August 24, 1959.

that the need for money among the Seroei Papuans offered a new point of contact. It proved much easier to persuade the Papuan to cultivate commercial crops which had an immediate cash value; but the food crops were not forgotten and the government urged their cultivation alongside with the commercial crops on the land. Gradually the populace began to consume an increasingly greater amount of their own food crops, and thus the government had reached its objective — via the money interest of the cultivator and the commercial crops which it had not originally intended to use as 'bait'. But the less attractive side of this new individuation process should not be ignored. The steady trek to the larger cities has brought with it the problem of the rootless, de-tribalized and proletarianized Papuan, often out of work, living in wretched shanty towns, floating on a life of criminality and social unrest and unable or unwilling to go back to his traditional village environment. Paradoxically it is often not the ease, but the difficulty of connections between the rural areas and the cities that contributes to the human flotsam in the shanty towns: a Papuan having made his way to the city after great difficulty often finds it impossible to go back because of the cost of the journey. The shanty towns appear to be inhabited especially by younger, emancipated Papuan males who have worked for one of the bigger industrial installations. The consequence of the recent announcement, therefore, that the Netherlands New Guinea Petroleum Company would have to lay off as much as 50 per cent of its employees in the near future because of diminishing profitability of operations, can be imagined.⁵³

The integration of this awakening Papuan element in the economic structure of the region is West New Guinea's principal domestic problem, and it is realized that in many areas reforms are overdue. A thorough overhaul of the public legal structure of the region is forthcoming, including a restructuring of the position of the civil service. A new look at the pattern of land rights and land tenure needs to be taken. During the Fourth South Pacific Conference in Rabaul this year, Papuan representatives of West New Guinea expressed their approval of certain policy principles advanced by Australian New Guinea about the land tenure question in relation to development. Specifically, this approval entailed a recognition that

53. P. J. van Dooren, 'The Role of Cooperatives in Community Development', *Nieuw Guinea Studien*, vol. 3 (1959), pp. 241-259; *Nieuw Guinea Koerier*, November 20, 1959; 'Trek naar de Stad', *Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea*, vol. 7, no. 6 (November, 1959), p. 29, and Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, *Pers-documentatie betreffende Suriname en de Nederlandse Antillen en Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea*, vol. 1, no. 139, December 2, 1959.

traditional tribal concepts of land tenure can be a hindrance to development and a recommendation to the government to encourage the settlement of smallholders producing exportable crops on individually owned lands. Experience in West New Guinea has taught, declared the West New Guinea delegation, that cash crop cultivation in communal gardens meets with resistance from the population, because it is feared that tribal leaders arrogate most of the proceeds of such crops.⁵⁴ Although Papuan rights to the soil, either collective or individual, are not unrestricted in West New Guinea legislation, recognition of these rights is the foundation of agrarian policy in the area.⁵⁵ The benefits of such a policy, integrated with the co-ordinated social development of the Papuan, are self evident, but it is equally true that in a thinly populated region such as West New Guinea, still lacking in significant development impulses, Papuan land rights can be major obstacles to economic advance. An example is what befell a Dutch entrepreneur in the Hollandia area recently, who had noticed that sereh grass from which the so-called citronella oil is produced grew well on plots where other market crops would not grow. The entrepreneur in question proposed the cultivation of the grass near Lake Sentani but the plan has foundered mainly because the Papuan population in question has declined to set aside the necessary land for the project.⁵⁶

The slow pace of economic development has its effects also on the speed with which the road to political autonomy is travelled. The comparative absence of a viable body of public and political opinion aggravates the stultifying bureaucratic atmosphere of the West New Guinea community, the dangers of which only tend to become evident as a result of some spectacular scandal or other, like the recent mail censorship affair.⁵⁷ The gradual institution of lower levels of local autonomy (such as the 'regional community' or *streekgemeenschap*

54. Gouvernement van Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea, Bureau Voorlichting ter Gouvernementssecretarie Hollandia, *Mededelingen Voor De Pers*, No. BEP 20, *De Vierde Zuid Pacific Conferentie te Rabaul*, 1959 (mimeo), pp. 5-6.

55. On land tenure legislation see H. G. Verhoeff, 'Overheid en Grond in Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea. Beginselen van Agrarisch Beleid', *Nieuw Guinea Studien*, vol. 1 (1957), pp. 31-58; 129-146; 225-256, and V. E. Korn, *De Grond van de Papoea in de Staten Generaal* (The Hague, 1956).

56. *Nieuw Guinea Koerier*, July 17, 1959.

57. On June 12, 1959, the acting attorney general at the Justice Court of Netherlands New Guinea, W. C. van Beek, was ordered on leave by Governor P. J. Platteel, ostensibly because of the manner in which van Beek had made known his objections to allegedly illegal procedures of censorship of letters carried out by police in New Guinea. The dismissal created a political tempest in New Guinea as well as in the Netherlands, since other prominent figures in the New Guinea community, including a Papuan leader and the Apostolic

of Biak Numfoor, established on June 24, 1959),⁵⁸ with their own local councils, as well as the foundation of advisory councils (like the one in Hollandia), and the promised formation of a Papuan Council for the entire area, strike one as significant only in the context of some definite time-table or programmed scheme of development toward self government, but if a programme exists emancipated Papuan opinion is not aware of it. The lack of meaningful public legal rights also arouses concern in the community of Dutch private citizens. The educated Papuan's future for some time now seems mainly determined by employment opportunity in lower bureaucratic functions. In 1958, 1,568 regular Papuan civil servants were in the employ of the government (1,439 in 1957) and the largest single groups of them consisted of lowest grade policemen (301) and village school teachers (247). Even considering the time element, one is not impressed by the number of Papuans who have been deemed qualified to hold positions of some executive responsibility, such as supervisor in the technical services (1), head of a principal police station (2), top grade 'government assistant' (2), or head forest official (1). In principle all types of schooling are equally open to all population groups, but Papuan salaries on the average are half of those received by the higher grade Dutch officials. Thus, a Papuan policeman of the lowest rank has a monthly salary of about \$45 (163.63 florins), a village school teacher of about \$54 (222 florins), a beginning 'government assistant' about \$105 (426.25 florins).⁵⁹ These are 'typically' Papuan positions, and are so regarded by Papuans and Dutch alike.

It is against such a socio-economic background that the development claims and exhortations of recent Dutch publicists should be evaluated. For Verhoeven there is a noble task reserved for the Dutch in West New Guinea; even in the so often colourless official reports about the area he discerns a 'mysterious fire' of zeal and

Vicar to the area, also reputedly had their letters opened by officials. Though some legal basis for these censorship procedures is not altogether lacking, a general feeling that excesses might have been committed led first to a visit of Platteel to the Netherlands, and then to the sending of a special committee appointed by the government to investigate the censorship charges. The committee heard testimony both in Holland and in New Guinea, and although at this time of writing its report has not as yet been made public it is reported that the committee did find numerous cases of illegal opening of letters of private citizens by government officials.

58. See *Gouvernement van Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea*, Bureau Voorlichting ter Gouvernementssecretarie, Hollandia, *Mededelingen voor de Pers*, nos. 39, 50, 1959.

59. *Rapport Inzake Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea*, 1958, *op. cit.*, tables VII and XXVIII.

personal devotion. He also points out that 'our task in New Guinea does not exceed the limits of our capacities, in view of the fact that the annual investment in this overseas part of the realm does not amount to one half of one per cent of our total budget'.⁶⁰ A somewhat more substantial effort, however, than this, should, as we have seen, be given some consideration. The writers of the Wiardi Beckman Institution report to the Dutch Labour Party agree with a leading Labour deputy that the Netherlands is a country 'which only with very limited means can promote the development of West New Guinea and which is even more limited in its means of protecting the Papuan'.⁶¹ It seems clear that an adequate deployment of these limited Dutch means, both private and governmental, has not as yet taken place, and what is worse, that a systematic, time structured and integrated development plan, based on development resources both in West New Guinea and the Netherlands, still awaits formulation, let alone implementation. Even on essential details of such a possible plan there appears to be no agreement. West New Guinea is thinly populated; a case could be made for the capital, organizational and technical skills of limited numbers of immigrants to raise the productivity of its inhabitants. The policy of protecting the social integrity of the indigenous Papuan population has greatly contributed to the retardation of extensive immigration by such population groups as might contribute significantly to the *per capita* output, and thus to the introduction of the dynamics of economic development by private entrepreneurs. It is a question, as the Wiardi Beckman report points out, whether this overriding recognition of Papuan interests is necessarily beneficial to the area's economic growth in the long run.⁶² One may, with an eye to historic developments in Indonesia, wish to avoid the typical socio-economic structure of colonialism in Asia in which the economic process is dominated by alien population groups, but since today the Papuan himself searches for entrepreneurial organization and outlets, it is surprising to see so few Dutch writers comment on the possibility of a carefully supervised partnership between immigrant investor and distributor, and indigenous producer. The comparative insignificance of foreign (including Dutch) population groups which meaningfully contribute to the development of the West New Guinea area, it may be argued, also draws the socio-economic, and ultimately the political antitheses between Papuan and the Dutch

60. Verhoeven, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

61. *Het Vraagstuk Nieuw-Guinea. Rapport van de Dr. Wiardi Beckman Stichting, op. cit.*, p. 11.

62. *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

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government in ever more unequivocal and exclusive terms, a process which could not but be detrimental to that 'relation of friendship' which, when the ultimate goal of Papuan self determination has been reached, 'does not lead to its dissolution but to its reaffirmation'.⁶³

The opponents of Dutch legal claims to West New Guinea have no difficulty deprecating the Dutch development effort. New Guinea needs labour and, according to Röling, Indonesia should be given first consideration in supplying this need, for Asians are better suited than Europeans to prepare other Asians (here Röling means Papuans) to live in an Asian environment. Financially West New Guinea is a burden to the Netherlands and adequate amounts of Dutch capital for investment in New Guinea are lacking.⁶⁴ The latter contention must be regarded as doubtful indeed, and the amount set aside in the Dutch budget to defray West New Guinea deficits is hardly a significant burden. But West New Guinea does need capital and capital goods, the technology which can with ease overcome its labour shortage; it requires the organizational mechanism of commercial export agriculture and small scale industry. All these tend to be in short supply in Indonesia itself. It can again be argued that it is immigrant labour of a rather high level of technical and organizational skill, backed by capital resources, which West New Guinea primarily needs, not the poverty stricken and technically untutored migrants from overcrowded Java. One recent critic of Dutch New Guinea policy asks whether the Netherlands does not herself require the capital now being used and still needed to develop New Guinea, in view of Holland's rapidly grow-

63. Van Baal, *Het Nieuw Guinea Vraagstuk*, op. cit., pp. 44-45. In 1958 the total number of 'Asians' (e.g., Chinese and Indonesians) was estimated at 18,000, the total number of Europeans, mostly Dutch, at 17,000. How heavily the Papuan is dependent on the government for employment, as compared to private enterprise (i.e., employment in the non-tribal sphere), is evident from the following figures: In 1957 of the 15,901 employed Papuans, 6,989 were employed by the government (including in such categories as that of manual labourer) and 8,912 by private persons. In 1958 the number of Papuans employed in the private sector had markedly dropped. In that year of the total of 15,886 then employed, 7,884 were employed by the government, and 8,002 by private persons. *Rapport Inzake Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea* 1958, op. cit., table XXIX A, and the 1957 report, table XXIX A.

64. Röling, *Nieuw Guinea Als Wereldprobleem*, op. cit., pp. 91-92. Compare with the view of the Dutch daily *Vrij Nederland*, October 17, 1959: 'New Guinea threatens to become a bottomless pit, which keeps on swallowing millions, a huge monument to the stubbornness of many of our political leaders'. Financial aid is forthcoming, however. Early in October, 1959, the Directorate of Overseas Areas of the European Common Market organization announced a contribution of 26 million Dutch florins for the development of West New Guinea.

ing population.⁶⁵ One might reply that wise Dutch investments would bring handsome returns, while demographic pressures in the Netherlands make West New Guinea increasingly important as a potential Dutch colonization area. The real issue is the inhospitable atmosphere, created wittingly or not by Dutch policy and bureaucracy, in which private Dutch colonization and enterprise have to work.⁶⁶

III

Since November 29, 1957, when the UN General Assembly failed once again to muster the necessary support for an Indonesian demand urging resumption of negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands regarding the status of West New Guinea, the international aspects of the West New Guinea dispute have undergone no significant change. In his policy declaration regarding West New Guinea the new Dutch Premier, Professor J. E. De Quay, declared (May 26, 1959) that the principle of self-determination for the Papuan population remained the objective of the Dutch government and that measures would be taken in all fields to attain this objective.⁶⁷ Since September 1, 1959, the Ministry of Overseas Affairs (once the Ministry of the Colonies) which directed New Guinea policy, has ceased to exist and West New Guinea affairs

65. R. Roolvink, 'Nieuw Guinea, Herorientatie Noodzakelijk', p. 25 in *Terdege ter Discussie*, *op. cit.*

66. One can, at this juncture, only speculate on the reasons for this unfavourable atmosphere. Perhaps in part it is caused by the general uncertainty of Dutch control and of the legitimacy of its foundations. Perhaps Dutch policy makers wish to avoid any suspicion of a 'colonial' economic structure, with alien minorities dominating the production process. Perhaps too, the intellectual orientation of the bureaucracy, schooled in the traditions of 'ethical' statecraft in Dutch universities, is to blame. One is reminded that during much of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the present century the relationship between colonial civil service and private Western enterprise in Indonesia was not always of the best, the former often seeing itself as the 'aristocratic' defender of the Indonesian against the depredations of the latter. The existence of 'tension' between civil service and Western private enterprise received intensive consideration by such leading representatives of Western estate organizations as M. W. Treub in the 1920's (cf. M. W. F. Treub, *Nederland in de Oost*, Haarlem, 1923, pp. 313-319), a period when fortunes were made in Western estate enterprise, and led directly to the foundation of a new institution of higher education for the training of civil servants in Utrecht, in competition with the more 'ethically' oriented training programme in Leyden. One wonders how much of this animosity still persists in West New Guinea today.

67. *Peradocumentatie Ministerie van Zaken Overzee. Afdeling Documentatie*, vol. 2, no. 191, May 26, 1959.

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are now under the direction of a special division of the Ministry of the Interior, to signify the integral constitutional relationship between Holland and West New Guinea. Shortly after De Quay assumed office, the Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, visited the Netherlands. At the conclusion of his discussion with Dutch officials Menzies stated: 'I have told the premier that from beginning to end Australia fully supports the position under which the Netherlands possesses sovereignty over West New Guinea, and that neither the use of force nor the use of threats can bring a change in this'.⁶⁸ The purchase of arms by Indonesia over the past year has led to Dutch protests and to increasing press speculations that sooner or later Indonesia may resort to force in obtaining West New Guinea.⁶⁹ Though protestations of peace have become somewhat fewer of late in Indonesia, there are no significant indications that Indonesia does in fact plan to resort to arms.⁷⁰ Not without protest and popular demonstrations a change in the Dutch military service law was approved in June, which allows the sending of Dutch draftees to West New Guinea.

Thus what some Dutch critics have called the 'ice box' policy appears certain of continuance for some time to come. In general, speculation about the future status of West New Guinea by various Dutch publicists has involved four possibilities: (1) retention of New Guinea by the Netherlands, (2) transfer to Indonesia, (3) transfer to Australia and (4) transfer to some international agency, e.g., the United Nations or the South Pacific Commission. A fifth possibility, immediate departure of the Dutch after granting sovereignty, is not seriously considered at this time, since it is believed to be tantamount to abandonment of a still undeveloped territory.

68. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, no. 242, July 1, 1959.

69. See, e.g., Theo C. Droogh in *Elsevier*, September 26, 1959, cited also in Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, *Persdocumentatie betreffende Suriname en de Nederlandse Antillen en Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea*, vol. 1, no. 40, September 26, 1959.

70. The left wing Indonesian press is more militant, however. The Djakarta daily, *Pemuda*, October 5, 1959, noted that as a result of recent weapons acquisitions the Netherlands are acquiring the necessary respect for the Indonesian armed forces and that in the near future Indonesia's armed forces will be able to 'liberate' West New Guinea. In April and September, 1959, about 10 unarmed Indonesians carrying propaganda materials landed in two canoes at Fak Fak. They were unable to carry out their mission, however, and fell in the hands of the police. See Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, *Persdocumentatie Betreffende Suriname en de Nederlandse Antillen en Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea*, vol. 1, no. 67 (October 14, 1959) and no. 91 (October 30, 1959).

Reserving consideration of the first of these possibilities until last, it may be noted that sentiment in the Netherlands advocating an immediate unconditional transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesia is today less significant by far than before the December 1957 days when the greater part of the Dutch minority in Indonesia was told to leave the country, Dutch assets in Indonesia were seized and Dutch enterprises were nationalized by the Indonesian government. This does not necessarily mean that Holland's sole control over the area has attained the stature of a policy principle free from popular criticism. It is rather that those outside the communist and fellow travelling camps who are still willing to consider a transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesia now are apt to attach certain conditions to such a transfer. Of these conditions the existence of a stable Indonesian government, willing to meet Dutch conciliation efforts half way, is most frequently mentioned. An Indonesian government, free from communist domination, which is 'prepared to negotiate reasonably' with a Dutch government that has accepted a transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesia as 'a possibility' is seen as a first step toward a solution.⁷¹ Central to these negotiations, moreover, should be a definite 'term of transition' during which the Indonesians can progressively take over Dutch administration as the Dutch themselves are gradually withdrawing their responsibilities over the Papuan population. The report of the Wiardi Beckman foundation likewise does not consider a transfer to Indonesia a serious possibility unless 'lasting changes', not now in view, have taken place in the political and economic life of Indonesia.⁷² Such a transfer, if it could be given consideration, would in any case have to place in the foreground Indonesia's guarantee that no sharp breach would be made in administrative and development policies toward the Papuan. It is perhaps of interest to note that some Indonesian figures, without abandoning their *a priori* national claim to West New Guinea, have begun to realize that greater political and economic stability at home might not only strengthen their claim in these circles in the Netherlands, but possibly also in the rest of the world.

Cold War implications of the West New Guinea dispute have also been considered. Communist elements in Indonesia, Röling points out, exploit the New Guinea issue for their own ends, to the dismay of more moderate Indonesians. If, as a result of this agitation,

71. L. Hanekroot, *Nieuw Guinea. Tijd Voor Een Hernieuw Politiek Onderzoek* (The Hague, Bandung, 1958), pp. 20-21.

72. *Het Vraagstuk Nieuw Guinea. Rapport van de Dr. Wiardi Beckman Stichting, op. cit.*, p. 16.

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actual hostilities break out between Indonesia and the Netherlands then 'fighting in New Guinea could be the factor which would bring all of Asia within the Soviet sphere'.⁷³ An immediate settlement is therefore essential, i.e., a transfer of the area to Indonesia. Recent events have substantiated Röling's views in part. It is true that Indonesian communists have continued to take a militant stand on the West New Guinea dispute, wishing to bring it before the United Nations once again, a move presently opposed by the Indonesian government. Yet it would be a mistake to think that the present Indonesian policy of generating national strength and unity through the 'West Irian Liberation Front' and postponing another United Nations' test until sufficient domestic political and economic stability have been reached, is without significant popular support. Moreover, Röling's opinion that an armed conflict over New Guinea might result in the loss of all Asia to communism is rather sweeping; both the US and Australia, for example, have made it plain to Indonesia that they will not allow armed aggression against West New Guinea.

The third possibility, that of a transfer of the area to Australian control, has thus far received only informal consideration in Dutch circles. It is unlikely that Australia itself would accept such a suggestion at this time, but it is also necessary to note that the political unity of both East and West New Guinea is regarded as a distinct future possibility, and that, considering the geographic location of Australia and New Guinea, the latter's position within the former's 'sphere of sovereignty' cannot be excluded.⁷⁴ Just recently a leading official in the West New Guinea division of the Dutch government remarked that 'on both sides of the border it is made clear to these Papuans that they belong to one people, living on one island, . . . and that in the future they can possibly lead a common life'.⁷⁵ That Indonesia would strongly oppose such a move, goes without question. Yet, increased Dutch-Australian co-operation in the development of the area is likely to become an evermore formidable obstacle to Indonesia's claims.

What is termed an 'internationalization' of control over West New Guinea, either by some UN agency or by the South Pacific Commission, would, in Dutch opinion, meet with certain objection from Indonesia and, since such a transfer could or should probably not be negotiated without UN concurrence, the nations which have

73. Röling, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

74. *Het Vraagstuk Nieuw Guinea. Rapport van de Dr. Wiardi Beckman Stichting, op. cit.*, p. 18.

75. *Peredocumentatie Ministerie van Zaken Overzee*, vol. 2, no. 258, July 13, 1959.

customarily sided with Indonesia in the West New Guinea dispute, e.g., those of the Afro-Asian and communist blocs, would probably prevent it. At the moment such a suggestion is not seriously considered in official Dutch circles either. It has been pointed out, however, that West New Guinea's political development might well be directed in terms of federative unity with other regions in the South Pacific area and that such a development is in accord with the alleged ethnological and geographical nature of West New Guinea which 'belongs to the Melanesian basin'.⁷⁶ Indonesia might well wish to participate in such a development, although Dutch publicists realize that at present 'Indonesia's rigid onesidedness bars all modes of collective responsibility'.⁷⁷ Yet such a development might not be without advantage to Indonesia. Dutch spokesmen have repeatedly indicated that if the Papuan population, at the end of its period of tutelage, freely chooses to join the Indonesian state this choice would be respected by the Dutch. Some form of joint responsibility, perhaps by allowing Indonesia's entry into the South Pacific Commission, would give Indonesia a foot in the door by means of which it could make its influence progressively felt on the Papuan world.

Conservative Dutch opinion does not consider all this very likely. To those in favour of the retention of Dutch control over West New Guinea compromise with Indonesia is *ipso facto* impossible because 'The Indonesian does not regard a political agreement as something for which he assumes a lasting moral responsibility. He temporarily accepts it as a first step to a certain objective of which the end justifies the means.'⁷⁸ Moreover, it is not New Guinea that is important to the Indonesian, it is the *issue* of West New Guinea⁷⁹ as a scapegoat for domestic troubles or as a catalyst of a badly needed new national unity, that is of significance. By now many Papuans have unhesitatingly opted for the Dutch side in the Dutch-Indonesian 'cold war', and a transfer to Indonesian control would gravely compromise them. Another exodus problem would be created; for the Eurasians in West New Guinea who came to the area precisely because they declined to live under an Indonesian government would have to be moved. At this time, furthermore, there is some thought being given to the migration of Ambonese Indonesians, supporters of the 'Republic of the South Moluccas' in its ongoing war with

76. *Het Vraagstuk Nieuw Guinea. Rapport van de Dr. Wiardi Beckman Stichting, op. cit.*, p. 21.

77. Verhoeven, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

78. Van Beuge, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

79. van Baal, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

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Djakarta, who are now in the Netherlands but are willing to settle in West New Guinea. Finally, conservatives argue, there has been a shift in favour of the Dutch position in the United Nations. Of the 20 Latin-American nations, for example, ten supported the Indonesian side in the 1954 session, but only five did so in 1957. Indonesia picked up support from the growing bloc of Afro-Asian nations, but four of these nations in 1957 (Cambodia, Liberia, Turkey and the Philippines) withheld support, indicating that this bloc is not as solid as is sometimes thought.⁸⁰ With the growing number of new African states, however, it may well be that the balance will increasingly shift in favour of Indonesia, but whether this trend will be strong enough for the two-thirds majority necessary to carry an Indonesian resolution in the General Assembly is doubtful. Quite apart from what is believed to be the legitimacy of Dutch control over West New Guinea, conservatives feel strong enough to ignore Indonesian protests made before the forum of international opinion.

March, 1960.

80. For the shifting votes in the Ninth, Eleventh and Twelfth General Assembly of the United Nations see *Nederlands Nieuw Guinea in de Negende Algemene Vergadering van de Verenigde Naties*, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, no. 37 (The Hague, 1955), pp. 32-33; *Nederlands Nieuw Guinea in de Elfde Algemene Vergadering van de Verenigde Naties*, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, no. 49 (The Hague, 1957), pp. 34-35; and *Nederlands Nieuw Guinea in de Twaalfde Algemene Vergadering van de Verenigde Naties*, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, no. 53 (The Hague, 1958), pp. 50-51.

FOOD PROBLEMS IN INDONESIA¹

K. V. BAILEY*

INDONESIA HAS A NAME AS the famous and beautiful spice islands, a tourist's and anthropologist's paradise, one of the world's major exporters of rubber, copra, and formerly of tin, oil products, sugar, tea, coffee, and many other natural products. It is also well-known for its prolonged and bitter struggle for freedom from colonial domination and its subsequent successive steps to secure the control of its economy entirely by its own nationals. The archipelago is commonly regarded as tremendously wealthy. But its wealth is largely potential and the natural handicaps are such that it seems doubtful whether more than a minority of the enormous population will ever reach a reasonable standard of living.

Of Indonesian's population of 85 million, 55 million are compressed in Java alone — little more than one-half the size of Victoria. The average land-holding per farmer is less than one acre. The yield per acre is less than that of an acre of Victorian Mallee under wheat. Imagine a thousand families each of five persons subsisting on every Mallee farm! Some 70-80 per cent of Java's population are subsistence farmers. They eat what they grow and grow what they eat. And as the population grows the squeeze becomes harder and harder.

Indonesia was recorded by FAO² as having the lowest calorie consumption (about 2,000 calories per head per day) and the lowest protein consumption (about 40 gm. per head per day) in the world, whereas for Australia the figures are about 3,300 calories and 103 gm. protein per head per day.³ Overall figures for Indonesia are essentially the same as those for Indo-China, Malaya, Burma, Thailand and the Philippines.

Rice is, traditionally, the staple food of most of Asia's teeming millions. There is nothing wrong with rice as a food, but it nor-

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1. Based on an address given to the Victorian Branch of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 16th March, 1960.

2. Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations: *World Food Survey*. Washington, 1946.

3. Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations: *Second World Food Survey*. Rome, 1952.

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mally supplies 70 per cent of the total calories and the scanty amounts of vegetable consumed with it are often insufficient to prevent serious vitamin deficiencies. Beriberi has virtually disappeared because most of the rice is home-pounded, and the rice for consumption in the cities is only lightly milled, with little loss of vitamins. However, blindness from vitamin A deficiency is widespread throughout the rice-eating areas, because children of pre-school age particularly are given insufficient leafy vegetables.

The most serious shortage is of protein. Rice is a fairly adequate staple food for adults, but for growing children, especially infants just after weaning, it contains far too little of the essential body-building proteins. In our diets these are supplied by animal foods—milk, meat, eggs, fish. Only the privileged few in Indonesia can afford to eat these—mostly city-dwellers. The rural population usually eat fish (salted or fresh) or meat only once a week in very small quantity. Eggs and livestock generally are sold to the cities to enable the farmers to buy more of their staple foodstuff, a minimum of clothing (two changes) and some state-subsidised education for the children. The chief protein-supplement comes from various dried beans, such as soya-beans, which are widely used at least in the more prosperous areas: sometimes even daily.

Protein-malnutrition affects infants and toddlers throughout the tropics. Its advanced form, called Kwashiorkor, is the commonest nutritional-deficiency in the world.^{4, 5} Commonly infants in poor rural and urban areas are weaned somewhere between one and two years of age and are given only adult foods (cereal or starchy tubers) with little or no protein-rich supplements. Growth ceases and weight may even be lost; the child becomes bloated with oedema-fluid due to protein depletion, the hair falls out and the skin shows characteristic changes (see photograph, plate A), and the liver becomes enlarged and fatty. Such infants can be effectively treated with skim-milk or other protein-rich foods if brought to hospital in reasonable time. It is seen in hospitals throughout Indonesia, even in the most prosperous rice areas, because parents are often unaware of the need for the protein-rich supplements, even where they could afford them.

There are however many areas where rice used to be the staple but the home-production is now insufficient to meet requirements. In some of these areas cassava (tapioca) is used as a supplement or replacement for the rice; in others, maize is mixed with rice

4. Brock, J. F., *Survey of the World Situation on Kwashiorkor*. Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci., 57, 696, 1954.

5. Brock, J. F., *Nutrition and the Clinician*. Lancet, 1, 859, 1959.

(especially in East Java) and in others it becomes the sole staple. Maize is the main foodstuff in the drier islands east of Java, especially in Flores and Timor. It is a fairly good substitute for rice, having about the same protein value (8 per cent). Cassava however is a very poor substitute or supplement because it is almost pure starch.

The writer and his wife, as members of the Nutrition Institute (Djakarta) were assigned the task of investigating the nutrition problem of the cassava areas in its medical and agricultural aspects respectively. Cassava forms the staple food throughout the limestone-hill country, which includes most of the South coast of Java (a strip in West Java, and another strip in Central and East Java) and also strips in the centre and north of East Java and almost the whole of Madura. The whole area embraces a population of some 5-6 million. Our work was concentrated in the Gunung Kidul regency (population $\frac{1}{2}$ million) situated near Jogjakarta in the South of Central Java.

The cassava districts form Indonesia's most chronic and serious nutritional problem, not only because the young children suffer from protein malnutrition, but because the whole population is short of calories and protein and 'hungeroedema' is endemic, i.e., always afflicts a significant proportion of the community (5-10 per cent of adults). Hungeroedema is akin to the semi-starvation seen in post-war Europe and Asia, except that a life-long deficiency of protein for those living in the cassava areas has predisposed to a much greater incidence of the condition. The patients are usually not frankly starved, but show the same wasting and bloating with oedema caused by chronic protein depletion as semi-starved subjects (photographs, plate A). The average consumption is only 1,400 calories and 15 gm. protein per head per day, and for much of the year about 10 gm. protein daily only. In the off-season, the day's fare consists of a plateful of steamed cassava, a small onion and some chillies. Poorer people eat only once in two days. The cassava root looks like a dried-up parsnip or dahlia tuber and has much the same food value.

The people in these areas are appallingly poor. Their daily food costs them only about one penny per person per day. Ninety-nine per cent are subsistence farmers and their poverty is a consequence of the poverty of the land. It is rocky limestone soil, deficient in all minerals and in organic matter, severely eroded, only the subsoil or the exposed underlying bedrock remaining. Yields steadily diminish year by year as the soil becomes more exhausted. Originally this land was forest-covered but as population grew the trees were felled

and steeply sloping land essentially unsuited for intensive agriculture was opened up. (Photographs, plate B.) At first a good crop of dry-land rice could be obtained but later only the hardier maize could thrive. Now rice, maize and cassava are planted in mixed cultivation but the yields of rice and maize are very low: only a tenth of that obtained from fertile land. Cassava is favoured by the farmers because it will grow on the poorest of soils and withstands the severe dry season better than cereal crops and, most important of all, its yield is highest, in terms of bulk and calories. Thus the farmer can more readily fill the hungry stomachs with cassava than with any other crop.

At first sight the general population in the cassava areas seems not too badly nourished. They are strong: men and women carry heavy burdens, e.g., women may carry loads of cassava weighing 90 lbs. for a distance of 25 miles from Wonosari to Jogjakarta, and the next day return to Wonosari for another load. But the other side of the story is the thousands of hungeroedema patients, the stunted passive children and the wasted infants. These do not meet the passing eye. There is widespread but disguised malnutrition — a chronic lack of both calories and protein.

Kwashiorkor, retarded development of school-age children, and low calorie intakes are of course widespread not only in Indonesian villages but in most of Africa and Asia. However, the cassava areas do make a special contribution. It was reported to the FAO-WHO Conference on Protein Malnutrition,⁶ held in Jamaica in 1953, that Kwashiorkor appeared for the first time and is now endemic in certain areas in Africa where cassava-planting became widespread in the post-war years of food-shortage. In addition, the cassava areas in Java contribute a new sociological and nutritional phenomenon, endemic hungeroedema in adults as described above.

Unfortunately, even in Indonesia the cassava problem does not end in the limestone-hill regions in Java. Cassava-planting is being actively propagated by the Government in other areas to meet shortages of rice or maize, both in Java and further east in Indonesia, notably in Timor.⁷ This means that in practice deficiencies of cereals are being met by increased production of cassava (and other starchy tubers). This is contrary to the recommendation of FAO,³ that increased calorie requirements should be met by increasing production of cereals, not cassava.

6. Waterlow, J. C. (Ed.). *Protein Malnutrition. Proceedings of a Conference in Jamaica*, 1953. University Press, Cambridge, 1955.

7. Ormeling, J. F. *The Timor Problem. A Geographical Interpretation of an Underdeveloped Island*. J. B. Wolters, Groningen, Djakarta, 1956.

What can be done to improve diets based on cassava? The author and his wife, after a study of the limited agricultural and economic possibilities of Gunung Kidul, concluded that there were three main lines of attack: (i) increased production and consumption of protein-rich legumes; (ii) increased maize and sorghum production; (iii) milking of village livestock, especially goats.

Of the protein-rich legumes grown in these areas the best (soya-bean and peanuts) are sold in large quantities to the cities as a cash crop. However, by nutrition education more of those products could be kept for home consumption, especially for toddlers. More promising are various kinds of climbing beans, notably the velvet bean (*Mucuna pruriens*). This grows well on poor soils and even in the dry season. It bears prolifically, is rich in protein (24 per cent) and is already known and acceptable to the village people, though they were unaware of its high nutritional value and often do not look after them. Their production could be greatly increased by planting them in farmyards where they can climb over bamboo trellises or over the house-roofs (see photograph). They can also be planted in rocky waste-land which will not produce other crops; they form an effective ground-cover for such soils, preventing soil erosion losses (photograph, plate B). These beans fetch a poor price on the market and their production does not compete with cash-crop sales; they can be kept for home consumption.

Maize is also already known and popular but its yield is much less than that of cassava. Its preparation for the table is tedious: maize requires heavy pounding (usually done by the women-folk) and prolonged cooking (for about two hours). Though cheaper than rice it is more expensive than cassava and requires considerable amounts of fuel for cooking. But again, by a process of nutrition education the people could be induced to use more of it, once its superiority over cassava is made plain.

Sorghum is a cereal of about the same nutritional quality as maize. It is already grown in some parts of Gunung Kidul and elsewhere in Java (and in Timor). Some American and Australian strains are highly drought-resistant. It is hoped that in time strains adapted to local climatic conditions will be bred and made available to the farmers.

Livestock in Indonesian villages are commonly not milked. In Gunung Kidul the average farmer possesses or looks after one ox and two goats. Oxen are used chiefly for ploughing. There is no land whatever set aside for pasture. Milk yields from both cattle and goats are extremely low by our standard (about one-tenth). Nevertheless many families would be able to milk one goat for at

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least a part of the year. Even half a cupful of milk daily for half the year would make an appreciable difference to a villager with hungeroedema or a toddler, or a nursing mother. In recent years goat-milking has been actively promoted by district administrations in parts of the cassava areas. It appeared to be distinctly beneficial to schoolboys in these areas.

The prognosis for the cassava areas is poor. Soil erosion has proceeded beyond hope of rehabilitation in many places (photographs, plate B). Soil fertility is declining and population is increasing by about 3 per cent per annum. An overall total increase in food production could probably be achieved by intensive application of fertilisers but it seems unlikely that farmers could afford to pay for the necessary fertilisers themselves. The choice of fertiliser and its method of application needs further study. It seems desirable to use it primarily for increased cereal production (rice, maize and sorghum) and legumes. In Indonesia generally, the limited amounts of fertiliser available are usually applied to irrigated rice-fields. It is suggested that it is more urgent to prevent further declines in the drier lands and hilly country and that these areas should have priority for fertilisers (chiefly ammonium sulphate and superphosphate).

To deal effectively with the limestone areas, perhaps one-third to a half of the population would have to be transferred to other regions, and the hill-slopes reafforested. This would require planting with smaller shrubs such as *Leucaena glauca* and *Acacia villosa* first; later, as soil is retained, larger trees could perhaps be planted. An attempt is shown in plate B at least to prevent soil from being washed away from the terraces by planting shrubs.

Transmigration has been in progress for some ten years, but on too small a scale. In Gunung Kidul alone the annual population increase is about 11,000, whereas only 1,000 have been transferred annually (to new land sites in Sumatra or Borneo) at government expense, and another 1,000 annually leave the area of their own accord. When the world cannot cope with two million refugees, it is not to be wondered at that the Indonesian government is unable to deal effectively with a similar number of peasants. To induce them to shift is but one facet of the problem; the provision of rail and ship transport is another; and the provision of facilities at a new settlement site to meet their requirements in the first few months, before their land is productive and they become self-sufficient, is the greatest of all.

The nutrition problem in Java's limestone hill areas is not just a problem of local concern. It has its lessons in soil and water con-

Plate A
MALNUTRITION



KWASHIORKOR



STUNTED GROWTH

HUNGER OEDEMA



EMACIATION




SWELLING (OEDEMA)

Plate B
GUNUNG KIDUL
Exhausted Hilly Land



EROSION



MUCUNA PRURIENS (CLIMBING BEANS) ON TERRACES

LEUCAENA GLAUCOA TO HOLD TERRACE WALLS

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servation. It also reveals the inadequacies of cassava as a staple foodstuff. This calls for sound judgement in Indonesian planning when confronted with overall food shortages, especially of rice, at home. And a nutritional and agricultural warning is being enacted which parts of Asia and Africa would do well to heed.

Can the outsider help? Through the WHO Maternal and Child Health Centres skim-milk supplies from UNICEF have been distributed widely throughout Asian countries, to nursing mothers and needy infants. This reaches perhaps a fifth of the infant population of Indonesia. This is a major contribution. Yet it barely touches the fringe of the under-nutrition and malnutrition at all stages along the life-track of most Indonesians.

It is suggested that the only way to increase substantially the quantity and quality of foods for a predominantly subsistence-farming population is to increase productivity per unit area. In the past estate-agriculture has brought profits to the colonists or their middle-class successors, but little benefit, either economic or nutritional, to the masses. And in the poorer areas of Java estate agriculture was never a major factor in the economy.

To increase soil productivity, the scientific application of fertilisers seems of much greater promise than mechanisation. In overcrowded Java the limiting factor is not labour-shortage. The soil is deficient in all minerals and in organic matter. Its rehabilitation, and the effective increase of staple crop yields, can only be achieved by application of fertilisers to suitably selected seed strains and in the appropriate ecological conditions. Land unsuitable for intensive cultivation must be reafforested. It is suggested that the body best able to co-ordinate such a programme of research is FAO.

One wonders if prosperous countries such as our own (operating through both private bodies and governmental agencies) could contribute to a World Fertiliser Pool, the fertiliser to be distributed to underdeveloped regions where it is most needed. Increasing local productivity is a sounder approach to world-wide food shortages than the distribution of food surpluses as charity.

ATTEMPTS AT EROSION CONTROL

ON BANNING NUCLEAR TESTS

G. P. KING*

NEGOTIATORS HAVE TOUCHED ON ALMOST every aspect of arms control in the fifteen years since Hiroshima. But only in the test ban talks of the last two years have they come to grips with the problems of an arms control *treaty*, and actually drafted treaty articles. The negotiations have been unique in other ways too. For the first time the *testing* of a weapon is to be controlled without any directly related effort to control its production, and *scientists* have been uniquely influential in various ways during the course of negotiations — for two very modern reasons. One is that scientists are more deeply involved — both numerically and morally — in war production. The other is that arms control has become technically far more complex. However, in itself the test ban is a marginal problem and a much simpler one to solve than general disarmament, which has occupied negotiators most since 1945. Because there has been almost no progress on any other aspect of arms control it is widely believed that if the test talks fail general disarmament has little chance for many years. It is held that the test ban could be a pilot scheme leading to other measures of arms control, accustoming secretive nations to teams of foreign inspectors tramping about their territories. It is also hoped that the test ban may solve the so-called Nth country problem and slow the race for armament between the great Powers. Finally and obviously it is argued that a ban would stop any further radioactive contamination of earth and atmosphere by weapon tests.

We can only guess whether there is opposition to a ban in the Soviet Union, but in the United States powerful circles have argued against it continually since 1958. They say that nuclear war is on the verge of becoming relatively humane but that the 'clean' H-bombs which are under development must be tested or it would be futile to produce them. They say that no control arrangement in sight can guarantee detection of all underground weapon tests, and that dictatorships cheat better than democracies. They argue that lighter, cheaper, less powerful and more powerful Nuclear warheads and bombs must be tested, or the research and development money lavished on them will be pointlessly wasted. It is openly suggested that the Soviet Union has been testing secretly since the present informal ban began in 1958.

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Soon after the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) declassified the significant facts about the Bikini explosion the cry against tests was carried from neutral countries and Japan to the UN General Assembly. The Soviet Union specifically proposed a test ban as an integral part of its May 1955 disarmament plan. In March 1956, when other partial disarmament schemes were being canvassed in the Sub-Committee of the UN Disarmament Commission, the Russians proposed an isolated but uncontrolled test ban which the West at first rejected out of hand.¹ The Anglo-French plan of 19 March, 1956, favoured a limitation on tests in Stage Two and a ban at the beginning of Stage Three.²

In the early stages of the 1957 disarmament talks the Soviet insisted that a test ban would be self-policing. In her proposals of 6 May Britain suggested a conference of experts to investigate the need for control, to be followed by a test ban and a 'cut-off' in fissionable weapon material production.³ In June the Soviet moved toward the Western view. Zorin proposed in the Sub-Committee that a ban 'be implemented by scientific control posts to be set up in the US, USSR, UK and Pacific Ocean areas'.⁴ However he insisted on Security Council supervision (hence the veto) and he wanted the ban isolated from the 'cut-off'.⁵

The Soviet refused to participate further in the Disarmament Commission or its Sub-Committee after the Sub-Committee adjourned on 6 September,⁶ but continued to call for a test ban. After an intensive test series in March 1958 Khrushchev declared a unilateral Soviet suspension of tests for six months conditional on the big Western Two following suit. The Soviet then agreed to send delegates to a conference of experts for the design of a test ban control mechanism.⁷ This so-called Conference of Experts actually met in July, but since the West had not suspended tests, the Soviet resumed testing in August. On 22 August, Dulles, a late convert to the test ban idea, released through the President a memorandum which committed the US to a one year suspension of all weapon tests to begin on 31 October, the opening date for political negotiations

1. Joseph Nogee, 'The Diplomacy of Disarmament', *International Conciliation*, January, 1960, p. 263.

2. A. Nutting, *Disarmament — An Outline of the Negotiations* (O.U.P. for R.I.I.A., 1959) p. 23.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

4. See Jay Orear 'Detection of Nuclear Weapon Testing', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (hereinafter *B.A.S.*) March 1958, p. 99.

5. Nutting, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

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on the test ban treaty.⁸ However, US agreement to a plan was to be conditional on 'satisfactory progress in reaching agreement on and implementing major and substantial arms control measures'.⁹ The Soviet continued testing into November; but the US and Britain, after quickly announcing that they were henceforward free to test, went on to say that they would in fact refrain while the political negotiations proceeded satisfactorily.¹⁰

Between 1 July and 21 August scientific representatives of eight nations¹¹ meeting at Geneva, loosely supervised by diplomatic officials, had reached complete accord on the technicalities of the test ban control problem. The devisers of the 'Geneva System' claimed in their report to represented governments that all tests down to 1-kiloton yield in the atmosphere or oceans, and down to 5-kiloton yield underground, could be reliably detected by a network of 180 detection stations spread across the continents and mounted on ships at sea. This system was to be supplemented by air sampling flights and on-site inspection of 'suspicious' events. The stations were to be equipped with acoustic and light-detection apparatus and seismographs on the principle that combined use of methods facilitates detection. The problem of outer space tests (i.e., those above 18 to 30 miles) was discussed at the conference but no recommendations were made.¹²

The diplomats and scientific consultants of the US, USSR and Britain gathered in their turn at Geneva on 31 October to hammer out the 'practical and political problems' of policing a ban.¹³ The hope that they would merely have to rubber stamp the experts' findings was quickly dashed. Differences arose on a number of substantive and procedural questions. In the first place, the Russians stole the headlines by arriving in Geneva with a draft treaty which provided for 'a universal and perpetual cessation of experimental and hydrogen bomb explosions'.¹⁴ They said this should be signed first, leaving the details of control to be worked out later. This traditional Soviet philosophy of arms control was rejected by the

8. C. M. Roberts, 'The Hopes and Fears of An Atomic Test Ban', *The Reporter*, 28th April, 1960.

9. Presidential Statement, Washington, 22 August, 1958. Quoted in *Times* (London), 23 August, 1958.

10. *Times*, 8 November, 1958.

11. The Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, United States, Britain, France and Canada.

12. *Times*, 22 August, 1958.

13. Nutting, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

14. Quoted in E. K. Fedorov 'The Agreement on the Cessation of Nuclear Tests Must be Concluded Without Delay!', *B.A.S.*, September, 1959, p. 329.

Western Two and for three weeks the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests (as the three Powers had agreed to call it)¹⁵ was deadlocked over its agenda. Finally both sides wearied and decided to proceed without agenda.¹⁶ But, despite her participation in the Conference of Experts and her agreement at the Political Conference to discuss controls before a test ban treaty was signed, the Soviet was by no means in accord with the West. 'After all when we let off a bomb . . . you know about it', said delegation leader Tsarapkin to the Press on 16 November¹⁷ and in September, 1959, E. K. Fedorov, who had led the Soviet delegation to the Conference of Experts, and was now adviser to the political negotiators, still maintained that 'actually there was no problem involved in detecting nuclear explosions'.¹⁸

The converse of the Russian view was held by AEC and Pentagon officials in Washington who were coming to believe that there was an insuperable problem in the detection of underground tests at least. A White House release of 6 January, 1959, gave new data on seismic test detection derived from underground tests held in Nevada after the Conference of Experts.¹⁹ It was claimed that the Geneva experts had over-estimated the seismic effects of small-yield underground tests and also the feasibility of distinguishing them from earthquakes of comparable size. The Soviet delegate refused to discuss the new US data at the political conference, and said it should be referred to the test ban Control Commission when that was established.²⁰

Secondly, when substantive negotiations began there was a dispute about the proper composition of both the Control Commission and the control post staffs which it was to supervise. The Soviet held out for East-West 'parity' on the Commission: three Easterners, three Westerners and a neutral. The West wanted a three-two-two arrangement, maintaining that this put less 'strain' on neutral participation, and that the Soviet demand was unprecedented. At first the Russians wanted control posts staffed by 25-35 'host' nationals with one (later four) observers or 'controllers' from the other camp.²¹ The US delegation leader, Wadsworth, proposed a formula whereby one-third of all post staffs would be Western, one-third

15. The Soviet objected to the word 'suspension' in the original Western title — *Times*, 4 November, 1958.

16. *Times*, 21 November, 1958.

17. *Times*, 17 November, 1958.

18. E. K. Fedorov, *op. cit.*, p. 329.

19. Jay Orear 'How Feasible is a Test Ban?' *B.A.S.*, March 1959, p. 99.

20. 'Road Blocs at Geneva', *B.A.S.*, March, 1959, p. 138.

21. See *Times*, 22 December, 1958, and 30 January, 1959.

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Eastern and one-third neutral.²² The Soviet eventually agreed to these ratios, but differences still remain, concerning the selection of the neutral staff-members of the control posts and the question of 'host' or foreign command of them.²³

Thirdly, while both sides agreed at the experts' conference that 'all events which are recorded by the control stations and which could be suspected of being nuclear explosions will have to be inspected on the site',²⁴ the political negotiators differed radically on how to execute on-site inspection when they came to discuss it in January 1959. The West wanted a special mobile standby team empowered to proceed to the site of any 'suspicious event'²⁵ within five days unless two-thirds of the Control Commission disagreed. The team was to be composed of foreigners but the 'host' country could attach observers to it. The Soviet on the other hand wanted the team to be an *ad hoc* affair recruited from among the 'host' nationals at the control posts, with its formation and movement subject to veto by the three original nuclear Powers in the Control Commission.²⁶

There were echoes of the 1946-8 Baruch Plan negotiations in the Soviet defence of this proposal. 'The complete absurdity of putting the control organization in the position of a super-government, acting on the territories of foreign states irrespective of their will and desire, is obvious.'²⁷ In January, Tsarapkin pledged the Soviet to seek a veto also over the control organisation budget; the selection and dismissal of staff for the monitoring system on Soviet soil; sites for control posts and routes to be followed by inspecting aircraft,²⁸ and actions by the Control Commission on the findings of on-site inspectors — actions such as accusing violators of violation and obstructors of obstruction!²⁹

Nevertheless, before Christmas 1958 four Articles had been agreed to, providing that participating states would discontinue their own tests and encourage other states to do the same, that they would co-operate with Control Commission once established, and that the

22. *Times*, 6 March, 1959.

23. *New York Times* (hereinafter N.Y.T.) 24 August, 1960. The U.S. describes the Soviet position on command of control posts as 'self-inspection'.

24. Quoted in Hans Bethe, 'The Case for Ending Nuclear Tests', *Atlantic Monthly*, July, 1960, p. 48.

25. The attempt to define a 'suspicious' seismic event was dropped when both sides adopted the principle of a quota of on-site inspections. It has lately been mysteriously revived, *Times*, 7 October, 1960.

26. *Times*, 23 January, 1959.

27. E. K. Fedorov, *op. cit.*, p. 332.

28. *B.A.S.*, September, 1959, p. 317.

29. *Times*, 3 February, 1959.

control organisation would consist of a *Conference* of treaty nations, a *Control Commission* of seven members elected by the Conference for two year terms, and a *neutral administrator* appointed by the Control Commission (his appointment being subject to three Power veto) together with a deputy administrator and four assistants (two Eastern and two Western). Other Articles ratified by December 1960 provided for: periodic Treaty review; the Control Commission to enter agreements with the UN and any other future disarmament authority; treaty amendment by two-thirds majority in Conference (subject to three Power veto), and other Powers to enter the Treaty arrangement after its inception.³⁰ All other adopted Articles are of even slighter consequence than these.

The West revealed one of the 'throw-away cards' in its hand on 19 January, 1959, when the stipulation that the test ban must be conditional on progress in other disarmament spheres,³¹ was withdrawn.³² On 22 June, a second (three Power) Conference of Experts, this time on high altitude tests specifically, met in Geneva and reported on 10 July in favour of a satellite detection system for policing the test ban above 30 miles, and described the necessary instruments and ground equipment.³³ And on 4 November the Russians finally agreed to a third conference of experts to reconsider the vexed question of underground test detection in the light of the new US data, although they refused in advance to consider modifying the Geneva system.³⁴ Anyway this conference wound up in deadlock just before Christmas. However in 1960 the Soviet negotiators gradually came to admit that low yield 'decoupled' underground explosions would be difficult for the Geneva system to detect, although they continued to scorn the idea that the Soviet would cheat, or that such considerations should be allowed to hold up the treaty.

On 13 April, 1959, the US had offered the Soviet a *phased* ban, beginning with tests which could be readily detected — those in the atmosphere and under water — and proceeding to those which future research would make detectable.³⁵ The Russians refused to consider a partial ban at first,³⁶ but showed more interest in a new type of

30. Jerome K. Spingarn, 'Will a Test Ban Treaty be Signed?', *B.A.S.*, September, 1959, p. 335.

31. One of the 'more odious' Western proposals — E. K. Fedorov, *op. cit.*, p. 329.

32. *Times*, 20 January, 1958.

33. News Roundup, *B.A.S.*, September, 1959, p. 317.

34. *B.A.S.*, November, 1959, p. 428.

35. Letter from Eisenhower to Khrushchev, quoted in News Roundup, *B.A.S.*, June, 1959, p. 269.

36. During which period Tsarapkin threatened to revive the Soviet demand for a veto over on-site inspections if the US continued to insist on a partial ban — *N.Y.T.*, 4 March, 1960.

partial ban which the US proposed on 11 February this year. Underground tests giving a seismic reading of 4.75 or less, i.e., of up to 20 kilotons, were to be excluded from control under the treaty until detection methods could be improved by joint East-West research.³⁷

On 19 March the Russians agreed to this proposal provided that a moratorium on the excluded small underground tests was observed during the research programme and was written into the Treaty.³⁸ The US was reluctant to have the moratorium mentioned in the Treaty or to commit itself to the moratorium for four to five years, as the Russians suggested, in the absence of a guarantee that there would be useful research. In September 1960, a moratorium of 27 months was suggested by the US. It was to date not from the signing of the treaty but from the inauguration of a joint or national detection research programme, although it might not be permitted to run its full course unless a treaty were signed.³⁹ Not only the idea of a moratorium on underground tests but also the idea of a *quota* of on-site inspections of 'suspicious events' were British in origin. Macmillan had secretly canvassed the quota during his Russian visit of February 1959 as a compromise between the US demand for unlimited right of on-site inspection in Russia and the Soviet insistence on a veto power.

In February 1960, when the Soviet dropped the quest for a narrow formula defining a suspicious seismic event, which had proved beyond the scientists in November 1959, and suggested a quota, the US was sceptical at first. Wadsworth feared that in any year the quota might be quickly used up checking a rash of earthquakes, but the US gradually came to view the quota as a *deterrent* rather than an absolute check to violators. At the negotiations Wadsworth mentioned the figure of 20 on-site inspections per annum for policing the *partial* ban.⁴⁰

The Russians, however, would not commit themselves to a precise number of inspections for several months, and disagreed with the US that there was any technical method of arriving at a reasonable figure.⁴¹ For the Soviet the precise number was a political question, Tsarapkin said. Finally, on 26 July, 1960, the Russians agreed to three on-site inspections per annum on Soviet soil of all 'suspicious events' whether above or below the 'threshold'.⁴² This figure was to

37. *N.Y.T.*, 11 February, 1960.

38. *N.Y.T.*, 21 March, 1960.

39. *Times*, 28 September, 1960.

40. *N.Y.T.*, 10 February, 1960.

41. For example, by considering the number of earthquakes per annum with energy greater than 4.75 seismic units.

42. *N.Y.T.*, 27 July, 1960.

be revised after two years in the light of experience of control.⁴³ Wadsworth refused to take this figure seriously. American scientists have estimated there would be over 300 seismic events per annum in the Soviet which could be suspected of being clandestine *unmuffled* 20-kiloton-plus tests.⁴⁴

The fourth and most recent conference of experts related to the test ban question was held in May 1960 just after the collapse of the Summit Conference. It agreed on the need for a joint East-West programme of detection research, but failed to specify the number and type of seismic tests with explosives which would be needed. When the test ban conference resumed on 29 May it was bedevilled not by the after-effects of the abortive Summit meeting, as many observers had expected, but by the after-effects of the US decision of 7 May,⁴⁵ to study detection problems unilaterally with the aid of 12 nuclear devices. Project Vela would begin in late 1960 or early 1961, and Eisenhower explained that the devices to be used were obsolete and had no significance for weapon development. But, although the Russians acknowledged the case for research with atomic explosives,⁴⁶ they insisted on seeing the interior mechanism of each of the devices and threatened to resume testing unless the US agreed to this demand or dropped Project Vela.

The US Administration could not reveal atomic secrets, however antiquated, to the Soviet without a change in the Atomic Energy Act. Wadsworth offered to show Russian officials the outside of the famous black boxes, to pool all the devices under international supervision beforehand⁴⁷ and to permit on-site inspection of the explosions.⁴⁸ But these concessions did not satisfy the Russians.

The US has grown increasingly impatient with the test talks. Her unilateral suspension of testing was extended from 31 October, 1959, to the end of the year but was not renewed in 1960. On 29 December Eisenhower said the US was henceforward free to test but would continue the suspension on a day-to-day basis while the talks continued in good faith.⁴⁹ However the announcement hinted darkly of a time limit on the negotiations. Americans fear that the Soviet

43. *Times*, 2 August, 1960.

44. *N.Y.T.*, 3 August, 1960.

45. *N.Y.T.*, 8 May, 1960.

46. *N.Y.T.*, 5 May, 1960. However Tsarapkin contradicted the Soviet delegates to experts' conference of May by denying that the Soviet was planning any detection research of its own at all — *N.Y.T.*, 13 June, 1960.

47. So that they could not be modified during the research programme.

48. *N.Y.T.*, 3 June, 1960.

49. *N.Y.T.*, 4 January, 1960.

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may steal a march in nuclear weapon development by clandestine underground testing during a 'ban without controls'.

Something like a showdown is now (December 1960) looming in America's test ban policy. Negotiations have been at a standstill since they resumed on September 27 after a six-week recess, and Vice-President Nixon and the AEC Chairman McCone have both publicly 'surmised' (in McCone's phrase) that the Soviet has been testing secretly underground.⁵⁰ President-elect Kennedy thinks a 'reasonable' time limit should be set on the negotiations, after which tests should be resumed. However he agrees with the present Administration policy of not resuming atmospheric tests before the Soviet.⁵¹

In two years of negotiations all relevant issues have now been raised, but substantive disagreements still dominate the scene. A 'crash' effort to conclude the talks successfully would face disagreements on the following questions: the composition of the Control Commission, control posts and on-site inspection teams; the quota of on-site inspections on Soviet soil; underground test detection research; the length of a moratorium on sub-20-kiloton tests; atomic explosions for peaceful purposes;⁵² the number of control posts to be installed in Russia,⁵³ and the phasing of the installation of a control post net-work throughout the world.⁵⁴ No significant progress has been recorded since both sides agreed to the partial ban with moratorium principle in March, 1960. What prevents agreement is a combination of Soviet fear that the US intends to use the control organization for espionage, US fear that the Soviet would evade the detection system, stubborn facts of nature which make detection very difficult and lukewarmness about the ban on both sides.

THE CASE AGAINST THE BAN

The detection problem has been the bane of the diplomatic negotiations from first to last. Hans Bethe favours a ban but thinks the detection problem acute. He concedes that a 20 kiloton test can be muffled or 'de-coupled' by a factor of 300 if a testing enthusiast is prepared to dig a hole 500 feet in diameter at a depth of 3,000 feet. Therefore he advocates 200 extra seismic 'robot' stations in Soviet territory to reinforce the Geneva system. These would reduce the need for on-site inspections by guaranteeing unequivocal discrimina-

50. *N.Y.T.*, 5 October, 1960.

51. *N.Y.T.*, 11 October, 1960.

52. Both sides are agreed 'in principle' only.

53. The US wants 21; the Soviet says 15 is enough — *N.Y.T.*, 13 August, 1960. The Soviet has always demanded a veto over the siting of control posts.

54. See *Times*, 30 September, 1960.

tion of all earthquakes down to a force of one kiloton.⁵⁵ The system of robot stations has not yet been proposed to the Soviet, but even if it were accepted a determined violator could cheat with weapon tests of Hiroshima size by de-coupling, provided his security was good. And a robot system for the world would be very expensive. It will never be possible to detect all possible underground tests reliably by seismic methods, since fission weapons have already been made so tiny as to yield a mere six tons of TNT equivalent, but further research and refinement of instruments might eventually permit fairly reliable detection of fully de-coupled 20 kiloton tests. Is the coming generation of nuclear weapons 'cleaner', making for more 'humane' warfare, as the AEC has claimed? In addition to its super-bombs the US has *already* tested H-bombs, most of whose destructive power comes from fusion, and which are therefore quite 'clean'.

The informal test ban since 1958 has prevented the AEC testing many untried missile warheads, notably those of an improved version of the Polaris Fleet Ballistic Missile, the Minuteman ICBM and the Nike-Zeus anti-missile-missile. If neither side cheated, the controlled test ban might freeze warhead technology and deny both sides the fruit of the large sums already outlaid on untested developments. But the military importance of these developments is marginal.⁵⁶

THE CASE FOR THE BAN

First, what effect would a test ban have on the diffusion of nuclear weapons? Could it serve to freeze membership of the nuclear club? This question cannot be answered without a survey of 'Nth country'⁵⁷ attitudes to a test ban.

France is now the (N-1)th nuclear Power and the Nth thermonuclear Power. President de Gaulle has repeatedly said that France will not enter a test ban agreement unless the three thermonuclear Powers agree to other arms control measures such as the 'cut-off', considerable destruction or conversion of existing weapon stockpiles and control of the means of delivering thermonuclear weapons.⁵⁸ De Gaulle might change his mind when faced with a functioning controlled test ban, but it is not even clear that negotiations would proceed so far without French participation.

55. See 'The Case for Ending Nuclear Tests', *op. cit.*, *passim*.

56. See D. Inglis, 'The Fear of a Test-Ban Erosion', *Survival*, September-October, 1960.

57. The Nth country is the one at the top of the waiting list for the nuclear club.

58. *N.Y.T.*, 8 April, 1960.

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China will test her first nuclear weapon within a few years. It is long-standing Chinese policy that 'An international agreement made without the participation and signature of China's representative will have no binding force whatsoever on China.'⁵⁹ In July 1960 Wadsworth said that unless the monitoring system can be made worldwide, 'then the Treaty falls'.⁶⁰ China has given general support to all the Soviet Union's disarmament efforts since 1950, but continuing strained relations between the two great Communist powers will not help test ban prospects. If China suffers or chooses isolation from the rest of the Communist bloc her need of nuclear weapons to counter US striking strength in the North Pacific will be all the greater. China could possibly be induced to enter a disarmament agreement by the offer of a Security Council seat. But it is difficult to believe that even a Democratic Administration would be ready for this sort of deal with Communist China at an early date.

There are nine other powers with an atomic industry which could be switched to weapon development in a short time given merely the will and the money.⁶¹ Except for India, Switzerland and Sweden, they are all allied to one or other of the great Powers, and no doubt they can be bullied more easily than China and France, especially the Communist ones. Swedish policy is to drop her plans for a 'minimum atomic force' if there is a test ban of any sort, but even if all countries adhered to a ban the Nth country problem would not disappear without further measures. The technology necessary for producing Uranium 235 and Plutonium 239 is now widely diffused and is becoming increasingly cheap. It may be possible to develop a substantial weapon stockpile *without* testing — whether through scientific skill, theft of blueprints, 'nuclear sharing' or black-market acquisition. The classic argument for the test ban — that there would be no further irradiation of us and our children — does not apply to underground tests, and cannot be levelled at Nth countries prepared to meet the expense of testing underground.

I conclude that the test ban isolated from other measures may not effectively arrest the diffusion of nuclear weapons and that a total ban is not needed for preventing pollution of the atmosphere. By itself the test ban is a clumsy, indirect method of bringing the 'qualitative arms race' under control, with little appeal for potential nuclear Powers. An agreement to ban tests would quite likely fall, or

59. Chou En-lai, Speech to the National People's Congress, 10 April, 1960, quoted in *Current Notes*, May, 1960, p. 217.

60. *N.Y.T.*, 19 July, 1960.

61. These are: Belgium, Canada, East and West Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Sweden and Denmark. See 'The Nth Country Problem and Arms Control', National Planning Association, January, 1960.

never be achieved unless it could be linked to other measures. If there is an agreement between the Three its function may be not actually to stop tests, but to embarrass other Powers unwilling to enter the agreement.

Could a controlled ban be a pilot experiment foreshadowing more ambitious schemes of arms control? No doubt a successful ban would furnish some useful techniques, precedents, experience and confidence for future schemes. Test ban officials might even be able to improvise at tasks other than test banning: a mobile inspection team could gather and communicate urgently needed information between the great Powers in a military crisis, as Schelling suggests.⁶² But it would be wise to begin fresh negotiations on a problem like Schelling's rather than relying on the success of the test talks. Schelling's surveillance system could be arranged with exclusively Great Power participation; the test ban requires unpredictably wide multilateral co-operation, and negotiations have run into grave technical difficulties. If a controlled test ban failed because of shortcomings in the detection system, that would probably harm the prospects for other needed items of arms control.

62. See T. Schelling, 'Arms Control — Proposal for a Special Surveillance Force', *World Politics*, October, 1960.

THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD ARENA: AN ESSAY IN RECENT HISTORY. *W. W. Rostow*. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1960. Pp. xxii + 568. \$8.75.

Why did America's fortunes take such a bad turn after 1956? First there was the Suez crisis, which most of the world blamed on America's failure to build the Aswan dam. Then Suez threw NATO out of kilter, because Britain and France felt America had let them down. Meanwhile the Russians broke the Hungarian uprising and America was powerless to stop them. Then in 1957, when the Russians sent up their sputnik, Americans faced the fact that Russian science had overtaken them. Finally, to add to their troubles, in 1957 and 1958 the American economy went into an ominous slump. As the evidence of failure mounted, many Americans felt the same sense of frustration they had felt in 1949 when their China policy collapsed, in 1952 when their troops had to end the Korean war with a compromise instead of a victory, and in 1954 when North Vietnam had to be abandoned to Communist rule. Many Americans must have wondered if their nation's time of greatness had ended, and decadence had come to claim them, as it had the Romans.

In search of an explanation for America's failures, Professor Rostow examines America's performance in the First World War, at Versailles, in the depression of the 1930's, in the Second World War, at Yalta and Potsdam, and in the Cold War from 1947 on. He finds that America's shortcomings in diplomacy and defence policy arise from the national philosophic style of pragmatism, solving each problem as it presents itself instead of acting on an explicit general theory of the national ideals and the national interests. America has produced few geopolitical theorists in the tradition of Mahan. Lacking a general theory of international policy, American leaders fail to anticipate future crises. Instead they drift along, extemporizing, plugging some of the gaps revealed by the last crisis, and not always plugging the right gap. After the depression, the New Deal and built-in economic stabilizers; after 1941, the development of American strategic air power; after the loss of Poland and East Germany, the Truman doctrine and the Marshall plan; after the Berlin blockade, NATO; after Korea, the rebuilding of a standing army and a ring of military pacts around Asia, after Suez, the Eisenhower doctrine for the Middle East; after sputnik, a crash programme for parity in scientific education, missiles and space research.

Since Professor Rostow has analysed America's failures in this way, the reader naturally hopes for some sort of general theory of international policy for America, something more than an answer to the country's immediate predicament. But the book ends with recommendations mostly aimed at solving current problems. Here are examples of Professor Rostow's prescriptions. America should support the aspirations of new nations for prosperity and independence, and not expect them to adopt American-style democracy. Under a strong President, America should prepare to sacrifice some consumer luxuries (such as large cars) and accept higher taxes if necessary to pay for better schools and adequate defence. America should improve its society by encouraging individual initiative within the bureaucratic structures of business firms, government departments and universities. In science, America should encourage theoretical speculation and innovation. In economic policy, America should restore full employment, prevent inflation, and aim for an annual expansion of gross national product at the rate of five per cent. In diplomacy, America should avoid moralistic rhetoric and steer a compromise course be-

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tween pursuit of national power and adherence to ideal principles. Finally, America should maintain her armed strength and her alliances in order to achieve, in the long run, a world order in which the Russians have no alternative but to keep the peace, gradually free their satellites, and increase freedom and flexibility within their own Communist society.

These prescriptions have become widely familiar as themes of the Kennedy presidential campaign (not surprisingly, since Professor Rostow is among the group of Harvard and Massachusetts Institute of Technology professors from whom Kennedy drew material for his speeches). As Professor Rostow points out, these ideas have been circulating for several years both in print and in conversation among the intellectuals, and the intellectuals, he suggests, are the crucial element in the American political elite. The book repeatedly highlights contributions to American security by scientists and social scientists, and tells us how American policy-makers scored successes in their duels with the Germans or the Russians by relying on their advice, or else were beaten because they ignored them.

Professor Rostow's recommendations are laudable, but they fall far short of a general theory of American foreign policy, unless it is to be 'Rely on the intellectuals'! But what if the doctors disagree? The closest Professor Rostow comes to providing a general guide is in his comment on the debate between the realist and idealist schools which has run through the literature of international relations for the last ten years. He regards this debate as misguided because 'it appears to be a characteristic of American history that this nation cannot be effective in its military and foreign policy unless it believes that both its security interests and its commitment to certain moral principles require the nation to act'. Here at last seems to be a general rule: act when national interest and ideals coincide. But no. A page later (p. 548) Professor Rostow admits 'there may be times when in order to maintain military positions action must be taken which will conflict with the norms of the American ideological interest; and there may be occasions when it will be proper to take military risks to permit movement toward ideological objectives'. Unfortunately this equivocal proposition is in an appendix at the end of the book. It would have been a good starting-point for a general theory of international policy, a theory which would define the circumstances in which ideals ought to take precedence over interests and vice versa. Regrettably, Professor Rostow, whose original ideas on the process of economic development have been acclaimed as 'the most stimulating contribution to political and economic discussion made by any academic economist since the war', (*Economist*, 15 August, 1959) has been less successful this time in bringing fresh thought to an urgent problem.

Professor Rostow redeems himself in the incidental digressions from, and illustrations of, his main themes, as for example when he speculates that private ownership of automobiles in Russia would diminish the power of the Russian government, or hints that a 'horse-power tax' might curb America's lust for big cars, or argues that diffusion of industrial, military and political power in the world will eventually force Russia and America to adjust themselves to a multi-polar world order.

One of the best chapters in the book traces the origins of the Cold War to 1943 and 1944 when Stalin guessed that Americans would be unwilling to use force to obtain an honourable settlement of the Polish question. Professor Rostow thinks it was a mistake for America to be soft on this issue, but he also admits that Roosevelt's and Truman's idealistic policy of regard-

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ing Stalin as a gentleman gave Americans a good conscience later on when they found out that he was not, and that they would have to be tough. Relying on honour was a good prelude to relying on force. Here the dictates of realism and idealism diverged at first, then finally converged. Professor Rostow unfortunately offers us no general rule about the circumstances in which America ought to follow the one or the other. This book will disappoint those who are looking for an original theory or a new programme, but, in spite of its length, it can be read with profit as a stimulating review of America's recent forays and frustrations in the world arena.

D. C. Corbett

LORD LOTHIAN (PHILIP KERR): 1882-1940. *J. R. M. Butler*. London, Macmillan & Co., 1960. Pp. xiii + 385. Australian price 57/9.

Sir James Butler's decision to deal with Lord Lothian's life by topics rather than chronologically will make this book useful to other historians. For them, it will be a considerable convenience to have Lothian's *Round Table* activities, his interventions in the German problem, and his views on the organization of peace pulled together in separate chapters. And although the material in these chapters, drawn mainly from letters, does not substantially add to our knowledge of the period, it has a certain illustrative value. But for those who come to the book hoping for a clearer picture of a man who, in spite of an almost infallible wrongness of judgment, exercised an extraordinary fascination over a wide circle of influential friends, the book will be a disappointment. The departure from chronological order means that there is no clear picture of the development of Lothian's whole personality. Clearly, for instance, his curious religious progression, which took him out of the Roman Catholic Church and finally into Christian Science, is related to his political judgments; indeed he wrote to Lionel Curtis in May 1922 that 'Christian Science is the real key to all our problems, political and economic no less than personal' and he found in Mrs Eddy's *Church Manual* the pattern for a world state. But by assembling in one chapter the material relating to Lothian's religious development over the whole of his life, Sir James Butler does not help the reader to understand this development; on the contrary, by isolating the stages of this development from the other aspects of his life, he makes it less and not more comprehensible. Stanley Baldwin considered Lothian 'a rum cove'—and the present biography does not take us much further.

Perhaps the most valuable parts of the book from the historian's point of view are the two chapters dealing with Lothian's views and interventions on the German problem between 1933 and 1939, and appendixes giving notes of interviews with Hitler, Goering and Schacht and a full-scale memorandum on the international situation sent to Anthony Eden in 1936. Further light is thrown on Lothian's relationship with Adam von Trott, the ambiguous German who was executed in 1944 for alleged complicity in the plot to assassinate Hitler, and although there are still some aspects of this affair which remain obscure, one can perhaps agree that it reflects no discredit on Lothian—even though it does not flatter his discretion. It is less easy to accept Sir James Butler's low estimate of the significance of the so-called 'Cliveden set' and of Lothian's part in it. On this point the author seems to give too little weight to Vansittart's judgment—and incidentally his quotations from Vansittart's memoirs are neither adequate nor accurate. Perhaps the most revealing comment on Lothian's personality comes in an extract in a letter from Lord Brand:

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Philip had one quality which was somewhat disconcerting to his friends — I realised it from South African days. He took colour at once from his surroundings, because he was so sensitive and sympathetic to the arguments of those he met. I always likened him to a pendulum which swings from one side to the other, but always tending to return to a stable equilibrium in the centre.

The first part of the metaphor is sufficiently accurate; the second part is not if it implies that in the long run Lothian arrived at balanced and soundly-based judgments. The truth seems to be that he did his best work when the ends to be sought were determined by others — as in his South African period, as during his association with Lloyd George, as during his tragically-brief period as Ambassador in Washington. When he was a free agent his charm, his acquaintance with the notable figures of his time, and above all his invincible conviction that he had a duty and a right to order human affairs, made him dangerous. There is a characteristic passage in a letter to his *Round Table* associates written from Canada in 1909; 'If you forced Canada to choose now between Imperial Federation and independence, I think she would take independence. If you postpone the issue for 25 years and are assiduous in manipulating the press and running Imperial Conferences and so forth you may be able to force the issue then, with the result that Canada will take Federation.'

Leicester Webb

THE SOVIET BLOC: UNITY AND CONFLICT. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1960. Pp. xxii + 470. Australian price 85/3.

The existence of the Soviet bloc, the forces which hold it together and those which tend to divide it, are matters of considerable importance to the non-communist world. Mr Z. B. Brzezinski, for many years a scholar in the Russian Research Centre at Harvard, seeks in this book to analyse the origins and character of the Soviet bloc, and the ways in which it has changed and is changing. His analysis is developed in terms of the ideology and the power interests of the rulers of the bloc, the relative weight of these elements at different stages in its history, and the modifications of and conflicts within both ideology and the power structure arising from relations between its member states. The analysis ends with some suggestions about the possible future of the bloc, and some general conclusions about 'the interaction of ideology and institutions of power of several states within the same ideological context'.

Brzezinski sees four stages in the development of the Soviet bloc. The first of these, lasting from 1945-47, was characterised by both 'institutional and ideological diversity'. The USSR, having seized the opportunity presented by the Red Army's sweep across Eastern and Central Europe to install regimes in which communists dominated or shared, retired to a preoccupation with the immediate problems of post-war reconstruction, leaving the newly-established People's Democratic regimes to consolidate themselves. The formal independence of these states was recognised; the communists within their governments saw their political structure as fundamentally different from that of the USSR; a considerable diversity of institutions and political programmes developed with little interference from the CPSU.

From 1947, the domestic tightening up in the USSR was reflected in the establishment of a rigid hierarchical control in the bloc. The Soviet model of

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rapid industrialisation, collectivisation of agriculture and the liquidation of all potential opposition (including dissidents within the Communist Parties) was rigorously applied in the People's Democracies. Both institutional and ideological conformity was enforced by Soviet state and party intervention, with the aim of strengthening the Soviet state and economy, and the recalcitrant Yugoslavia was expelled from the bloc. This phase ended only with Stalin's death in 1953.

During the Stalinist period, ideology had degenerated into a rationalisation of the necessities of Soviet power, and the enforcement of Stalin's model, together with Soviet economic exploitation of Eastern Europe, had created considerable internal tensions. The new Soviet leadership, at first internally divided, finally sought a way out of these difficulties in recognising that there were many roads to socialism (including that chosen by the heretical Yugoslavs), and that the domestic interests of the bloc members could not be arbitrarily sacrificed to Soviet interests. However, this concession to 'institutional and ideological diversity' led to sharp political conflicts within the People's Democracies, to the challenge of national communism (that is, to policies which put national interests above those of the USSR), and to the threatened disintegration of the bloc in the Polish and Hungarian events of October, 1956.

These divisive tendencies have been contained, in the final phase, by the renewed isolation of Yugoslavia, the crushing of national communism in Hungary, the acceptance by the new Polish leaders of the essentials of bloc policy, and the assertion by the Soviet leaders (powerfully supported and sometimes pushed ahead by the Chinese communists) of a common set of ideological assumptions for the whole bloc, which are underpinned by a developing economic interdependence, despite some continuing diversity of institutions.

Brzezinski concludes from this that, as the East European regimes grow more secure (and so less dependent on Soviet support), and as new, locally-trained leaders take over, the pressures for diversified solutions to domestic problems will grow, and will increasingly conflict with Soviet interests. He suggests that a bloc linked not only by immediately parallel interests but by common ideological objectives must have one authoritative centre for the interpretation of the ideology, since any political decision in any part of the bloc is directly relevant to policies in all parts; but this position, he thinks, cannot be maintained — the existence of another great power (China) within the bloc already creates a rival centre of authority; and, even without China, the authoritative interpretations of immediate policies will only be accepted so long as external tension and rapid internal social and economic change make this acceptance seem necessary. Lacking such stimuli for uniformity, a process of 'ideological erosion' can be expected to set in. 'For this to take place, however,' he concludes, 'the ideology must be denied both victories and enemies' — which, as he confesses, is 'a difficult and paradoxical task since denial of one can be construed as the manifestation of the other'.

A multitude of evidence is supplied to support this thesis, and it is this detail which is the book's most useful quality. When Brzezinski is discussing the fine points of shifts in Soviet policy and the varying reactions of East European communists to these shifts, he is interesting and acute — and above all he is bringing together a mass of data not previously so conveniently assembled. But the further he gets away from the particular, the less valuable are his generalisations. There are, I think, three reasons for this.

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First, the abominable American habit of dressing up trite and even meaningless propositions in pretentious jargon. Thus (p. 103), discussing East European economic policy: 'In this manner policy reflected the impact of a peculiar normative perspective on reality as well as the assumed existential imperatives of that reality for those in policy-making positions.' Translated from the academese, all this means is that the ruling groups, in determining their policy, were influenced both by the objectives set by their social theory and by their estimate of the existing political situation — which is, one feels, a truism.

Secondly, there are some indications that Brzezinski is straining his evidence to fit pre-determined patterns. It is not only that on one page (383) he describes his final chapter as attempting 'some tentative generalisations [on the basis of the foregoing analysis]' and as '[helping] to bring out the underlying assumptions of what has preceded'. More importantly, this point is made by some rather extensive lapses of judgment, such as his comment (pp. 179-80) on Khrushchev's report to the 20th Congress of the CPSU: '... with the exception of the admission that under certain favorable circumstances socialism may be established by nonviolent parliamentary devices and the assertion that war was no longer inevitable due to the power of the Communist bloc, no startling changes in the existing trends were foreseen.' Exceptions of this order might seem themselves to have become the rule, rather than serving as proofs of a contrary proposition.

This is one evidence of what seems to me to be the central weakness of Brzezinski's position: the attempt to discuss ideology and power in their own terms and isolated from the reality of existing conditions, both internal and external.

Thus, reference is made from time to time to external tension as one factor influencing the ideology and power structure of the Soviet bloc. But this is generally presented (perhaps because Brzezinski is unwilling to concede any Western responsibility for international tension?) as the creation — either real or fictional — of the Soviet leaders, in order to strengthen bloc solidarity. This is a rather crude application of the over-simplified theory that foreign policy is always an extension of domestic policy; it leads directly into Brzezinski's conclusion (p. 408): 'If an ideological erosion does take place, it will probably begin with doubts about the general desirability of a cohesive bloc and of similarity of action, both of which would lose their urgency once the enemy ceased to be a threat.' This proposition can only be true if the bloc and uniform domestic policies and institutions are a necessary part of the ideology, which, on Brzezinski's own distinction between the 'doctrinal' (i.e., ends) and 'action programme' (i.e., means) aspects of ideology, they are not. The bloc is, on the contrary and on the evidence (the Soviet Union's primary concern with membership of the Warsaw Pact in its dealing with Yugoslavia, Poland and Hungary in 1956-57), an immediate measure dictated by the communist view of the international situation. Consequently, in a changed situation, the bloc could be dispensed with in its present form, with no loss to communist social objectives.

Similarly with the uniformity of domestic policies: this was dictated by the belief that the possibility of war between the two camps demanded forced industrialisation and the elimination of potential internal enemies. Given a changed estimate of the international situation (which Khrushchev has been developing since the 20th Congress speech) the need for this uniformity, which has caused so many of the bloc's internal difficulties, disappears. Again, there

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is no reason, other than an *a priori* assumption, to suppose that these elements are any more than a temporary tactic dictated by the immediate estimates made by Soviet ideology.

By seeking an explanation of the ideology and power structure of the Soviet bloc in terms of themselves — power serves ideology, ideology rationalises power — Brzezinski ends with a tautology. If international tension diminishes, and the need for cohesion in external and domestic policies therefore seems less urgent or even unnecessary, then the bloc — which was created to meet this tension — will fall apart. The bloc would go, but is there any reason to assume that communism, as an ideology with established social objectives but revised means of seeking them, would not remain?

Ian Turner

THE SOVIET DICTATORSHIP. Herbert McClosky and John E. Turner. N.Y., McGraw Hill Book Company Inc., 1960. Pp. xiv + 657. \$7.95.

This conscientious and voluminous work (it has 597 pages, not counting appendices and index) will probably be widely used as a textbook for undergraduate courses on the Soviet political system, particularly in the United States. Its comprehensive structure is well adapted to this purpose. Three 'background' chapters on Marxism, Tsarist Russia and the Bolsheviks as part of the pre-1917 revolutionary movement, and a 120-page sketch of the political history of the Soviet Union up to 1958 are followed by successive chapters on the role, structure and membership of the Party, the formal constitutional structure and the role of the soviets in practice, public administration, the legal system, the political police ('Control by Terror'), administration of the economy, and party controls over intellectual and cultural life. In a final section, on 'The Future of the Dictatorship', the authors suggest that the 'forces for stability' are, for the foreseeable future, likely to keep in check the 'conflicts and tensions' and 'forces for change' in the Soviet socio-political system. Translations of the Soviet Constitution and the rules of the CPSU are appended. There is no bibliography.

New attempts at overall description and analysis of the political systems of the major world powers are always welcome. The publication of Fainsod's *How Russia is Ruled* in 1953 offered for the first time a plausible account of Soviet institutions as a functioning system, uncluttered by the usual elaborate exposition and analysis of the official doctrinal rationalizations. Subsequently, Scott's *Russian Political Institutions*, although somewhat formalistic in approach and revealing a less profound acquaintance with the realities of Soviet political life than Professor Fainsod has attained, gave us an excellent brief description of Soviet political structure. With these two books on our shelves, one or other of the following contributions is most to be hoped for from any subsequent textbook: (1) a fuller and more convincing account of the way Party and Government bodies function together as a unified decision-making and administrative apparatus; (2) a picture of the changes which have taken place in the structure, role and tone of various institutions since the death of Stalin and possibly in the system as a whole; (3) a fresh overall appraisal of the nature of the Soviet political system.

The book under review does not appear to contribute much in any of these directions. Party-state relations are touched on only *en passant* in what is essentially an institution by institution account, and nothing worthwhile is added to existing analyses.

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Despite a 25 page account of political developments since 1953, and references to recent changes at many points in the text, the features of various arms of the regime are frequently described as if they were cast in an immutable mould, once and for all, by the late dictator. For example, the abolition of the MVD Tribunal is mentioned on page 460, and the authors are evidently familiar with the 1958 legal reforms, which lay down, among other things, that 'no other organs or institutions whatsoever apart from a court selected in the manner prescribed by law, has the right to hear criminal cases, to establish the guilt of a person who has committed a crime, or to sentence him to criminal punishment'. Nevertheless, they treat the role of 'police terror' on page 444 as if State Security officials still possessed the power to arrest and sentence political offenders without reference to the normal courts. The impression is consequently built up, probably unintentionally, that the system is not only stable, but static. I have no doubt that this is a false impression, and that many interesting and important changes have occurred in Soviet political life since 1953, some of which, incidentally, cast significant light on the fundamental character of the system. The failure of McClosky and Turner to bring these out is perhaps due to the common fallacy of estimating significant change in communist states solely in terms of the dictatorship-democracy dichotomy, which in many instances is quite irrelevant.

Nor is the authors' account lit up by any original interpretative framework. It is true that a somewhat new note is struck by the use of the concept of oligarchy, but the note seems to be a false one. The attempt to apply Michels' theories on oligarchy to the Soviet Union (p. 235 ff.) is quite inappropriate, since the Soviet system is not one which was designed to function democratically and spontaneously developed non-democratic features, but one which was authoritarian from its inception and was subsequently given a spurious democratic cover. The 'iron law of oligarchy' keeps on cropping up, albeit unlabelled, to bedevil the presentation of many aspects of the system. Take the following passage:

There are several reasons why the Supreme Soviet relinquishes its power to a smaller body like the Presidium. While the Supreme Soviet, like the Party Congress, is a large body meeting briefly and infrequently, the Presidium is a small, working agency that can be called into session quickly. Engaged in considering state policy from day-to-day, it can act when necessary with speed and directness. Moreover, its members are usually full-time political leaders who are close to the Party centre, while the membership of the Supreme Soviet is broad and varied, reaching far down in the hierarchy of power (page 351).

No such elaborate explanation is required to explain why the Supreme Soviet does not in fact deploy the powers vested in it by the 1936 Constitution: it never has, and was never intended to. Apart from this, it seems incongruous to employ the concept of oligarchy to explain features of a system which for most of its history has been run not as an *olig-archy* at all, but as a *mon-archy*.

If *The Soviet Dictatorship* fails to break new ground in any of these directions, our assessment of it must rest on how effectively it covers the field previously traversed by other authors. Considered on this level, the book seems to me to have three main defects.

First of all, there are errors of fact, mostly on points of detail which do not invalidate the authors' arguments, but nonetheless irritating to the serious student. A couple of examples: The police system was not divided into two

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ministries in 1954, with the MGB being reorganised into the Committee of State Security (KGB) in August of that year (p. 461). There has never been an MGB since March 1953. The KGB was set up in March 1954. On pp. 166-167 Khrushchev is represented as having been removed from the Central Committee Secretariat on March 6, 1953, and reinstated on March 14. In fact he was in the Secretariat right through, and it was the First Secretaryship of the Moscow Regional Committee that he relinquished on March 6. At no time has the structure of the Central Committee Secretariat corresponded with the diagram on p. 205. For example, the Cadres Section and Party, Trade Union and Komsomol Organs Section have never existed simultaneously. The table of Party and Government Posts held by Presidium Members in December 1957 (p. 215), contains three errors. This table, moreover, in an attempt to indicate 'the interlocking directorate between the Presidium and the government's highest offices' lists under 'government posts' membership of the Supreme Soviet and lower level soviets — purely honorific positions. In reality only three of the fifteen full members of the Presidium held Government Posts in December 1957.

The other two defects, though more serious, I shall mention only briefly. Many formulations and descriptions seem to indicate lack of a close acquaintance with important practical details of the system. To mention just one example, the discussion of party elections on pp. 232-233 gives a completely misleading impression of how these are manipulated, although information on this is available from Soviet sources.

Finally, the authors are so concerned to prove the undemocratic nature of the regime at every step, that the writing often acquires a polemical edge, which many students, at least in England and Australia, may find uncongenial.

If the tone of this review has been rather critical, I do not want to give the impression that *The Soviet Dictatorship* as a whole is a badly written or seriously misleading book. It is just that students of Soviet politics are now in the happy position of being able to apply fairly exacting standards in assessing new textbooks in this field.

T. H. Rigby

FRANCE, TROUBLED ALLY: DE GAULLE'S HERITAGE AND PROSPECTS. *Edgar S. Furniss*. For the Council on Foreign Relations. N.Y., Harper and Brothers, 1960. Pp. xiii + 512. \$5.75.

It is tempting fate to pass judgment on a French political regime within the first year of its life. In his book *France, Troubled Ally*, Edgar Furniss wisely refrains from doing any such thing. He restricts his study of the Fifth Republic to a historical and analytical survey of its origins and early trends. His interest in France is primarily in her role as an ally for America. But as her international policies are so intimately linked to her domestic conditions, he delves quite deeply into the French home scene from 1945 to 1958. He passes judgment on the Fourth Republic, and propounds a very definite thesis from which it is possible to draw conclusions highly relevant to the Fifth Republic.

The theme of this detailed and well documented study is that the great weakness of post-war France was her unshakable determination to claim the status of a great international power, despite her incapacity to sustain any such role. Furniss is even inclined to detect an inverse ratio between her capacity and her demands. He attributes her downhill run during the Fourth Republic to the fact that her leaders, while failing to find the requisite strength, resolutely refused to reduce their commitments and aspirations.

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He shows France consistently stale-mated—first, in her early desire to act as mediator between East and West; next, in her ambition to be accepted as the unchallenged leader of Europe; thirdly, in her anachronistic determination to remain a great colonial power; and lastly, in her demand to join Britain and America in a strategic triumvirate. In no case did she have real power to enforce her will on her allies. Fourth Republic governments, reduced to immobility by their chaotic domestic politics, resorted to intense diplomatic manipulation as a substitute for real bargaining power. Her allies were less willing to confuse the smoke with the fire.

In a very interesting section on the vampire Fourth Republic, Furniss points out that a political system designed to avoid alienating any of its domestic components was tragically slow to absorb and act on the lessons of these set-backs. There did come a time, at last, when improvement was possible. Mendes-France, in a plea for reappraisal, showed France how to cut her losses; the long delayed economic prosperity augured solid progress on a domestic level; at last, a government decided to take liberal and realistic action in Algeria. But the impetus came too late to enlist public support. The national imagination was too conditioned to regard limited national power, however realistic, as anything but disastrous. The Fourth Republic, debilitated by its own policies and system, was unable to initiate a break with its past. And, rather than accept change, a small, conservative group was able to overthrow the Republic.

In his analysis of the Fifth Republic's heritage, Furniss underlines certain facts which often tend to be overlooked about the real and important progress achieved in the last years of the Fourth Republic—the solid economic and industrial development, the moves towards Euratom and the Common Market, the *loi-cadre* for the French-African community. Describing the sound bases for domestic consolidation, he suggests that France is no longer a world power, but a Continental power. The survival of the Fifth Republic will depend on how far it is prepared to reconcile power and responsibility. If de Gaulle can guide France from her position as an unreliable world power to a strong and prosperous situation within Europe, Furniss believes he will achieve something eminently worth while.

But he seems to have considerable doubts about the matter, doubts which he bases on de Gaulle's ambitious foreign policy in the early days of the regime. A different point of view might interpret these attitudes, at least in part, as the necessary bait for widespread public support, and a diversion from less popular domestic policies. Perhaps, too, Furniss underestimates the amazing capacity for compromise and manoeuvring which tempers de Gaulle's unswerving nationalist mystique—a capacity which has enabled him to handle the precipitous nationalism of the African community. And in doubting whether de Gaulle can do much better than Mendes-France in 1954, he possibly overlooks the essential fact that de Gaulle ensured for himself a constitutional mandate to enforce his will before he attempted to impose it on the nation.

Jean Battersby

THE NEXT FIFTEEN YEARS. *Pierre Mendes-France*. Cambridge University Press, 1960. 3/6.

In this brief article Pierre Mendes-France, the radical French politician, defines the next fifteen years as a period which will determine the pattern of human destiny in a new era of history. He points to the grave human problems created by the scientific and technological advances of our age, and

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shows their special urgency in a world divided by two opposing ideologies. Man's capacity to handle the social and political implications of these vast developments always lags far behind, a fact which Mendes-France finds very worrying. For the implications of human judgment have never been more serious, or the consequences of error more catastrophic.

Starting from the assumption that both America and Russia have come to regard nuclear war as unthinkable, he goes on to outline a new struggle for world domination, in which the battlefield is the uncommitted and underdeveloped nations of the world. The winning side will be the superior in industrial and economic development, and the quickest to the draw with offers of practical, liberal and specific aid.

In such a war, according to Mendes-France, it is not sufficient for the West to defend its faith against aggression. It has an urgent and imperative duty to proclaim its faith, to be the aggressor, and to get in some well aimed shots as soon as possible. Within fifteen years these nations will be committed, either to democracy or to totalitarianism. They will be influenced by what gets them started rather than the ultimate price they may have to pay. Time is the important factor.

Mendes-France's argument is in many ways limited—for instance in its assumption that the balance of power will remain between America and Russia. And even within its limits, it says nothing new. Its interest and importance lies in its clear and concise proposal of an optimistic solution to the world struggle, and in its urgent warning. It is a plea for alertness, moral responsibility and action, by one of the most dynamic of Western politicians, and as such should not be ignored.

Jean Battersby

NATIONALISM AND THE RIGHT WING IN JAPAN. *Ivan Morris.* Under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. London, Oxford University Press, 1960. Pp. xxviii + 476. Australian price 81/3.

For many years Japan has been the subject of numerous books in the fields of history, travel and current affairs, but the great majority of these, particularly those of the pre-war days, were written by people whose observations were necessarily limited by the fact that the writers, for the most part, had little more than an elementary knowledge (if any) of the Japanese language, and were forced to rely on secondary material in English, or material supplied by Japanese researchers. Dr Morris belongs to the steadily increasing number of Western writers of the post-war period who do not suffer from this handicap. His use of primary sources has clearly been extensive and this makes his exhaustive study essential reading for anyone who wants to share his undoubted insight into the development of right-wing societies in Japan. The book contains, too, a preface which is a valuable summary of Japanese right-wing politics of the pre-war period by Professor Maruyama Masao of Tokyo University, who is among the most knowledgeable of his countrymen on this subject.

Dr Morris begins his study with an account of the sweeping measures which the Occupying Powers took to ban right-wing elements from occupying positions of influence in the immediate post-war years. His conclusion is that 'while most of the ultra-nationalist groups succumbed in the early post-war period to the inclement conditions caused by defeat and to the blasts of the Occupation typhoon, a surprising number managed to weather the storm by adapting themselves to the new environment' (p. 57). Their ability to survive he at-

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tributes to their capacity to adapt themselves to the circumstances by adopting democratic slogans. This resilience, Dr Morris holds, was partly due to their own inherent weaknesses, namely a lack of ideological and organizational unity and the fact that they were always an auxiliary rather than a leading force in the direction of the nation's policies. Perhaps this point could be disputed. Despite the fact that the right-wing elements were often disclaimed by Japanese government authorities as a thorn in the side of the government, the fact that this thorn was not plucked out but left there to goad the government into accepting extremist policies seems hard to refute.

The book then goes on to examine the causes of the revival of right-wing groups quite early in the Occupation period. At the commencement of Chapter III Dr Morris states 'it is impossible to understand the movement of the extreme right except in terms of the extreme left, and any account of the rise of the new ultra-nationalist groups in the post-war period would be incomplete without at least a brief statement on the general course of Communism' (p. 59). He then traces the increase in the influence of the left in the early days of the Occupation, the Socialists' sudden accretion of power with a rise in the number of Diet seats held from 15 to 143 in the 1947 elections, and the Communists' increase in strength under the policy of building a 'lovable Communist Party'. When the short-lived harmony between the United States and the Soviet Union made way for the development of the cold war, and the emphasis in American policy in Japan turned from reform to stabilization, the left lost favour with the Occupation authorities and vice versa. At the same time the right-wing societies began to be more active, from time to time coming into violent conflict with the left. Having outlined the events leading up to the right-wing revival, Dr Morris deals in some detail with some of the more important and influential right-wing societies and their leaders.

He draws attention in particular to the peculiar amalgam of left and right-wing concept, in some of them, but regrettably does not carry his conclusions from this far enough. There can arise from this tendency a set of circumstances which governments, no matter how democratic they may be, need to weigh most carefully in determining the measures which they take to combat Communism. The natural corollary of the existence of a confusion of right and left-wing concepts in rightist societies is that left-wing elements can be attracted into these societies. Dr Morris points this out. He gives instances of cases of former leftists being recruited by the right. What he does not point out is that this is a result which can be expected in a political climate in which the right is condoned and the left discouraged. Right-wing groups acting as non-official adjuncts of government bring pressure to bear on members of the left-wing movement. In Japan this is a comparatively easy process, where all except the most rigid followers of left-wing dogma can be persuaded by appeals to Japanese tradition to turn away from 'un-Japanese activities'. Even if they cannot be easily turned, there are other inducements and other methods of persuasion. This occurred frequently in the thirties, when people of former left-wing sympathies turned rightist, and acted against their former associates, or alternatively became leaders of right-wing thought. What those who offered the inducements to conversion did not know, and what they probably don't know today, is the complete motivation of those they convert. What should be recognized is that opportunists, often converts, whether they are genuine or not, will do anything to prove themselves loyal either to their new sponsors, or their former mentors.

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It is a truism that democracy as we know it is founded on the idea of an opposition. This is the contribution of the parliamentary system to orderly progress. It created and fostered the concept of 'the Honourable the Leader of the Opposition', when authoritarian regimes in Europe were putting political opponents into asylums as insane (European psychologists found that opposition, or negativism, was one of the indications of an unsound mind). As soon as this idea is accepted, democracy is on the way out. There are some people in Japan who understand this but perhaps the number is not great enough, because they must considerably outnumber the tough-minded of right or left if they are to make democracy work in Japan—or anywhere else, for that matter. Reliance upon pressure and counter-pressure will lead to chaos as it did in the thirties. Measures to check illegal actions by any political group should not be countered by gangsterism by another political group. That is the road to disaster. Dr Morris hints at this, but he does not say it positively enough. For all that, the alternative conclusions he poses seem to emerge from the facts he has revealed.

Among his more important conclusions Dr Morris finds that 'despite its comparative weakness, nationalism remains the most important emotional force in the country, and there are many signs that it will become more pronounced during the coming years' (p. 395), and 'from the standpoint of the main form of post-war nationalist feeling, democracy and its concomitants have a "foreign" aspect that renders them irrelevant to Japan's real needs and, under certain circumstances, positively harmful' (p. 396). On the other hand, 'it would appear that so long as the country succeeds in preserving its present system of democratic politics based on parliamentary supremacy, freedom of opposition, and respect for civil rights, the extreme right wing has little chance of increasing its influence' (p. 406). Or, 'furthermore, it is probable that under the existing system conservative leaders will for some time be able to carry out their essential aims, including a steady pursuit of present "reverse course" policies without reverting to authoritarian extremes and without any help from ultra-rightist elements' (p. 407). Or, 'numerous factors combine to make it likely that, barring severe international or economic crises, the present system will be preserved in its essentials for the foreseeable future' (p. 407).

'This rather sanguine picture of the future', says Dr Morris, 'is based on two main premises. The first is that Japan will not be confronted with a threat from the outside which seems seriously to threaten her national security and which the Government appears incapable of meeting under the existing system of free parliamentary politics.

The second premise is, unfortunately, far less secure. The preservation of the present democratic structure depends to an important extent on the success of the economy. In case of severe and prolonged economic crisis, there is a considerable chance that Japan will swing to one non-democratic extreme or the other' (p. 409). He tends to the view that, though damaging to the influence of the West on Japan, a swing to the extreme Right would be less damaging than one to the extreme Left (p. 422). What would happen in the event of a world war he wisely does not attempt to foresee.

Having weighed the probabilities, Dr Morris concludes that in the event of a breakdown of the existing democratic regime, Japan is more likely to swing to some form of extreme rightist politics than to Communism. This view is 'based on pre-war and post-war factors but is not advanced with 'any dogmatic assurance'. He, nevertheless, gives this type of prognostication the last word

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when he says, 'Democracy in Japan is no hardy perennial, but a very fragile growth indeed. It would be most unwise both for the Japanese themselves and for us in the West to assume that it has already reached the point where it can withstand the challenge of real crisis' (p. 426). All of this may seem a little perplexing to the uninitiated, but the problem is a complex one and various courses could be open to Japan. Dr Morris has weighed the facts and his own observations, and come to conclusions which are not very different from those of a considerable number of other observers of the Japanese scene. In view of his comparatively long association with Japan, his work with the Foreign Office, and his encouragement and assistance from the Royal Institute of International Affairs, his views cannot be lightly tossed aside.

T. W. Eckersley

ELECTIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. *T. E. Smith.* With an introduction by B. Keith-Lucas. London, Macmillan, 1960. Pp. xvii + 272.

THE BELGIAN CONGO. *Some Recent Changes. Ruth Slade.* For Institute of Race Relations. London, Oxford University Press, 1960. Pp. viii + 55. 3 maps. Australian price 8/6.

RACIAL PROBLEMS IN SOVIET MUSLIM ASIA. *Geoffrey Wheeler.* For Institute of Race Relations. London, Oxford University Press, 1960. Pp. xii + 66. 2 maps. Australian price 10/-.

In 1954 at very short notice Mr T. E. Smith, then an officer in the Malayan Civil Service, was ordered to organize the first General Election in the Federation of Malaya due to be held in the following year. The 'older hands', he recalls, promptly prophesied chaos and disaster. As it chanced there was some confirmation for their prognosis shortly afterwards (but before the Federal Election) when one of the States of the Federation decided to hold elections to its own State Council without taking the necessary precaution of drawing up an electoral register. 'The results', as Mr Smith wryly recalls, 'were unfortunate'. But when the subsequent Federal Elections took place the Jere-miahs were confounded. 'Luckily for the author's reputation', Mr Smith observes, 'the Federal elections in 1955 took place in a calm and peaceful atmosphere'.

From this he proceeds to affirm with ample justice that

this first general election in Malaya and similar first elections in other parts of Asia and Africa during the past few years must have dispelled any lingering doubts on the suitability of the ballot box for use by semi-literate societies. It is now quite clear that, given proper backing and competent staff, an administrator can with careful preparation go through all the motions of organising a large-scale election when the electorate is drawn from the ranks of such societies and it is equally evident that most of the voters in these elections have realised that they are in fact making a choice of some kind when they take part in polling.

There may still be all kinds of doubt about the transfer of western political and constitutional institutions to non-western environments; but, as Mr Smith demonstrates, there can no longer be any doubt that even in societies with a high percentage of illiterates, a genuinely free democratic election is now entirely feasible. Political freedom in these countries may sometimes be at a premium. We may see more and more of them switch over to a dictatorial brand of Presidential rule. Parties and parliaments, cabinets and coalitions, may crumble and even collapse; but it will not be, as was once feared, because

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nobody knows how to run a free election successfully. One of the striking aspects of Mr Smith's account is the absence of any discussion of the role of the police; yet in practice they have never had to play anything like the important role that was popularly assigned to them when the spread of free elections into new environments was still only in prospect. The obstacles to holding such elections were clearly overestimated. It was the Indian Government and people in 1952 who first broke the barriers of scepticism. They had, of course, some experience to fall back upon. It is, indeed, one of the occasional weaknesses of Mr Smith's book that he has not looked at the elections to Indian legislatures in the inter-war period. Nevertheless the successful accomplishment of free elections in developing territories is in the main an achievement of the past decade. It constitutes a major political and constitutional advancement.

How has it been achieved? As Mr Smith confirms there is little in the end that is talismanic about the holding of such elections. They merely require a great deal of meticulous and unremitting labour, spiced by a perceptive imagination. Since the second world war quite a number of different administrators, besides Mr Smith himself, have suddenly been detailed, without having any previous experience to draw upon, to organize an elaborate election in wholly novel surroundings, and have fulfilled their brief with admirable success and without apparently encountering any insuperable difficulties. Very occasionally a man with election experience in one territory served as elections supervisor in another. Mr J. C. Penney served in this capacity in the Sudan and then in Zanzibar. But most election supervisors, as Mr Smith recalls of his own experience, were given little to guide them and had to feel their own way forward. Even the British Colonial Office which had ultimate responsibility for elections in a dozen or more colonial territories scattered across the world, never gave any systematic assistance to those of its colonial governments who were holding them for the first time. (It is most remarkable, for instance, how promiscuously the details of their Elections Ordinances varied.) It might well be thought that this was to let pragmatism run wild, but there was never a disaster. Even so it was high time that a corpus of relevant information was extracted from the considerable number of reports on elections in developing territories which have now been compiled. Mr Smith has fulfilled an important assignment most assiduously. He has compiled a detailed and clearly compounded survey of election practices in these countries from the initial establishment of an electoral administration, through the processes of registration, nomination of candidates and polling, to the counting of votes and the declaration of the poll.

He has, however, not quite made up his mind whether he is simply writing a survey of election experiences or a handbook for election supervisors. In so far as he has sought to provide the former he has not always taken sufficiently into account the particular background to each election whose analysis he considers. Kenya's special provision in 1957 for absentee voting, for instance, was not, as he suggests, due to an excess of administrative generosity, but to the Kenya Government's interest in getting to the polls as full a turnout as it could of the small electorate it had chosen to enfranchise. A larger electorate in Kenya will next time make such a provision quite superfluous. At the same time Mr Smith is often chary of compiling (as he well might, and occasionally does) a list of 'do's' and 'don't's'. He does allow himself to state, however, his belief that as soon as possible registration should become the responsibility of registration officers and should cease to be voluntary. This relates to the very significant point which he makes that the compilation of the register is of far

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greater importance from the election administrators' point of view than anything which happens on polling day. But in like manner he has some useful things to say about polling. In the course of a most valuable discussion he lists the pro's and con's of the system, which has been so widely employed in India and Africa, of providing separate ballot boxes for each candidate. Wherever this has been adopted the illiterate voter merely has to drop his unmarked ballot paper into the box labelled with the symbol of his chosen candidate. Mr Smith allows that this system has proved of great value. He suggests, however, that the problems of operating the alternative system of marking ballot papers for insertion in a single ballot box have been overestimated. He cites important evidence from Malaya and the West Indies to show that in practice this system even with a substantially illiterate population does not involve the rejection of more than about 2½ per cent of the votes cast. In view of the far greater control which it allows over abuses — voters are not left on their own with the ballot boxes behind a screen — this does not seem to be a seriously high figure. Mr Smith says nothing, unfortunately, about election publicity. Yet if a substantially illiterate population is to understand the voting procedure the explanation of its inevitable intricacies is as important a consideration for electoral administrators as the details of those intricacies themselves. It is very often, indeed, the key to popular support for the whole system of free and secret balloting, whose vindication in novel circumstances Mr Smith has otherwise so meticulously surveyed.

For the background to the Congo crisis Dr Slade's pamphlet *The Belgian Congo. Some Recent Changes* has no equal. It suffers from having been written at least a year before the Congo was granted self-government so precipitously on 30th June, 1960, and Dr Slade's crystal gazing led her occasionally to be much more optimistic about the future than events have subsequently justified. But she remained quite unmesmerized by Belgian talk of their mission in the Congo and gives a convincing account of the elements which went to brew the cauldron, upon which the Belgians so suddenly realised they were sitting. She observes, for example, that by the 1950s

African *assistants médicaux* with years of training behind them and entrusted with considerable responsibilities began to compare their salaries (about 37,500 francs annually) with the much higher amounts (about 137,000 francs) received by the white *agents sanitaires* who had done a mere six months of preparatory training at Antwerp.

Colonel Wheeler's companion volume on *Racial Problems in Soviet Muslim Asia* is an equally valuable short account of a situation on which there is all too little information in English available elsewhere.

D. A. Low

THE DIPLOMACY OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA, 1945-1958. *Russell H. Fifield*. N.Y., Harper and Brothers, 1958. Pp. xiii + 584. \$7.50.

This massive work has the virtue of painstaking industry. Collectors of exotica will appreciate also two full pages on the Spratly and Paracel islands. There are other morsels of little-known and not easily obtainable information which relieve one's heavy plodding through a mass of somewhat unrewarding detail. Professor Fifield takes us on a systematic survey of every country in the area, topic by topic, rarely obtruding his own opinions and quoting voluminously from official statements.

A textbook on this subject had to be written sooner or later. Whether Professor Fifield has really filled the need that was emerging is another matter.

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It will be duly added to the lists of required reading on Far Eastern international relations because there is nothing else quite like it. It is indeed a useful reference work, with good index, huge bibliography, succinct summaries of most of the issues likely to be considered and with sufficient range to be useful for the reader who knows nothing about the subject as well as for the advanced student. The international politics of Southeast Asia over the past decade have become increasingly tortuous, so that the author deserves gratitude merely for compiling a survey of who talks to whom and in what tones. But several basic shortcomings in the book's conception seriously weaken its value.

In the first place, it is impossible to see the wood for the trees. The introductory and concluding chapters are monumentally platitudinous, but the intermediate chapters on particular countries do not even take up and put life into their stale generalisations by attempting to evaluate them. The style alone precludes this. Topics are laid out one by one as if straight from the card-index. The subject of each paragraph is indicated—conveniently for underlining!—early in the first line; sub-headings would have been easier but they would have revealed the structure damningly. There is no explicit argument, although both the selection of facts presented and the frequent use of evaluative adjectives constantly provoke the reader into wondering where the author stands on an issue or why he makes the judgment he does. Possibly he felt obliged to prune the text down to the barest skeleton by letting the 'facts' speak for themselves—and one must admit that his array of facts is in many respects comprehensive and illuminating. But many of them are ludicrously trivial. ('Ho Chi Minh in the summer of 1955 included Moscow on his visit abroad. Leaving Peking, Ho stopped briefly at Ulan Bator, the capital of the Mongolian People's Republic, and arrived in Moscow on July 12. He was enthusiastically received. . . .') Academicians of Asian diplomacy love documenting tedious tours and fatuous public utterances by ministries of information.) Neither in general nor in detail is any framework given for assessing trends or the strength of forces which are confusingly contradictory.

Old style diplomacy was an intellectual exercise (for those who had a taste for it) and the subject of weighty tomes. The urge to produce weighty tomes on recent Asian international relations arises largely from an ambition to make the subject academically respectable. Universities study Asia because it is important in the modern world, but they are not sure if international relations of this kind is suitable fare for undergraduates. It is becoming so: the big problems are there and the corpus of published data is growing. On the other hand, the intellectual weight of the subject will have to be a good deal greater than it is in this discursive survey, which flits from topic to topic without pausing to probe too deeply into any of them. Precisely because the geographical area under study embraces a wide variety of separate diplomatic problems, many of them of slight intrinsic importance, it is so much the more necessary for an author to impose some intellectual coherence upon the mass of material presented.

The problems of Southeast Asian international relations which need to be investigated are the nature of the Communist and 'Imperialist' threats (as seen by the countries concerned and as the objective evidence reveals them), the practicability of the 'neutralist' and SEATO attitude to security and the relationship between domestic and foreign policies. Fifield says almost nothing on the latter: perhaps he considers that 'diplomacy' is a narrower field, but this book certainly goes beyond diplomacy in a strict sense. The first two problems he inevitably brushes against from time to time, but always *en passant*, never

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subjecting either to the sustained scrutiny which is necessary if this subject is to be worth writing textbooks about. The objections raised against SEATO are briefly mentioned in the chapter on the Philippines and then passed aside with the observation that 'nevertheless, the Philippines was glad to have served as host to the Conference'!

China looms constantly over the politics of Southeast Asia, both as a threat and an example. The subject can hardly be discussed without some indication of the scope and limitations of her influence. Early in the book, the author speaks of China exerting pressure through her large minorities in Southeast Asia. Indonesia has the second largest of these minorities, yet in the three pages devoted to Indonesian-Chinese relations (in a 60 page chapter on Indonesia), no indication is given of the nature of or the scope for such pressure. 'Apart from the question of dual citizenship, relations between Djakarta and Peking have been somewhat nominal', he concludes, after giving most of his attention to the former. Granted that this was written before the recent Indonesian-Chinese rift and granted also that, by confining himself to descriptions of fact and avoiding speculation on aspects of this problem which cannot be documented, Professor Fifield has avoided writing nonsense about it. Yet there is no indication of the smouldering resentment against the Indonesian Chinese that was never very far from the surface and has recently become a matter of continuing friction between the two governments. There is no hint of the ambivalent compound of admiration and disdain with which so many Indonesian politicians regard the Chinese. Excessive reliance on the written word, on 'diplomacy' in the strict sense, has caused the author to overlook an important dimension of foreign relations here and to give a strangely incomplete impression. Yet Indonesian attitudes to the Chinese are surely of crucial importance in any evaluation of her 'neutralist' policy.

J. A. C. Mackie

POLITICAL FORCES IN PAKISTAN, 1947-1959. Keith B. Callard. N.Y., Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959. Pp. 48. \$2.00.

In Asia in the period immediately following the Second World War demands for political independence were closely allied with the democratic idea. The removal of colonial rule was justified on the grounds that self-government was not only desirable in itself but was also a practical proposition. The granting of independence resulted in the establishment of political institutions based largely upon British practice. Since that time success in the working of democracy has not been a marked feature of Asian political life. Recently a widespread reaction appears to have set in and in Pakistan, in particular, a military paternalism has replaced the transplanted form of government.

Professor Callard in this excellent little monograph examines most ably the turbulent era of Pakistani politics from partition in 1947 to the military assumption of power in October 1958 — a period that marks the failure of the democratic experiment. *Political Forces in Pakistan, 1947-1959* gives us a brief but valuable record of the background to that period when in actual fact democracy only existed on paper and in the minds of lawyers nurtured in the British tradition. Replacing the authority of the British raj came a system of government which had no real foundation other than its familiarity to a political elite who knew no alternative. However, the struggle for independence had already sown the seeds for the destruction of democracy, because the demand for a separate Islamic state not only involved agitation against British authority but also against the idea that the majority had a claim to power.

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As Professor Callard points out 'The national solidarity of Muslims had to be placed ahead of the equal voting rights of the inhabitants of undivided India'. When partition came and an independent state of Pakistan was realised aimlessness came to replace a previous sense of purpose. Kashmir, refugees and the constant likelihood of war with India inserted a state of tension into the country which it was found difficult to reconcile with democratic government. To the task of demonstrating democracy at the 'breadline' was the additional problem of establishing a sense of political community in a divided land one of whose two sections contained a very significant proportion of Hindus. Professor Callard in a well-written yet concise account effectively portrays the circumstances in which politics became more than ever a road for the self-seeking and the civil service an avenue where standards of propriety were not those of Whitehall. As a result the military have stepped in and are ruling not in the traditions of Westminster but in those of Sandhurst.

M. Leifer

The Australian Journal of **POLITICS AND HISTORY**

Editor: Gordon Greenwood
Issued twice yearly in May and November

Vol. VI, No. 2

November 1960

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January-June 1960

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Subscription: (including postage) Australia £1/1/- per year or 12/6 per copy; United Kingdom £1 stg.; U.S.A. and Canada \$2.75.

UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND PRESS,
St. Lucia, Queensland, Australia.

